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Evolutionary Social Psychology, Natural History & the History ofldeas 
Simon Jonathan Hampton 
Abstract 
The aim of this dissertation is to analyse two notions which inform contemporary evolutionary 
psychology. In Part I Tooby and Cosmides' (1992) Standard Model thesis ofthe history of twentieth 
century social science is examined with regard to social psychology. In Part II the practical and 
theoretical fecundity of the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness is examined, again with 
regard to social psychology. 
The analysis of the Standard Model thesis yields the result that it is not reliable as an intellectual 
history of social psychology. A principal reason for this is the failure of the thesis to acknowledge 
the instinct debate ofthe late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Further consideration of the 
instinct debate leads to the conclusion that evolutionary psychology may be in the process of 
repeating the history of social psychology rather than making substantive advances. 
The analysis of the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness concept yields two results. Firstly, 
in use it fails to accommodate the findings of palaeontology. Secondly, it promotes a view of mental 
capacity and functioning that is at odds with that of modern humans. Further consideration of the 
natural history of the human lineage leads to the conclusion that the past was not, in some sense, 
ontogenetically prior to the present and that it will not furnish social psychology with an adaptation 
that functions in a predictable manner. 
In Part III it is recommended that an evolutionary approach to social psychology should dispense 
with the concept of adaptation as proposed by evolutionary psychology. 
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General Introduction 
Evolutionary psychology has been advertised as a new approach to those concerns that are 
encompassed by the rubric "social sciences". In the last ten years volumes of popular science (both 
theoretical and empirical), the content of numerous journal articles, the re-branding of an established 
journal as well as new publications, new under- and postgraduate courses and university departments 
testify to this (Rose & Rose, 2000; Cartwright, 2000). 
The idea upon which the edifice of evolutionary science is built is this: the replication of embodied 
entities in conditions wherein resources are finite is curtailed by the finiteness of resources. It is an 
idea that has been labelled "universal acid" (Dennett, 1995). In addition to this idea, evolutionary 
psychology rests on three main propositions. The first is that psychology needs a paradigm if it is to 
progress just as do other sciences. The second is that mind, behaviour and social interaction are 
products of evolution and are to be understood within the confines of contemporary evolutionary 
theory. And the third proposition, in light of the second, is that psychology should enjoy and be 
bound by conceptual integration with other levels of analysis as are the natural sciences. 
The expression of evolutionary psychology that I focus upon is John Tooby and Leda Cosmides' 
The Psychological Foundations of Culture (1992) and, to a lesser extent, the papers that presaged 
and preceded it, Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture, Part I: Theoretical 
Considerations (1989), and The Past Explains the Present: Emotional Adaptations and the Structure 
of Ancestral Environments (1990b). Specifically, I examine two of the principal features of 
evolutionary psychology as Tooby and Cosmides present it, the "Standard Social Science Model" 
and the "Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness". Before I go on to outline this dissertation I 
would first like to say something about how and why it came to be written. 
I first began to digest Darwin, Darwinism, neo-Darwinism, evolutionary theory, sexual selection 
and kin altruism through the resources most available and accessible to me as a second year 
undergraduate. At that time these happened to be Richard Dawkins' The Selfish Gene, David Buss' 
The Evolution of Desire, and Matt Ridley's The Red Queen. Jaded by the apparent squabble that 
seemed to me to pass for social psychology, I was deeply impressed by the prospect of a coherent 
and respectable theory of sex, violence and cooperation. 
Wishing for something more technical on the one hand and psychological on the other, I was led to 
Karl Sigmund's Games of Life and Christopher Badcock's Evolution and Individual Behaviour. Still 
with precision and psychology in mind, alongside the issues Sigmund and Badcock raised, I read 
again and with sharper appreciation Leda Cosmides' 1989 paper The logic of social exchange: Has 
natural selection shaped how humans reason? Studies with the Wason Selection Task. 
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The logic of social exchange is a fine paper and justly famous. It cuts through twenty years of work 
with Peter Wason's Selection Task by offering evidence toward the proposal that elusive problems in 
psychology may be solved via an appeal to Darwin's notion of an adaptation. As a student of social 
psychology I was strongly attracted to the finding that the "solution" to the Selection Task was not 
rational in Wason's original sense but socially rational. 
It soon became apparent that the best, and must buy, in the field to which Cosmides' approach 
claimed allegiance was The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture 
edited by John Tooby, Jerome Barkow and Leda Cosmides. From that point it was a short step to 
learning that Tooby and Cosmides' The Psychological Foundations of Culture was the set text of 
evolutionary psychology. 
Having read those volumes I have mentioned, some modularity literature and some philosophy of 
science, much of The Psychological Foundations of Culture was not particularly new to me- Tooby 
and Cosmides accept that "the ideas underlying the Integrated Causal Model [the program detailed in 
the essay] are not original with us" (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992: 114). Even its stridency seemed of a 
piece with the wider field. However, I did encounter in the essay what appeared to be terms of art, 
denotations seemingly unique to evolutionary psychology. The terms in question are the Standard 
Social Science Model and the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness. They bothered me. It did 
not seem obvious why Tooby and Cosmides needed these concepts given they proclaimed 
evolutionary psychology to be a straightforward application of neo-Darwinism to human 
psychology. I was not sure what the two concepts added to their enterprise. Still, keen to get on with 
some evolutionary psychology I did not let these new terms bother me too much and I planned to 
start a PhD focussing on female aggression. 
My planning included a few months of "grazing" - a general read around wider material on 
evolution and related topics. This reading came to include Robert Richards' Darwin and the 
Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind (1987) and Robert Foley's Another Unique Species: 
Patterns in Human Evolutionary Ecology ( 1987a). The former forced me to think again about the 
Standard Social Science Model and the latter about the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness. 
Put simply, Richards and Foley made me think that two of the most common terms of the approach 
to social psychology to which I was most drawn were spurious. The possibility that the Standard 
Model thesis was inaccurate and that the natural history of man was not amenable to being treated as 
a relatively simple primal state raised again and refreshed the question as to what these concepts 
added to evolutionary psychology. If spurious, I wondered if these concepts actually detracted from 
the chances of an evolutionary informed social psychology. 
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What follows is the result of my inquiry. It breaks down into three main parts. In chapter 1, 'The 
Adapted Mind', I outline the thesis and detail the components of evolutionary psychology as 
expressed in The Psychological Foundations of Culture. These components are conceptual 
integration, mind as a suite of adaptations, the Standard Social Science Model and the Environment 
of Evolutionary Adaptedness. 
The paradigm that Tooby and Cosmides ask the social sciences to adopt is called The Integrated 
Causal Model (ICM). The integration flows from subscription to two views. The first of these is the 
need for sciences to enjoy conceptual integration. The second is evolutionary theory. The paradigm 
the ICM is designed to replace is what Tooby & Cosmides call The Standard Social Science Model 
(SSSM). In the chapters that comprise Part I of this dissertation I detail and distil the SSSM so as to 
permit an examination of its historical validity. Using the fruits of that labour I then show how, 
contrary to the claims ofTooby, Cosmides and other evolutionary psychologists, Darwin has been 
influential in the psychological sciences and social psychology. In showing that the historical 
account and, subsequently, the attitude toward the past of the discipline is mistaken, I hope to 
achie've two things. One is to avoid the possibility that an evolutionary approach is built on a myth of 
revolutionary origins. The other is to show what is different about evolutionary psychology in 
comparison to the first and most concerted effort to construct an evolutionary approach to mind and 
behaviour. 
In comparison to other approaches to psychology and social behaviour inspired by Darwin, what is 
most salient about evolutionary psychology is the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA). 
Resting on an account of the human past, the EEA serves as an adaptation generator. In the chapters 
that comprise Part II the EEA is scrutinised. I show what role it plays in the general enterprise of 
evolutionary psychology and criticise its supposed power. I argue that it is questionable on 
theoretical grounds and show that, in use, it makes assumptions about natural history that are not 
supported by the evidence. Invocations of the EEA violate the call for disciplines in the social 
sciences to make themselves conceptually consistent and prominent evolutionary psychologists fail 
to adhere to the very evidence that is used to show that modem humans have evolved. 
In Part III I show how the theory of evolution may be profitably used by social psychologists. In 
accord with Robin Dunbar's claim that "The significance of Darwinian theory lies not so much in 
whether it is right or wrong as in its power" (Dunbar, i 988: 161 ), I try to show what its power is. I 
take seriously the fact that modem humans are a unique and distinct species and argue that 
evolutionary theory can provide us with nothing more than a set of broad and flexible constraints on 
what sort of things may be said of them. Most important, perhaps, I argue that the concept of 
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adaptation as presented by Tooby and Cosmides should be abandoned by evolutionary social 
psychology. But let us first look more closely at Tooby and Cosmides work and outline their thesis 
of the Adapted Mind. 
9 
Chapter 1 The Adapted Mind 
Summary of chapter 1 
John Tooby and Leda Cosmides' adapted mind thesis is introduced and its influence acknowledged. The four 
central components that comprises evolutionary psychology and Tooby and Cosmides' "integrated causal 
model" are conceptual integration, the standard social science model, the environment of evolutionary 
adaptation and psychological adaptations. Each is outlined. The standard social science model and the 
environment of evolutionary adaptation are isolated for further analysis in later chapters. 
1.1 Introduction 
The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of culture (Barkow, Cosmides & 
Too by, 1992) may be regarded as "one of the first and most important collections of essays on 
modern evolutionary psychology" (Badcock, 2000: 17). It is regarded as "first" because it claims to 
introduce a novel approach. Its importance flows from its ascription as "the seminal publication in 
th[e] field" (Corballis & Lea, 1999: v). 
As a whole The Adapted Mind is centred on the supposition that evolved psychological 
mechanisms generate human behaviour and culture, 
... It unites modem evolutionary biology with the cognitive revolution in a way that has the 
potential to draw together all of the disparate branches of psychology into a single organised system 
of knowledge ... [Another goal of the volume] is to clarify how this new field, by focusing on the 
evolved information-processing mechanisms that comprise the human mind, supplies the necessary 
connection between evolutionary biology and the complex, irreducible social and cultural 
phenomena studied by anthropologists, sociologists, economists, and historians (Barkow, Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1992: 3). 
Of the nineteen papers that comprise The Adapted Mind, four are wholly theoretical. Of the 
theoretical papers, Tooby & Cosmides' The Psychological Foundations of Culture is the cornerstone 
and it has been the most influential and frequently cited (see Appendix 1). For example, in Pinker's 
view" ... John Tooby and Leda Cosmides ... forged the synthesis between evolution and 
psychology" (Pinker, 1997: x). There are four main claims made in this paper. Together they 
constitute the argument for an evolutionary approach to psychology and they provide the conditions 
and rationale for the experimental studies in the volume. 
In order of presentation, the claims can be summarised as; 
• conceptual integration 
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• the standard social science model 
• the environment of evolutionary adaptedness 
• minds are adaptations 
Conceptual integration as a claim belongs to the philosophy of science. The standard social science 
model is a thesis in the history of idea. The environment of evolutionary adaptedness is a 
methodological tool based on a depiction of natural history. And the assertion that minds are 
adaptations is a particular philosophy of mind derived from evolutionary theory. In pulling these 
strands together, The Psychological Foundations of Culture presents a paradigm. This paradigm 
aims to subsume social psychology. 
As indicated, Standard Model is the concern of Part I of this essay, and the EEA is the concern of 
Part II. In the reminder of this chapter I will outline the other principles, curtailing the exposition to 
points that have a direct relationship to the SSSM, the EEA and arguments in Part III. 
1.2 Conceptual integration 
Conceptual integration, 
... refers to the principle that the various disciplines within the behavioural and social sciences 
should make themselves mutually consistent, and consistent with what is known in the natural 
sciences as well ... A conceptually integrated theory is one framed so that it is compatible with data 
and theory from other relevant fields (Cosmides, Tooby & Barkow, 1992: 4). 
According to Cosmides, Too by & Barkow, "As a result" of the failure of social scientists to adhere 
to the principal of conceptual integration, 
... one fmds evolutionary biologists positing cognitive processes that could not possibly solve the 
adaptive problem under consideration, psychologists proposing psychological mechanisms that 
could never have evolved, and anthropologists making implicit assumptions about the human mind 
that are known to be false (ibid: 4). 
Barkow, Cosmides & Tooby liken conceptual integration to "vertical integration". Vertical 
integration amounts to a philosophy of science that is reductionist in the classic sense. Integration is 
necessitated by causation, and causes flow vertically upwards from lower levels of analysis. Every 
scientific claim is explicable and consistent with what is known in the science immediately below it 
in a hierarchy. The hierarchy is determined by the precision of physical detail and prediction. Thus 
"the laws of physics apply to chemical phenomena, and the principles of physics and chemistry 
apply to biological phenomena, but not the reverse." (ibid: 13) 
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Conceptual integration would appear to amount to a slight softening of this position. Sciences as a 
whole are a family of bodies of knowledge that form a cluster rather than a "epistemological or status 
hierarchy" (ibid: fn; 13). The criterion of mutual consistency remains but the difference between the 
hierarchy of vertical integration and the "heterarchical relationships" (ibid: fn; 14) encouraged by 
conceptual integration comes with the reciprocal influence between sciences that the latter permits. 
The shift between vertical and conceptual integration is essentially methodological. So, whilst there 
is no suggestion that culture is responsible for psychological mechanisms in the manner that 
psychological mechanisms are responsible for culture - the causal chain that The Adapted Mind 
proposes is; natural selection> evolution> adaptations > psychological mechanisms> culture. The 
demand that culture be consistent with psychological mechanisms is matched by the demand that 
psychological mechanisms must be consistent with culture. In principle, a cultural "fact" can cast 
doubt on a psychological theory. 
If we are to take it as seriously held, there is an important implication ofthis view. Evidence 
produced by one discipline (or "level" in the terminology of vertical integration) enjoys no privileges 
over evidence produced by another adjacent discipline (or level). Accordingly, then, theories in 
psychology, which ought to be consistent in their own terms, may be verified by evidence from 
social psychology, and so on. The importance of this will become clearer when we come to discuss 
the role of the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness in evolutionary psychology. Our 
understanding of those aspects of the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness that were social 
relies entirely on adjacent disciplines. What those adjacent disciplines have to say about the pre-
human past suggests that typical construals of the EEA far exceed the palaeoanthropological and 
archaeological evidence. 
1.3 Minds are adaptations 
The term "adapted mind" might imply that the mind is whole, a unitary thing, but this is not what 
Tooby and Cosmides mean. To grasp what it is Tooby and Cosmides mean by the term "adapted 
mind" we need first to review the argument that the mind is modular. 
In the most general terms, for a system to be modular it must consist of functionally and/or 
physically separable units. These units/modules are (more or less) specialised. On the one hand, the 
system- the whole- is nothing more than the sum of its parts (nothing more than its modules). On 
the other hand, the system achieves a concert beyond that which isolated modules might suggest. 
There are a number of ideas in psychology that converge toward the modularity view. Let us look as 
some of them (keeping in mind their vintage which will be of use later on). 
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From the view point of physiology, the human brain, quite literally, looks modular. Anatomy 
presents it as a conjunction of cortices, lobes and hemispheres (MacLean, 1990). For example, the 
role of the ventromedial nucleus may be specified in female-typical sexual behaviour (Le Yay, 
1995). Parts of the brain are posited as critical for certain processes and these parts are (more or less) 
unique in their exhibition. The neurophysiological literature consists of such examples from Broca to 
Crick. It is a literature of anatomical modularity. 
However, Tooby and Cosmides are not physiologists. They stress that evolutionary psychology is 
concerned with cognitive processes rather than physiology (the demand for mutual compatibility 
withstanding). It is concerned with what we may call mental modularity as opposed to what we 
might call brain modularity. Perhaps most forcefully and influentially expressed by Fodor (1983), 
mental modularity rests on distinctions between types of process. Types of process are not 
necessarily types of function (although types do have a function) but of instantiation. The argument 
for computational modularity runs like this. Perception systems are "smart". That they are smart is 
demonstrated by their discriminations and augmentations, i.e. their ability to sort and enrich 
information. Discrimination and augmentation are demonstrated by the poverty of stimulus argument 
which shows that there is more to output than just input, more in a response than there was in the 
stimulus (Chomsky, 1986). However, in terms of processing and computation, perceptual systems 
also need to be "dumb" if they are to be fast, automatic, functionally robust, and content and/or 
domain specific processes - the key benefits of modularity. They need to be "encapsulated" from 
general cognition (or thinking) if this is to be achieved. Encapsulation divorces processes from one 
another. 
In a modular mind, perception is brought about by a range of domain-specific encapsulated 
modules (e.g. seeing, hearing) that are inferential in a very limited sense. Raw sensory data is 
enriched via limited processing and the influence of small domain-specific "proprietary data bases" 
(Fodor, 1989). Thus, sensory processes are modular because encapsulated, semi-smart because 
inferential, yet essentially "dumb" in that they cannot be informed by higher order cognition and are 
relatively inflexible. Modules generate information for the non-modular thinking process. And, 
importantly, general cognition - a combinatorial belief for example - does not interfere with 
perceptual modules 1• 
Modularity ends where thinking and problem solving begin. Modular "dumb" cognition and 
general "smart" cognition meet over an unspecified code understood by both types of cognition. 
Whereas modular cognition is characterised as being fast, automatic and encapsulated, general 
cognition is characterised as slow, global, flexible and contingent. 
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Evolutionary psychology embraces cognitive modularity. Advocates of cognitive modularity stress 
its ecological plausibility and its consistency with evidence from studies of patients with brain 
damage. These studies also suggest that modular systems can suffer local failures without a 
subsequent global failure. This point is one of the reasons why modularity suits evolutionary 
psychology- it amounts to good engineering (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992; Pinker, 1997). 
There are other ways in which modularity meshes with evolutionary psychology. The most 
important of these is with the claim that mind is a suite of adaptations. In principal, modular 
processes should dovetail with solutions to adaptive problems. If mind was other than modular-
were it to be domain general - it would be too clumsy to be effective in natural environments. 
Modules deliver to generalised thought a relevant and relatively "clean" synopsis of the distal 
environment -just the sort of speedy, acute, discriminative perception that evolution has demanded. 
Aside its philosophical and technical difficulties (e.g. "It is easier to think of examples of a domain 
[of thought] than to give a definition of one", Hirschfeld and Gelman, 1995), in adopting the modular 
view of mind, evolutionary psychology imports other problems. The most significant ofthese for an 
evolutionary social psychology based on the framework of The Adapted Mind is the relative 
importance of the modular and the general with regard to social perceptions and discriminations. Just 
as the adaptive value of modular cognition is in its "dumb" speed, the adaptive value of general 
cognition would appear to be its ponderous intelligence, in its "adaptability". We will return to his 
issue in Part III. 
The radical move that Tooby and Cosmides claim to make is that the suite of module-like systems 
that comprise the mind are adaptations: that it is a complex system of computational mechanisms. 
These mechanisms may be readily compared to anatomical features or organs in that they are 
products of natural selection designed to perform specific functions. We can flush out this position 
by recourse to an alternative: to hold that mind is an adaptation is to be distinguished from the 
position which holds that the mind is adaptive. 
According to Tooby and Cosmides, to say that minds are adaptations is to say that they have a 
functional specification in light of certain species-specific problems posed by species-specific 
environments in the past. Thus, "The human mind consists of a set of evolved information-
processing mechanisms ... these mechanisms ... are adaptations, produced by natural selection over 
evolutionary time in ancestral environments" (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992: 24). In principle, mind 
taken to be an adaptation is no different from, in the widest sense, say, gills, and in the narrower 
sense, say, opposable thumbs. However, to say that minds are adaptive is to say that they can or 
might function adequately in light of novel problems posed by novel environments. They can be seen 
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to be adaptive by virtue of their ability to negotiate novel problems and environments against some 
criterion of reproductive success (replacement would be a minimum). Evolutionary psychology rests 
of the first of these characterisations. 
The distinction between the adapted mind and the adaptive mind is important. In positing the mind 
as adapted, Tooby and Cosmides create for evolutionary psychology an obligation: it needs to 
explain why the adaptation that is mind can generate the adaptive prowess it exhibits. We will be 
addressing this issue in chapter 7, section 3, 'Adaptations, exaptations, spandrels and by-products'. 
The hub of my argument there is that, by virtue of the disjunction between pre-history and human 
history (i.e. the last 10 000 years) at the narrowest, or ancestral and modern environments more 
generally, much of what we see in contemporary human behaviour is exapted behaviour generated 
by adapted mechanisms. The difficulty for those who hold to the adapted mind view is that humans 
are so good at many behaviours to which they cannot possibly be adapted to perform - are such 
competent exaptors- it is difficult to tell what is an adapted function and what is an exapted function. 
The more insistent we are on specifYing adaptations generated by a dead ancestor, the more 
exaptations appear. 
What unites conceptual integration and modularity of mind are the information processing 
adaptations that Too by and Cosmides place at the centre of an evolutionary stance towards 
psychological, behavioural and social sciences. Psychological mechanisms are the flying buttresses 
that keep evolution and culture apart whilst knitting them into the same edifice. Conceptual 
integration and modularity are not new approaches2• It would, then, appear to follow that these two 
proposals are not, in and of themselves, responsible for the influence ofTooby and Cosmides' The 
Psychological Foundations of Culture. Accordingly, we need to look at those elements ofTooby and 
Cosmides thesis that are novel to explain its impact: the Standard Social Science Model and the 
Environment of Evolutionary Adaptiveness. 
1 Fodor offers the Mueller-Lyer illusion as an illustration of the relationship between the modular and non-
modular: Although we may know that the two main lines in the diagram are of equal length we are consistently 
deceived by the information generated by 'dumb' modular processes. Not being able to not be deceived shows 
that general processing cannot override modular processing in the first instance. 
2 This is readily seen in the work of David Marr. Marr has been an influential advocate of the information 
processing/cognitive approach. Marr's most telling theoretical contribution to modem cognitive practise is 
what he called "levels of processing" (1982)- also known as "the classical cascade" (Dennet, 1991). The 
classical cascade divides the study of cognition into three parts. First there is the actual problem to be solved 
by the system (for example, edge detection in vision- a direct concern ofMarr's). Then there is the algorithm 
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that will reliably solve the problem. Lastly there is the physical specification of the matter that instatiates the 
algorithm. Marr argued that cognitive science need only concern itself with the first two levels. Physical 
instantiation was the preserve of neurology. In order to constrain what "problems" at the top of the cascade 
might be he suggested that a proposed problem ought to make sense in evolutionary terms. The utility and 
veracity of algorithms, put simply, are that they work - they either do or do not solve the proposed problem. 
However, their psychological status depends upon their ability to be instantiated in the nervous system. In 
Marr's scheme, the cascade equates to conceptual integration, the primacy of the problem to be solved equates 
to an adaptionist approach, and single purpose algorithms equate to modularity. 
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Part 1: The Standard Social Science Model 
Chapter 2 The Standard Social Science Model 
Summary of chapter 2 
This chapter is an exposition ofTooby and Cosmides' thesis of the Standard Model paradigm. First I show 
how Tooby and Cosmides set it out as a movement. Then the reasoning that is said to hold it together as a 
movement and the reasoning that is said to hold it apart from the natural sciences is elucidated. For purposes of 
analysis in later chapters I show how the thesis can be presented as two complimentary propositions. I call 
these propositions the 'culture as cause commitment' and the 'tabula rasa commitment'. 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 provided an outline of two aspects of John Tooby and Leda Cosmides' adapted mind 
program. An additional element of The Psychological Foundations of Culture is an intellectual 
history of social science in the twentieth century. Tooby and Cosmides argue that the social sciences 
have been dominated by a paradigm-like set of principles and they call this paradigm the "Standard 
Social Science Model". As Rose and Rose (2000) have indicated, as a component of evolutionary 
psychology, The Standard Social Science Model is one of the elements that marks it out from 
sociobiology and human behavioural ecology. Whilst the role of the Standard Social Science Model 
in the overall scheme of evolutionary psychology is not necessary it does, nonetheless, play an 
important part. The contrast between the Standard Model and the evolutionary model which Tooby 
and Cosmides propose legitimises the claim that, as a whole, evolutionary psychology is a new 
approach. 
To show what Tooby and Cosmides mean by the term "The Standard Social Science Model" 
(hereafter the "SSSM" or "Standard Model") I follow their order of presentation. Beginning with a 
section titled 'The epoch of the SSSM' I offer quotations from the relevant passage of The 
Psychological Foundations of Culture. These quotations reveal the SSSM in broad form. Following 
that I present a summary of what they call the "The central logic of the SSSM". Next, in a section 
titled 'The SSSM and culture' the implications of this logic are explicated. Finally I present a set of 
criteria that may be derived from their arguments regarding the history of social science. These 
criteria are presented as a set of commitments in the final section of the chapter. Presented as 
commitments, the two core elements of the SSSM will be examined in chapter 3, 'General remarks 
on the validity of the SSSM with regard to Social Psychology'. In chapter 4, 'Instincts', I review and 
discuss the instinct debate of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century with a view to showing 
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that many academics and researches of the period interested in psychology and social behaviour 
could not possibly be regarded as advocates of the SSSM. I argue that, in fact, the debate over 
instincts refutes Tooby and Cosmides thesis of the Standard Social Science Model. 
It should be noted that this chapter is purely expository. No attempt is made to assess the SSSM. 
2.2 The epoch of the SSSM 
.. The intellectual worlds we built and grew used to over the past 3,000 years were laid out before 
much was known about the nature of the living, the mental, and the human. As a result, these 
intellectual worlds are, in many important respects, inconsistent with [the] new unified scientific 
view and, hence, in need of fundamental reformulation ... To many scholarly communities, 
conceptual unification became an enemy, and the relevance of other fields a menace to their 
_freedom to interpret human reality in any way they choose (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992: 21). 
After more than a century, the social sciences are still adrift, [amounting to] a contradictory stew of 
ungrounded, middle level theories expressed in Babel of incommensurate technical lexicons. This is 
accompanied by a growing malaise, so that the largest single trend is toward rejecting the scientific 
enterprise as it applies to humans ... Instead of the scientific enterprise, what should be jettisoned is 
what we will call the Standard Social Science Model (SSSM): The consensus view of the nature of 
social and cultural phenomena that has served for a century as the intellectual frame work for the 
organisation of psychology and the social sciences and the intellectual justification for their claims 
of autonomy from the rest of science (ibid: 23) . 
. . . Because, it is reasoned, a "constant" (the human biological endowment observable in infants) 
cannot explain a "variable" (inter-group differences in complex adult mental or social organisation) 
the SSSM concludes that "human nature" (the evolved structure of the human mind) cannot be the 
cause of the mental organisation of adult humans, their social systems, their culture, historical 
change, and so on .... Whatever "innate" equipment infants are born with has traditionally been 
interpreted as being highly rudimentary ... Because adult mental organisation (patterned behaviour, 
knowledge, socially constructed realities, and so on) is clearly absent from the infant, infants must 
"acquire" it from some source outside themselves in the course of development. That source is 
obvious: This mental organisation is manifestly present in the social world ... the social (or cultural 
or learned or acquired or environmental) ... contains everything complexly organised ... Humans 
raised without a social or cultural environment would be "mental basket cases" with "few useful 
instincts, fewer recognisable sentiments, and no intellect" (Geertz, 1973, p45) ... The cultural and 
social elements that mould the individual precede the individual and are external to the individual. 
The mind did not create them, they created the mind ... [the] action of the social world on the 
individual is compulsory and automatic- "coercive" to use Durkheim's phrase ... The individual is 
- 18 -
acted upon (the effect or the outcome) and the socio-cultural world is the actor (the cause or prior 
state that determines the subsequent state) (ibid: 26) . 
. . . the question is not so much, What are the forces that act on and influence human culture and 
human affairs? but rather, What is the generator of complex and significant organisation in human 
affairs? ... the advocates of the SSSM are united on what the artificer is not: It is not in "the 
individual" (ibid: 27) ... 
. . . the SSSM denies that "human nature"- the evolved architecture of the human mind- can play 
any notable role as a generator of significant organisation in human life (although it is 
acknowledged to be a necessary condition for it). In doing so, it removes from the concept of human 
nature all substantive content, and relegates the architecture of the human mind to the delimited role 
of embodying "the capacity for culture". Human nature is "merely the indeterminate material that 
the social factor moulds and transforms. [This] contribution consists exclusively in very general 
attitudes, in vague and consequently plastic predisposition's which, by themselves, if other agents 
did not intervene, could not take on the defmite and complex forms which characterise social 
phenomena." (Durkheim, ·1895; p 1 06) (ibid: 28). 
Tooby and Cosmides argue that the "cognitive turn"- and by this we may take them to mean the 
adoption of what Farr (1996) has called "information theory" after the second world war- offered 
the SSSM a new, technical cloak and jargon: 
... the tabula rasa [has a] fully modem equivalent, a general purpose computer. Such a computer 
doesn't come pre-equipped with its own programmes, but instead, and this is the essential point, it 
obtains the programs that tell it what to do from the outside, from "culture" ... The conclusion that 
human nature is an empty vessel, waiting to be filled by social processes, removed it as a legitimate 
and worthwhile object of study .... Such efforts were (and are) viewed simply as crude attempts to 
serve ideological ends, to manufacture propaganda, or to defme one way of being as better and more 
natural than others (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992: 29). 
Though specific in their portrait of an intellectual tradition, to this point Too by and Cosmides are 
general with regard to disciplinary focus. With specific reference to psychology, they claim, 
In the SSSM, the role of psychology is clear. Psychology is the discipline that studies the process of 
socialisation ... Thus the central concept in psychology is learning. The prerequisite that a 
psychological theory must meet to participate in the SSSM is that any evolved component, process, 
or mechanism must be equipotential, content free, content independent, general purpose, domain-
general, and so on. Moreover, their structures must themselves impose no particular substantive 
content on culture. (ibid: 29) 
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; 
2.2.1 The central logic of the SSSM 
Tooby and Cosmides go on to expose what they call the "central logic" of the SSSM (ibid: 24-32). 
This logic is presented as a series often "steps". These steps flow from, 
... one salient causal and temporal sequence: how individuals change over their development from 
"unformed" infants into complexly competent adult members of their local social group, and how they 
do so in response to their local human environment (ibid: 25}. 
The ten steps that Tooby & Cosmides present as "the central logic of the SSSM" break cleanly into 
two arguments. The first ofthese makes a claim about the nature of mind, the second about the 
nature of culture. Although the two arguments are independent in the sense that their validity may be 
assessed separately, their conjunction amounts to the SSSM. The argument about mind runs thus: 
1. The psychic unity of mankind: The claim that human beings are more similar in terms of 
biological endowment than they are dissimilar. This claim forms the basis of the "moral 
authority" of the SSSM. It permits an interpretation that patterns of within-group similarity and 
between-group differences show culture to be the formative mode. 
2. Variation begins at birth. This follows from 1. "Nature" in the raw form ofthe new born is 
overridden and overwritten by culture. That nature is overridden demonstrates that human 
biological and genetic endowment is insignificant when it is not depicted as infinitely malleable. 
3. The Wild Child. This follows from 2. Individuals, undirected by patterns of organised behaviour 
and thought, would not spontaneously exhibit organised behaviour or recognisable emotions 
because they are born without form. 
4. Conclusion: Homini Tabula Rasa. Human nature is defined by its capacity to be enculturated. Its 
most universal feature is its flexibility and variability. Its essence is in the variety of its 
expression. 
The argument about culture runs thus; 
1. The causal arrow. This follows from homini tabula rasa. Given that the mind acquires 
organisation from a ready organised social world, the cause of organised behaviour and mental 
content is without and not within the individual. 
2. Omnis cultura ex cultura: The claim that cultural 'facts' as consequences, or effects, are 
invariably preceded by cultural antecedents, or causes. Given this relation, culture is (at the very 
least from a methodological point of view) independent of human nature. 
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3. Conclusion: Given that culture is the cause of behaviour and mental content, it is cultural that 
must be studied if an account is to be given of its effects. 
According to Tooby and Cosmides, these arguments constitute the logic of the SSSM. On the 
assumption that they are correct, the consequence is that psychology is necessarily the science of 
learning and social psychology is similarly best considered as the science of learning how to behave 
toward and think about others. Rendering the terms psychology and learning as synonymous 
amounts to the concession that humans are integral to the expression and perpetuation of culture. 
Culture is instantiated in minds and behaviour by some process or another of learning. The task of 
psychology is to determine how this is achieved. 
2.2.2 The SSSM and culture 
The logic of the SSSM leaves the characterisation ofculture largely unattended aside its causal role. 
The next stage ofTooby & Cosmides' depiction of the SSSM goes on to elaborate on its notion of 
culture. This is necessary because, according to Tooby & Cosmides, the general scheme of the 
SSSM at once rests on the hegemony of culture as cause and its variable forms as manifest in 
behaviour as evidence that it is the primary cause. Just as the essence of mind is its variability of 
expression, the invariant power of culture is demonstrated by the variable expression of its local and 
contingent effects. 
Tooby & Cosmides claim that the logic of the SSSM licences a highly constrained view and 
account of culture. Their account can be summarised in two parts. The first explains how culture 
replicates itself. The second explains how culture instantiates itself in minds. 
The argument about replication runs thus; 
1. Cultures are (more or less) local systems of"group universal behavioural practises, beliefs, 
ideation systems [and] systems of significant symbols". These systems are bounded but not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. 
2. Culture is maintained horizontally and transmitted vertically by the group across and through 
time. 
3. There is nothing for the child to learn other than culture. Its learning is nothing other than the 
sum of cultural effects. Individuals are (more or less) passive products of cultural prescriptions. 
4. Cultures replicate with near-fidelity by virtue of 1, 2 and 3. 
The argument about instantiation runs thus; 
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1. The absorption of culture by the individual is a prescription of culture as it is expressed at the 
group level. 
2. By virtue ofthe conclusion to the argument about minds, all identifiable organisation and 
content in human minds can be identified in the requisite culture. 
3. Cultures operate and are fully expressed at the group level. The totality of a culture equates to 
the totality of group thought and behaviour. 
4. All and any biological or genetic endowment in humans subserves culture. The sum of human 
innateness is the capacity for culture. 
2.3 The SSSM as a set of commitments 
We are now in a position to summarise the SSSM as a set of commitments. As I have unpacked 
Tooby and Cosmides' thesis, five core elements emerge. Four ofthese correspond to the conclusions 
to the four arguments Tooby and Cosmides present. From the two arguments regarding the central 
logic of the SSSM we may say that the argument regarding mind summarises as the tabula rasa 
commitment and the argument regarding culture summarises as the culture as cause of mental 
content commitment. And from the two arguments regarding the manner in which the Standard 
Model construes culture we may say that the argument regarding replication summarises as the 
independence of culture from mind commitment, and the argument regarding instantiation 
summarises as the central place of learning commitment. 
Here then is the set of commitments that constitute the SSSM. 
a. That mind, aside its capacity to learn, is a tabula rasa. 
b. That culture is the cause of mental content. 
c. That culture is independent of mind. 
d. That psychology should be concerned with the study of enculturation. 
The term "commitment" is used to represent four of the elements of the SSSM because they are 
said by Tooby and Cosmides to be just that. They are the fundamental propositions- be they 
explicitly stated or implicitly assumed - that constitute social science. They are commitments in that 
they are subscribed to by social scientists. 
It is apparent that these four commitments collapse into two. To say that the mind is a tabula rasa 
in its initial condition but exhibits content at a later stage implies that it learns. Similarly, to say that 
culture provides content implies that it is independent from any given instance of its psychological 
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manifestation. This is reflected in Tooby and Cosmides account of how the SSSM exhibits itself in 
the social sciences as practised. 
Having presented the thinking that comprises the SSSM, Tooby and Cosmides explain how this 
thinking has coalesced into the disciples that constitute the social sciences. The tabula rasa 
commitment finds its expression in what we know as psychology and the independence of culture as 
cause commitment finds its expression in what we know as anthropology. Here is Tooby and 
Cosmides' account of how this "division of labour" came about in the social sciences. 
One major consequence of the adoption of the Standard Social Science Model has been the 
assignment of a division of labour among the social sciences. It gave each field its particular 
mission, stamped each of them with its distinctive character, and thereby prevented them from 
making much progress beyond the accumulation of particularistic knowledge. Anthropology, as well 
as sociology and history, study both the important and variable content of human life (the signal) 
and the more vaguely defined processes and contingent events that generated it (the artificer or 
author of the signal). Psychology studies the medium on which this socially generated content is 
inscribed, the process of inscription, and the mechanisms that enable the inscription to take place 
(ibid: 40-41 ). 
That is how Too by and Cosmides show how the sub-disciplines of social science have been derived 
from "central logic" of the SSSM. The two that are to them most salient and important are "Content-
Independent Psychology" and "Particularistic, Content Specific Anthropology". They are logically 
complimentary exercises that follow from "the world built by the Standard Social Science Model". 
Accordingly, 
In advance of any data, the Standard Model defmed for psychology the general character of the 
mechanisms that it was supposed to find (general-purpose, content-independent ones), its most 
important focus (learning), and how it would interpret the data it found (no matter what the 
outcome, the origin of content was to be located externally ... ) ... A content-independent (or 
content-free) psychology symbiotically requires a content-supplying anthropology to provide the 
agent- culture -that transforms a malleable generalized potential into specifically realized human 
beings. So anthropology's mission was to study the particular. Consequently, anthropology became 
the custodian of the key explanatory concept in the paradigm, "culture" (ibid: 41 ). 
The binding element in the thesis of the SSSM is Tooby and Cosmides' claim that the primary 
commitments are ubiquitous in terms of temporal scope and influence: the whole of the twentieth 
century and the social scientists that constitute it. Our next task is to see if this depiction is valid for 
social psychology. In the next chapter we will consider some facts that suggest that it is not. 
Following that, in Chapter 4, we will look closely at a debate that dominated the period between 
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1890 and c.1930 and see that Tooby and Cosmides thesis is seriously inadequate and even 
misleading. 
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Chapter 3 General remarks on the validity of the SSSM with regard to Social Psychology 
Summary of chapter 3 
Tooby and Cosmides' Standard Model thesis argues that the social sciences are governed by the conviction 
that culture is an independent force which writes scripts that humans minds absorb. This chapter examines this 
claim with regard to social psychology in two main parts. First the possibility that social psychology has been, 
in effect, a branch of sociology is examined. Second the possibility that social psychology has been, in effect, a 
branch of behaviourism is examined. A preliminary conclusion is that, by virtue of the dominance of a 
psychological as opposed to a sociological emphasis in social psychology, the discipline cannot reasonably be 
said to have committed itself to the culture as cause commitment. However, although not dominated by 
behaviourism, the branch of psychological social psychology that has gone by the name of social cognition 
would appear to have imported the general-purpose machine view along with the computational metaphor. The 
general conclusion is that a heavily qualified version of the Standard Model thesis holds for social psychology. 
3.1 Introduction 
Tooby and Cosmides offer the SSSM as an account of the fundamental philosophical stance of the 
social sciences over a given period. The propositions that constitute the SSSM are said to have been 
universally held in an implicit paradigm. As a thesis in the history of ideas, the Standard Social 
Science Model, since being introduced by Tooby and Cosmides, has been adopted by a number of 
authors (e.g. Badcock, 1994, 1998, 2000; Corballis & Lea, 2000; Dennett, 1995; Ellis, 1996; Foley, 
1995; Gaulin & McBurney, 2001; Holcomb, 1998; Pinker, 1997; Rose, 2000; Wilson, 1997; Wright, 
1994) and discussed by evolutionary psychologists "as though it were a technical abbreviation rather 
than a rhetorical device" (Kohn, 1999: 19). However, Tooby and Cosmides do temper their claim. 
They add a brief addendum, pointing out that their characterisation of social science is just that, 
Of course, readers should recognise that by so briefly sketching large expanses of intellectual history . 
. . we are doing serious violence to the specific reality of, and genuine differences among hundreds of 
carefully developed intellectual systems. We have had to leave out the qualifications and complexities 
by which positions are softened, pluralism's espoused, critical distinctions lost ... It is the larger 
intellectual system we are criticising ... (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992: 31). 
They point to research in physiological psychology, perception, psychophysics, physiological 
motivation, psycho linguistics, and "much of comparative psychology" and credit it with being 
"strongly connected to the rest of science" (ibid: 30), and to "many important subcommunities in 
sociology, anthropology, economics, and other disciplines, which have sloughed off or never 
adopted the Standard Social Science Model" (ibid: 31). Also Tooby and Cosmides oscillate between 
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two time spans. They suggest that the SSSM has been dominant for the century prior to the time of 
their writing in 1992 (ibid: 23, 122), and that its hegemony persisted for the sixty years prior to their 
time of writing. Further, their final endnote offers a list of references to works that inculcate and 
develop the ideas underlying the ICM (ibid: 114). The oldest ofthese works is Tinbergen, 1951, and 
of the 117 cited 32 are from the nineteen-sixties and seventies (ibid: 124). It must also be noted that 
Tooby and Cosmides discuss what they call "the reasonableness of the Standard Social Science 
Model". They point out what is right about it in their view (e.g. the assumption of a universal human 
nature), why its anti-nativism is so attractive, and how it has generated a systematic bias toward the 
spirit of the natural sciences if not their methods. Also, others who have been influential in the rise of 
evolutionary psychology have presented a softened position. Specifically, Martin Daly and Margo 
Wilson, the authors of Homicide (1988), have briefly argued that psychology "never abandoned the 
adaptionist programme" (Daly & Wilson, 1998: 510). However, they do make an exception of social 
psychology, suggesting that it has "gone in circles" (ibid). 
Nevertheless, Tooby and Cosmides' point is forcefully expressed and clear. The SSSM has been an 
"overwhelming success" (ibid: 34). It is the success of the Standard Model that legitimises its 
characterisation as a paradigm. The aim of this chapter is to examine the Standard Social Science 
Model as it pertains to social psychology. Narrowing the examination to social psychology still 
leaves us with a claim of the same temporal scope and generality. Although Tooby and Cosmides 
neither specify social psychology or specific social psychologists as an exemplar of the SSSM, we 
must take it that the SSSM encompasses social psychology. The list of exceptions listed above 
clearly excludes social psychology. For social psychology to be an exception would fatally weaken 
their general case. 
Our examination of the veracity of the Standard Model as a history of social psychology rests upon 
an informative and widely addressed distinction within the discipline. It is widely accepted within 
social psychology that the discipline has been and is made up of a number of schools and traditions 
(Augoustinos & Walker, 1995; Cartwright, 1979; Collier, Minton & Reynolds, 1991; Farr, 1978, 
1987b, 1991b, 1996; Flugel, 1964; Gilmour & Duck, 1980; Markova, 1982; McGarty & Haslam, 
1997; Parker, 1989; Strickland, 1979) and even popular introductory general texts aimed at A level 
students present social psychology as a cluster of approaches (e.g. Gross, 1995). One common way 
of framing this diversity has given rise to the terms "sociological social psychology" and 
"psychological social psychology" (Cartwright, 1979; Collier, Minton & Reynolds, 1991; Farr, 1996; 
Good, 1993; House, 1977; McGarty & Haslam, 1997; Parker, 1989; Stryker, 1977, 1997). These two 
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construals of social psychology see the discipline as being, on the one hand, a sociological enterprise 
and on the other a psychological enterprise. 
So far as Tooby and Cosmides' thesis is concerned, this division appears to map quite neatly onto 
their depiction of the division of labour in the social sciences outlined in Chapter 2, section 2.3 'The 
SSSM as a set of commitments'. Recall Too by and Cosmides' claim that the SSSM hands 
anthropology and sociology the task of studying how content is generated and psychology the task of 
studying how this content is acquired or learned. This division of the SSSM opens up the prospect 
that social psychology as a branch of psychology maps onto one main commitment of the SSSM, and 
as a branch of sociology it maps onto the other. In prospect, ifthere is a discipline that embodies the 
Standard Model in the fullest sense social psychology is it. 
To tackle this prospect, I will first look at the extent to which social psychology is a branch of or 
dominated by sociology. We will see that sociological social psychology (hereafter SSP) has played 
less of a role in the general enterprise of social psychology than has psychological social psychology 
(hereafter PSP). From this we can conclude that if social psychology fits the Standard Model it must 
do so in its psychological form. This consideration will lead us onto an examination of, first, 
behaviourism and social psychology and then cognitivism and social psychology. These discussions 
will show that social psychology has never been behaviouristic but that it is open to the charge of 
having adopted a general purpose machine view of mind. 
Before going on it needs to be made clear that no attempt is being made to assess the SSSM in 
terms of its internal validity or conceptual coherence. It also needs to be made clear that no attempt is 
made to show that the SSSM does not "exist" at all in any one or all of its senses. The object of the 
exercise is to assess its plausibility as a history of social psychology. 
3.2 Psychology, Sociology and Social Psychology 
It is common for accounts of the birth and development of social psychology to locate it somewhere 
between sociology and psychology (Allport, G. 1954/1968; Danziger, 1990; Doise, 1986; Gilmour & 
Duck, 1980; McGarty & Haslam, 1997; O'Neil, 1982). However, social psychology is not always 
located between but within one or the other (Parker, 1989; Strickland, 1979). The result is a tension 
concerning its proper place (Farr, 1996; Good, 2000). 
Some historians (e.g. Jones, 1985. Collier, Minton & Reynolds, 1991) date the birth of the 'two 
social psychologies' as coterminous with the birth of social psychology itself- 1908. In that year 
sociological social psychology appeared in the form of the sociologist E.A. Ross's Social 
Psychology: an outline and source book, and psychological social psychology appeared in the form 
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of the psychologist W.D. McDougall's Introduction to Social Psychology. As may be expected in an 
enterprise which carries the tag "psychology", the common term and point of contention between 
PSP and SSP as expressed by McDougall and Ross is the notion of mind (or of the mental). 
McDougall construed psychology and mind in terms of the mind-body relation. Broadly speaking, 
psychological forms of social psychology follow this lead. Ross, on the other hand, construed mind 
in terms of the man-society relation. Equivalently, sociological forms of social psychology follow 
this alternative lead1• 
Farr ( 1996) has argued that the distinction was not entirely apparent at the time that these volumes 
appeared but that subsequent events have crystallized it. For example, the American Psychology 
Association and the American Sociology Association established their own social psychology 
divisions some time later. In 1937 Britt reported that ofthe seven hundred and twenty nine 
academics engaged in social psychology only nineteen were members of both Associations (Parker, 
1989:35). The distinction, division and tension between PSP and SSP has given rise to a literature 
that, itself, has become part of social psychology and its history. However, there is not a substantive 
debate on which of the two potential parents or guardians has, as a matter of fact, been dominant. 
The impact of McDougall's volume compared to that of Ross's appears to have presaged later 
events. One edition of Social Psychology: an outline and source book was printed. Introduction to 
Social Psychology ran to twenty-one editions within twenty years. Parker claims that by the time 
McDougall's students were themselves academic social psychologists, "Ross had been written out of 
the discipline" (Parker, 1989: 3 5). 
This situation has not very much altered. Defending the inclusion of social psychology as a 
subdiscipline of psychology, Jones reported in third edition of The Handbook of Social Psychology 
(Lindzey & Aronson, 1985) that of the seventy three general textbooks that were produced between 
194 7 and 1980 three-quarters were authored by psychological social psychologists, less than one-
quarter by sociologically inclined authors and the remainder were attempts at an integrated approach 
(Jones, 1998: 4). In a similar vein, the editors of The Messages of Social Psychology- a volume that 
might be described as an alternative "handbook" - situate the collection of essays within the PSP 
tradition (McGarty & Haslam, 1997). In the year before The Psychological Foundation ofCulture 
was published, Collier, Minton and Reynolds showed that the number of textbooks produced by 
psychologists between 1908 and 1989 was three times greater than that produced by sociologists 
over the same period (Collier, Minton & Reynolds, 1991: 6). And in the same year Backman claimed 
that there was a ratio of approximately eight psychological social psychologists to one sociological 
social psychologists (Backman, 1991 ). More recently Good has suggested that "Whatever the ratio, 
sociological social psychologists can be seen to constitute a small minority" (Good, 2000: fn392). 
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Taken as a form of sociology, sociological social psychology would appear to be amenable for 
categorisation as an example of the SSSM2• Tooby and Cosmides quote Emile Durkheim, suggesting 
that he is germane to its elaboration and exposition3 and Durkheim is certainly a major figure is 
sociology. Similarly, Marx is implicitly invoked. The claim that culture is the cause of mental 
content was, perhaps most forcefully and influentially expressed in his phrase, "It is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being determines 
their consciousness" (1858)4 5• However, the fact that SSP has been a minority form of social 
psychology from its inception to the present day shows that social psychology cannot be 
characterised as being dominated by the conviction that culture is solely responsible for mind and 
mental content. 
Still, the predominance of psychological forms of social psychology leaves open the possibility 
that the history of social psychology may be adequately characterised by that aspect of the Standard 
Model which is more explicitly psychological. The tabula rasa commitment invites us to look at 
behaviourism and its impact on social psychology. 
3.3 Social psychology and behaviourism 
In this section we will consider Tooby and Cosmides' claim that social psychology has viewed the 
mind as a tabula rasa (recall that the tabula rasa commitment is the assertion that mind, aside its 
capacity to learn, is devoid of content and would remain so unless enculturated). The tabula rasa 
commitment appears to be the most influential element of the SSSM in the sense that it is most 
frequently taken as synonymous with it. Thus, terms such as "the neo-behaviourist tradition" 
(Nicolson, 1999: 5) and the "the tabula rasa view" (Crawford, 1998a: 4) are used to denote the 
SSSM. 
We can begin our analysis of the validity of the tabula rasa commitment by looking to what is 
most frequently taken to be its source. Once we have a clear understanding of what the term refers to 
we will be better placed to pass judgement on it supposed ubiquity in the 20th century. We will then 
move onto considerations about the motivations of behaviourism and its influence on social 
psychology. Lastly we will discuss the impact of the general purpose machine view on social 
psychology. 
The genesis ofthe tabula rasa view in the post-Renaissance western canon is John Locke's Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding (1689) (especially Book's I and II). It was Locke's contention 
that minds are void of specific and explicit beliefs, ideas and knowledge at birth. What they do 
contain are functions such as combination, induction, deduction, division, multiplication and 
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abstraction. All beliefs, ideas and knowledge that develop in a given mind are the product of 
functions operating on sensations6. 
Now, the validity or completeness of any formalised logic that seeks to capture Locke's position, 
and the validity of it as a representation of mental functions aside, the only school of psychology to 
explicitly reject this sort of view of the mind in the direction of a literal blank slate, devoid of even 
elementary functions, is that associated with John Watson. Watson's oft quoted claim that the proper 
object of psychology should be the manipulation of behaviour with a view to its control and 
prediction, together with the view that the potential manipulations are endless, is the closest 
psychology has come to a rejection of Locke's basic position (Watson, 1913). 
Aside the fact that the tabula rasa view, when considered a product of Locke, never held the mind 
to be absolutely blank, there are three important things to note about the tabula rasa view in relation 
to the claim that it has, as a principal component of the SSSM, dominated social psychology. The 
first is that the behaviourist stance is at least as much a philosophy of methodology as it is a theory 
of human nature. The second is its duration as a dominant view within general psychology. And the 
third concerns its influence on social psychology. We will address each ofthese considerations in 
turn. The general conclusion to be drawn is that the tabula rasa view has been influential but for 
nothing like the period or as widely as proposed by Tooby and Cosmides. A narrower conclusion is 
that it has not been held in any very literal sense by influential schools and thinkers in social 
psychology. 
3.3.1 Behaviourism as a method 
A common misconception of behaviourism is that it denies there are mental states. This would 
appear to flow from its explicit rejection of the positions that it dubbed introspectionism and 
structuralism7• But neither John Watson nor Frederick Skinner- two main architects and advocates 
of behaviourism - issued such a denial. What they did deny was the utility of positing mental states. 
Watson set out his position clearly in the first paragraph of what has since become commonly 
referred to as "the behaviourist manifesto" (O'Donnell, 1985; Robinson, 1981; Leahey, 1994; 
Wozniak, 1997), Psychology as the Behaviourist views it (1913). 
Psychology as the behaviourist sees it is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science .. 
. Introspection forms no essential part of its methods, nor is the scientific value of its data dependent 
upon the readiness with which they lend themselves to interpretation in terms of consciousness 
(Watson, 1913: 158). 
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; 
Watson's dispute was not with those who said that humans, or for that matter animals, have mental 
states and that such states are conscious. What he did dispute was the claim that these states are 
amenable to controlled experimental study. He suggested that introspectionists, or "content 
psychologists" as he called them, themselves tacitly admitted this; 
Psychology, as it is generally thought of, has something esoteric in its methods. If you fail to 
reproduce my findings, it is not due to some fault in your apparatus or in the control of your 
stimulus, but its is due to the fact that your introspection is untrained. The attack is made upon the 
observer and not upon the experimental setting ... Ifyou can't observe 3-9 states of clearness in 
attention, your introspection is poor. If, on the other hand, a feeling seems reasonably clear to you, 
your introspection is again faulty. You are seeing too much (ibid: 163-4). 
Watson's point was that the natural sciences take exactly the opposite stance. 
In physics and chemistry the attack is made upon the experimental conditions ... In these sciences a 
better technique will give you reproducible results (ibid: 163 ). 
It would appear to be the case that Watson, and behaviourism more widely, has been misunderstood 
for the following reason. The claim that the mind should be treated as a black box because its 
contents are not amenable to being treated as objects with (to give Watson's example) extension and 
duration, is read as a claim that the mind is a black box, devoid of content. 
An early misinterpretation of Watson's position is clearly demonstrated in his exchange with 
McDougall in 1929. McDougall pushed his objection to Watson's refusal to take self-reports of 
mental states as data to the point whereupon he strongly implied that Watson denied the existence of 
such states altogether. 
The position set out by Watson was echoed by Skinner over sixty years later. Skinner's remarks 
show that behaviourism was, essentially, a method: 
... cognitive [i.e. mentalistic] psychology is an appeal to ignorance. It is putting explanatory entities 
of one kind or another inside the organism - things associated with thinking, reasoning, intuition. I 
want to get at the environmental manifestation of the behaviour which is attributed to these inner 
thought processes. When you do that, you take a step forward because if you explain behaviour in 
terms of what a person is thinking, you then have to explain that thinking. You have a whole new 
problem (interview with Skinner, in Cohen, 1977:279). 
Again, it is quite clear that "thinking, reasoning, intuition" are not being denied. What Skinner did 
repudiate is the utility of such concepts. What is also indicated in the methodological approach he 
adopts is his interpretation of mind- body dualism. As Farr (1995) and Markova (1982) have 
intimated, behaviourism concentrated on the physical side of the dichotomy. In doing so, it made but 
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also suppressed the assumption that some casual relation held between the two. This helps us to see 
one ofthe aspects of mind- body dualism. The assumption that the mind is causally dependent on 
the body quite plausibly leads one to a certain sort of characterisation of mind- that the key 
relationship is with the body and not with culture or society. These implications are characteristic of 
the tabula rasa view of mind as it has informed psychological social psychology's methodology. It is 
not at all clear that they are consistent with Tooby and Cosmides' depiction of the SSSM. 
An unmissable irony emerges from Tooby and Cosmides' accusation that tabula rasa view and, by 
implication, Watson and behaviourism, has so badly misled psychology and social science. "The 
Integrated Causal Model" that Tooby and Cosmides propose seeks to end the state of affairs 
whereupon psychology and the study of social behaviour are "cut-off' from proper science. 
Watson's proposal sought exactly the same end. 
3.3.2 The influence of behaviourism on social psychology 
The consideration that behaviourism never fully embraced the tabula rasa view at the root of the 
SSSM is, to some extent, rendered redundant by the fact that social psychology never fully embraced 
behaviourism. One of the reasons for this is because behaviourism did not endure for nearly so long 
a period as Tooby and Cosmides imply. Let us look at this point before moving onto a consideration 
of what impact it may have had on social psychology. 
Should one concede that behaviourism did incorporate the view that there was no such thing as 
mental content, it does not follow that this view persisted throughout the twentieth century or for the 
major part thereof. In attempting to assess the temporal scope of behaviourism as the leading 
paradigm in general psychology we can be guided by Skinner. The following quotation helps us to 
mark its start date as a paradigm, 
My colleagues among graduate students at Harvard [in the mid nineteen twenties] were all interested 
in Titchenerian psychology ... They were all mentalists ofthe first order. I wouldn't say that 
behaviourism won its place at that time at all (interview, in Cohen, 1977: 275-76). 
These remarks are consistent with the account given by other historians (e.g. Samelson, 1981; 
Wozniak, 1997) who also suggest it was at least a decade after Watson's "manifesto" before 
behaviourism could be called dominant in any sense of the term. Wozniak (1997) goes further and 
suggests that it was twenty five years before it became mainstream in America. 
Allied to the delay that might be expected between the date of Watson's manifesto and its 
widespread adoption, the clear suggestion is that it would be premature to date the "winning place" 
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of behaviourism much before 1930. We may then consider this fact with the work and impact of 
Tolman. 
Tolman is frequently cited as the first influential behaviourist to break ranks and posit cognitive 
structures as key in the explanation of learning and behaviour. His approach is first evidenced in the 
1930 paper Introduction and removal of reward and maze learning in rats (produced in conjunction 
with Honzik) and received its mature expression in the 1948 paper Cognitive maps in rats and men. 
If Tolman is not accepted as representing a break with the tabula rasa view as it was espoused by 
behaviourism we may move forward to 1957 and Chomsky's celebrated attack on Skinner's Verbal 
Behaviour. This date is taken to mark the beginning of the cognitive revolution (the movement to 
which Skinner refers above). The point here is that, should we hold the classical view of the tabula 
rasa aside, and should we ignore the behaviourist utilisation of it and accept Tooby & Cosmides 
version, we are left with a span of dominance that could be as short as ten years, is probably no more 
than thirty, and may, at best, have been about fifty years in duration. Again, this is not consistent 
with the SSSM. 
With regard to the influence of behaviourism on social psychology we might assume that it had 
none on sociological forms of social psychology (see Field, 1974 for an opposing view). But we can 
also find more general statements to the same end with regard to psychological forms of social 
psychology: 
The major theoretical advances in recent years have been primarily concerned with cognitive 
processes within individuals. And although it would not be correct to say that other determinants of 
behaviour have been completely ignored ... the fact remains that the central focus of attention has 
been on cognition ... There have, of course, been radical behaviourists who reject such statements as 
utter scientific nonsense, but their protests have not significantly affected mainstream social 
psychological research and theory (Cartwright, 1979: 89-90). 
Fifteen years later Martha Augoustinos and Ian Walker make much the same claim. 
Social psychology has always prided itself on never succumbing to the behaviourist revolution which 
so debased and derailed the rest of psychology. During the hey-days of behaviourism, social 
psychologists were researching internal mental constructs such as attitudes, values and stereotypes 
(Augoustinos & Walker, 1995: 3). 
Of course, the second part of this quotation may lead us into the SSSM - the mental constructs talked 
of may be derived from culture. We can now tum to a consideration of the sort of mind that has or 
contains mental constructs and that phase of research and thinking in social psychology that comes 
under the rubric "social cognition". 
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3.4 Social Cognition 
Mainstream social psychology, especially since the second world war, but evident as early as 1924 in 
Allport's volume Social Psychology and the influence of gestalt ideas, has been interested in mental 
constructs as causal mechanisms. Moreover, these constructs, or mechanisms, are squarely located 
within the individual. These concerns and the approaches they entail bedded in under the banner 
term "social cognition" in the nineteen fifties when "cognitive psychology came to be seen as the 
most legitimate approach to psychology in general" and, 
The cognitive orientation became so pervasive in social psychology after the war that the phrase 
"cognitive social psychology" is somewhat redundant, in much the same way that the phrase 
"experimental social psychology" is redundant (Collier, Minton & Reynolds, 1991: 198). 
The question we need to address in light of the tabula rasa commitment is whether the hypothesised 
· mental constructs responsible for social cognition are the result of exposure to culture. 
Theodore Newcomb was amongst the first social psychologists to adopt in a self-conscious manner 
what we are calling here social cognition. Whereas in psychology this outlook took the form of a 
search for the algorithms that solved the problems of cognition such as visual perception and 
language processing, in social psychology it took the form of a search for how such systems 
communicated with one another. Consider how Newcomb was evaluated by his contemporaries: 
Newcomb's theory is couched in system terms. Each variable- attraction, orientation, perception of 
the orientation of the other person - is in part a consequent of and in part a determinant of each other 
variable ... For example, assume that A, who is attracted to B, discovers a discrepancy between his 
attitude and B's attitude toward an object of common relevance, such as another person, X A likes 
person X; i.e. has a variety of affective and cognitive components of a positive or favourable nature 
with respect to X. He discovers, however, that B dislikes X and views many of X's attributes 
unfavourably. Given the attraction of A toward B, this discrepancy between A's attitude and his 
perception of B's attitude would give rise to strain and to a postulated force toward change in the 
relations between these three system components (Secord & Backman, 1964: 248). 
I would argue that there is something about this way of conceptualising mind that is typical of social 
cognition. There is the notion of some sort of tension and some sort of goal-state. Minds generate 
and focus upon incongruities and inconsistencies that they then need to eliminate or accommodate. 
Leon Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance rests on the same premises. And there is some 
attempt to formalise these notions such that there is a tractable covariation between them. What also 
bound researchers such as Newcomb, Kelley, Festinger, Murphy, Schachter and Sherif, the people 
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who dominated the "cognitive orientation" in social psychology (see Appendix 2), was the rejection 
of the behaviouristic learning approach. Only with Bandura did what Secord and Backman (1964) 
call the "reinforcement orientation" approach rise again for a relatively short time in the late sixties 
and early seventies (Collier, Minton & Reynolds, 1991 ). 
Tooby and Cosmides argue that the switch to a cognitivistic lexicon glossed over the underlying 
persistence of the tabula rasa view. The "general purpose machine" approach was a SSSM inspired 
idea that imposed itself upon the application of computation to psychological problems. They are 
right in suggesting there was no attempt by social psychologists to assess the plausibility of their 
models in computational terms - at least not until AI entered social psychology (e.g. Schank & 
Abelson, 1977). Furthermore, when we consider the length of the research programme commonly 
called "social cognition" we see that, in 1992, it had constituted nearly half the life span of social 
psychology and more than half the total effort courtesy of the growth in numbers of researchers 
calling themselves social psychologists (Cartwight, 1979). 
However, an irony arises from the concession that the social cognition approach fits the Standard 
Model. Above, in section 3.2, 'Psychology, Sociology and Social Psychology', we touched upon 
recent complaints that "social cognition research is individualistic because it searches within the 
person for the causes ofbehaviour"(Augoustinos & Walker 1995:3) and that this has resulted in an 
undersocialised view of man; 
... research and theory in social cognition is driven by an overwhelming individualistic orientation 
which forgets that the contents of cognition originate in social life, in human interaction and 
communication ... As such, societal, collective and symbolic features of human thought are often 
ignored and forgotten. Contemporary social cognition research is individualistic because it searches 
within the person for the causes of behaviour ... Today the dominant perspective in North American 
social psychology is known as social cognition. Some have argued that the "Social" is a misnomer 
and that the only thing social about social cognition is that it is about social objects - people, groups, 
events (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995:3) 
With the tenor ofTooby and Cosmides thesis in mind, consider the fact that above passage is a 
preamble to a discussion of what is known as the "crisis" literature in social psychology (Cartwright, 
1979; Jones, 1998; Parker, 1989). Contrary to Too by and Cosmides' thesis as it applies to social 
psychology, this literature centered on the complaint that the discipline was not social or sociological 
enough (Good, 2000). For example, Parker suggests that" ... social psychology as an academic 
institution is structured in such a way as to blot out what is most interesting about social interaction 
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(language, power and history)" (Parker, 1989: I) as a result of a "thorough-going individualism" and 
a "mechanistic framing of human action". 
The irony is that only subsequent to relatively recent complaints against the prevailing dogmas of 
positivism and individualism has a mood been engendered such that theories and approaches much 
more Standard Model-like have been given voice. Perhaps the most obvious of these is social 
representations theory (Moscovici, 1972. 1984a. 1988). Social representations theory does fit Tooby 
and Cosmides' thesis given the emphasis on Durkheim. The social representations approach 
acknowledges and rests on his notion of "collective representations". One cannot deny that the 
following fits Tooby and Cosmides' depiction. 
The central and exclusive object of social psychology should be the study of all that pertains to 
ideology and to communication from the point of view of their structure, their genesis and their 
function. The proper domain of our discipline is the study of cultural processes which are 
responsible for the organization of knowledge in a society, for the establishment of inter-individual 
relationships in the context of social and physical environments, for the formation of social 
movements (groups, parties, institutions) through which men act and interact, for the codification of 
inter-individual and intergroup conduct which creates a common social reality with its norms and 
values, the origin of which is to be sought again in the social context (Moscovici, 1972: 55-6; italics 
in the original). 
Undoubtedly Moscovici's ideas have been influential but they do not enjoy hegemony in social 
psychology any more than have any other forms of SSP. 
3.5 Conclusion 
My argument is the first part of this chapter has been aimed toward a dismissal ofthe claim that 
social psychology has subscribed to the "culture as cause" commitment. Whilst social psychology at 
its inception as a science - as opposed to a branch of social philosophy - was informed by sociology 
and, by extension, Durkheim, the influence did not last through into what is often called the "modem 
period" (Farr, 1996). The extensive "two social psychologies" literature shows this. Some ofthis 
literature has as its goal a corrective to the imbalance toward psychological forms of social 
psychology (e.g. Stryker, 1997). But it would appear to be the case that the mainstream has not been 
and is not particularly interested (Jones, 1998). The conclusion is that, even in principle, the "culture 
as cause " commitment could hold only for the minority form of social psychology called 
sociological social psychology. This conclusion led us onto an examination of the "tabula rasa 
commitment". 
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My argument in the second part of this chapter has been aimed towards an examination of social 
psychology in relation to the claim that it has been dominated by radical behaviourism. This 
involved some consideration as to what tabula rasa meant to behaviourists and we saw that 
behaviourism did not deny mental states but their utility. These considerations aside, the important 
point is that social psychology never fully adopted behaviourism and it didn't become another 
branch of learning theory. 
Still, in relation to the Tooby and Cosmides depiction of history, behaviourism has had two distinct 
legacies. Its "black box" psychology, once repudiated became an anathema. What we might call a 
"crammed box" approach to psychology in general -the shift commonly called the cognitive 
revolution- did not retain behaviourism's disdain toward the possibility that humans were 
comprised, a priori, of a set of dispositions. However, the cognitive revolution was built upon a 
technical understanding of general-purpose computational machines. What is pertinent here is that 
social psychology has never fully subscribed to the metaphor of man as rat but it does appear to have 
subscribed to the metaphor of the machine. 
The result is that social psychology as a whole has not been driven by Durkheim or Watson but it 
may, in some sense, have been driven by Turing and von Neumann. The evidence needed to 
repudiate Tooby and Cosmides' characterisation need not be overwhelming. This follows from the 
strength of their claim. Accordingly the conclusion of this chapter is that whilst the SSSM does 
contain grains of truth it is not an adequate history of social psychology. "The Standard Social 
Science Model" is, in my view, what Dennett might call a "luscious slogan"8• To sustain my 
argument I have elucidated some of the more commonly accepted facts of twentieth century social 
psychology and it theoretical underpinnings. 
The consequence of this conclusion is serious for Tooby and Cosmides in the following sense. A 
failure to appreciate what social psychology is, how it operates, and what constitutes it in terms of 
ideas makes it unlikely that the remainder of their argument will fall on receptive ground. 
"Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler" said Einstein. The price of over 
simplification is, he suggested, vacuity. 
In the final analysis this chapter is an appeal to reason (as the term is used in the very cliche it is 
embedded in). In the form of the Standard Social Science Model, do Tooby and Cosmides represent, 
by implication, a social psychology that a social psychologist would subscribe to? The answer, 
appealing to my own reason, is no. However, I would like to extend the examination of the SSSM. 
Next we will consider one of the most protracted and keenly fought debates in the history of modem 
psychology, the instinct debate. 
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1 I follow the general scheme of Farr (1996), Markova (1982) and Robinson (1981) here. The argument is that 
social science at the beginning of the 20th century was guided by the following ideas: Psychology:- Psychology 
at the start of the 20th century construed mind in term of the mind-body relation. This involved the repudiation 
of Cartesian dualism. This is not to say that it claimed to have solved the mind-body problem. However, it does 
say that it assumed the problem to be soluble. Accordingly, it "saw" mind mechanistically and, thus, causally. 
Psychological social psychology, as a general enterprise, similarly rested on this basic assumption. At bottom, 
it rested on Decartes' notion of the reflex as a unit of explanation, and it charged itself with the task of 
expanding its complexity so to account for all behaviour. Sociology:- Sociology at the start of the 20th century 
construed mind in terms of the man-society relation. This involved an implicit acceptance of Cartesian 
dualism. This is not to say that sociology claimed to have proved classical dualism. However, it is to say that it 
accepts it in the sense that mind proper was not to be accounted for via the body and cause as it was construed 
in notions such as the reflex. Its alternative account of the mind was via society. Accordingly it "saw" mind 
dialectically, as the product of a synthetic account involving society as the founding affect. Sociological social 
psychology, as a general enterprise, rested on this basic assumption. It rested on Hegel's notion of a rolling 
synthesis of man and society, and charged itselfwith the task of specifying this synthesis at the inter-individual 
level. 
2 Even this can be readily questioned. We might also bear in mind that whilst sociological forms of social 
psychology are, very broadly, influenced by a stance toward dualism distinct from that which has shaped 
general psychology, the dualism of man and society itself has at least two elementary interpretations. One of 
these is "man in society" and the other is "society in man" (Field, 1974). The dualism of each remains distinct 
from that between mind and body by virtue of the dialectical stance. Nevertheless, there is an implication of 
the differing emphases. "Man in society" implies a certain priority of"man" in the relation and "society in 
man" implies the contrary. (Field [1974: 1] labels the different approaches "symbolic" and "sociologistic"). 
Good (2000) shows that whilst sociology has always been interested in psychological notions such as emotion, 
social notions such as culture have not been of interest to psychology. I suggest that, possibly starting with 
Mead, sociological forms of social psychology have accepted some sort of priority of the term "man" in 
relation to "society" (Farr, 1996, takes this view of Mead). The justification for this employs two strains of 
reasoning. Firstly, there is the long established general heuristic of a hierarchy of disciplines. This hierarchy is 
typically ordered according to levels of specification in much the same way as Too by and Cosmides talk of the 
"rules" of conceptual consistency. If we restrict the hierarchy to those enterprises that make some claim to be 
scientific, at the "bottom" we have physics, and at the "top" we have sociology. Psychology sits between 
biology and sociology, and social psychology sits between psychology and sociology. As we move up through 
the sub-levels of specification in psychology we move from physiology to social psychology. As we move 
down through the sub-levels of sociology we move from the historical to the social psychological. If we accept 
that sociology is broadly concerned with the relation between man and society, and if we accept that social 
psychology represents sociology at its most reduced, the suggestion is that sociological social psychology 
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emphasises the "man" in the relationship between man and society. My point here is that, following Tooby & 
Cosmides' own analysis of the relations between disciplines, sociological social psychology posits man as 
primary in the dialectic that constructs society and culture. 
3 Tooby and Cosmides appeared to have eschewed Durkheim's oft quoted assertion that, "There exists a social 
consciousness of which individual consciousness' are, at least in part, only an emanation. How many ideas or 
sentiments are there which we obtain completely on our own? Very few ... we find [them] ready made" 
(Durkheim, 1885)). 
4 It is Pinker's view that the SSSM is an "off the shelf moral package" (1997:4 7) adopted by the "New Left or 
Marxist[ s )" (ibid). 
5 The idea of content here goes beyond the Lockean conception. For Locke content was more a physical notion 
in the sense of psychophysics. By this I mean that he was concerned with discrete sensations. In Russell's 
(1912) languagethis equates to "sense data", in Ayer's (1936) "sense datum", and in contemporary 
phenomology it equates to "qualia" (i.e. Dennett, 1988). Colours are an example of discrete sensations. For 
Marx content is, if you will, "above" the level of every day sensations. Whereas Locke, and associationism in 
general, sought to analyse everyday consciousness into components, Marx presented a historical account of the 
overall source of the stream of consciousness. In essence, he argued that the particular "form of life" (to use 
Wittgenstein's term, Brearley, 1991) that amounts to one's conduct results in an exhaustive account of content. 
(There is, curiously, a behaviourist whiff in this view. We can find in Skinner's Science & Human Behaviour, 
in the chapter "Man a Machine", the claim that, "Behaviour is a primary characteristic of living things. We 
almost identify it with life itself'). When we look to social psychology for evidence of this sort of construal of 
content I suggest that, by strength of defmition, it is not to be found in the dominant form of the discipline, 
psychological social psychology (Graumann, 1986). This stance is reinforced by many proponents of 
sociological social psychology who have consistently echoed Ross (1908) in calling for a more historically 
informed approach (e.g. Sedgwick, 1973). 
6 We can illustrate what this view of the mind amounts too. By functions Locke means operations such as 
quantifiers in first order (or predicate) logic. Let us take the universal quantifier "V" as an example. Here is 
how such an operation typically works; 
Vx(a(x)-;.b(x))- which means that for all x's if x has property a then x has property b. 
This statement, allied with a second, 
Vx(b(x)-;.c(x))- which means that for all x's ifx has property b then x has property c 
leads to the conclusion that, 
Vx(a(x)-;.c(x)) which means that for all x's ifx has the property a then x has the property c 
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The quantifier V ("for all"), the connective---+ ("if .. then"), and the relation of transitivity are content neutral. 
They merely govern the relationships between the ascriptive (or propositional) items a, b, c and x, which are 
here unassigned but could, in principle, stand for anything. This distinction between functions and content is 
the basis of the tabula rasa view. Precisely what it is that is said to be "blank" or undetermined prior to 
experience are the ascriptive terms in sentences (or compound propositions). 
7 
"[By behaviourists] Words have been coined for the opponent school, words like "introspectionism" or 
"introspectionalism", but I have never heard anyone apply such a term to himself. Someone once suggested 
"Tichenersism", which had the advantage of seeming to indicate at least one Tichenerist definitely" (Boring, 
1929: 118). 
8 Dennett, 1995:491. 
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Chapter 4 The Instinct Debate and the SSSM 
Summary of chapter 4 
This chapter reviews the long and intense effort by psychologists to establish the concept of instinct in 
psychology and social psychology. Many of the most important figures of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century were involved. Whilst the concept of instinct developed it never lost its grounding in 
Darwinian theory and most proponents explicitly invoked Darwin to support their case. The examination of the 
instinct debate prepares the way for the conclusion that the instinct debate refutes Tooby and Cosmides 
Standard Model thesis. Additionally, whilst the term instinct lost favour in the 1930's, the concept continued to 
find expression in notions such as "driving adjustments" and Darwin's concept of habit was used by 
behaviourism to support its emphasis on how, why and with what outcome behaviour develops. One 
implication of the instinct debate for evolutionary psychology is that its integrity is damaged by its seeming 
ignorance of its own past. 
4.1 Introduction 
One cannot read an introductory text in the history of psychology or social science and not encounter 
some treatment of the concept of instinct. Similarly, few general textbooks of psychology fail to 
incorporate a discussion of its status. More widely, it can be seen that the concept of instinct has 
been an issue in psychological and behavioural thought since Aristotle (Beach, 1961; Drever, 1917; 
Hobhouse, 1901; Richards, 1987; Robinson, 1981). However, with a view to assessing the validity of 
the Standard Model thesis, the weight of the concept in the history of201h century social psychology 
is our concern. In this chapter we will concentrate on authors who worked on the idea in the late 
nineteenth and the first quarter of the twentieth century. 
The first pertinent point to be made with regard to this debate and the SSSM is its extent. The 
majority of those who today we take as representative of academic psychology at the time made 
contributions: e.g. Allport (1924), Angell (1906), Baldwin, (1896a,b), Dewey (1887, 1923), Dunlap 
(1919, 1932), James (1890), Lloyd-Morgan (1894), Mead (1936), Thorndike (1911), Titchener 
(1914), Tolman (1923, 1924, 1932), Watson (l913, 1919, 1931). Others, and I have in mind here 
William McDougall who published one of the first two textbooks of social psychology, have become 
almost synonymous with concept. 
Of course, the presentation of a list of work that discusses instinct does not in itself show that the 
authors were sympathetic to the idea, and, indeed, some were critical from the outset. But, as I hope 
to show, most favoured some formulation or another. The extent of the instinct debate alone suggests 
that the SSSM is not a reliable representation of twentieth century psychology. Moreover, instinct 
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theory was explicitly Darwinian. Most proponents took themselves to be Darwinians and most 
proposed instincts were for or about social thought and behaviour. 
In order to show that the instinct debate refutes the SSSM I will detail some of the many 
definitions and formulations offered by psychologists over a period of forty years. Courtesy of an 
explication of Charles Darwin's position, it can be seen how closely allied to his most formulations 
of instinct were. In a later section we will look at what happened to the concept of instinct once the 
term itself lost favour. It can be shown that although pushed to the margins the term was never fully 
abandoned. The final part of the chapter will consider what lessons evolutionary psychology might 
draw from the failure of the Standard Model as history. 
4.2 Evolution and the instinct debate 
Darwin devoted Chapter VIII of The Origin of Species to a discussion of instinct, and he returned to 
the topic again in The Descent of Man and The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals. His 
opening remark, "Many instincts are so wonderful that their development will probably appear to the 
reader a difficulty sufficient to overthrow my whole theory" (Darwin, 1859: 191) indicates his 
strategy: he took the concept as ready defined and devoted the bulk of his attention to showing how 
and why instincts may be regarded as products of natural selection. Although he stated "I will not 
attempt a definition of instinct" he did, in effect, produce a guarded definition by writing, 
An action, which we ourselves require experience to enable us to perform, when performed by an 
animal, especially by a very young one, without experience, and when performed by many 
individuals in the same way, without their knowing for what purpose it is performed, is usually said 
to be instinctive. (Darwin, 1859: 191) 
Additionally Darwin clearly equated the concept with the mental by adding, "It would be easy to 
show that several distinct mental actions are commonly embraced by this term." (ibid: 191). 
Presaging the debate that he licensed, Darwin discussed the readiness with which instinct and habit 
may be compared. He mentioned the apparent lack of thought that each may involve, their 
expression contra to will, and that they "often remain constant throughout life" (ibid: 192). Whilst he 
doesn't offer an example, he disambiguated the two terms by reference to the impossibility of certain 
crucial patterns of activity having been built up through habit. Perhaps the key element in his 
disambiguation of instincts and habits comes in the pitching of instincts as quintessential instances of 
natural selection; 
No complex instinct can possibly be produced through natural selection, except by the slow and 
gradual accumulation of numerous slight, yet profitable, variations (ibid: 193). 
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In other words, it is the origin of instincts and habits that distinguishes them most. Three further 
points about instincts are revealed by Darwin in the following statement, 
Again, as in the case of corporeal structure, and conformably to my theory, the instinct of each 
species is good for itself, but has never, as far as we can judge, been produced for the exclusive 
good of others (ibid: 193). 
The first of these points is the distinction between "corporeal structure", i.e. anatomy, and behaviour, 
the second is the species-specific nature of instincts, and the third is the focus on individual fitness. 
Darwin added that instincts are not mutually exclusive of''judgement or reason", that instincts vary 
in their expression among individuals of a species, i.e. that the strength of expression is distributed in 
any given population, and that instincts, by virtue of some inherent rigidity of operation, do not 
invariably function perfectly well in relation to the goals of the organism. We will see how these 
points influenced others in the course of this chapter. 
There are aspects of Darwin's discussion that are highly pertinent to our own: he positioned 
instincts within the framework of natural selection; he asserted a psychological component to them; 
and he did not pursue a rigid and formal definition of the term instinct. An important consequence of 
these aspects of Darwin's case was that future writers were given sanction to consider instincts as 
basic to a description of purposive behaviour and mental states but were left without a formal 
classification. 
Alfred Wallace too discussed and defined instincts: viz., "the performance by an animal of complex 
acts, absolutely without instruction or previously acquired knowledge" (Wallace, 2000: 2). He 
introduced his definition by reference to "The most perfect and most striking examples of what is 
termed instinct, those in which reason or observation appear to have the least influence, and which 
seem to imply the possession of faculties farthest removed from our own, [which] are to found 
amongst insects" (ibid). These comments give us, perhaps, some key to Darwin's view of him as 
"loose cannon" (Desmond & Moore, 1991). At once he is dogmatic with regard to the plausibility of 
spontaneous yet complex acts and he entertains the notion of a discontinuity of faculties between 
species nonetheless worthy of comparison'. 
Let us now move on and look at the view of William James2• In doing this we move into 
psychology proper and on to, arguably, the most influential psychological theorist of his generation. I 
hope to make it apparent that James considered instincts to be of fundamental importance to the 
study of mind and behaviour and show how closely allied was his view to that of Darwin. 
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James differed from Darwin with regard to emotions because he took them to play no causal role in 
individual behaviour. But James did see mind more widely conceived as both having a causal role 
and being a product of natural selection by virtue of the efficacy of its role. This approach set up his 
definition of instinct as, 
... the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends, without foresight of the ends, and 
without previous education in the performance ... They [instincts] are functional correlatives of 
structure. With the presence of a certain organs goes, one may say, almost always a native aptitude 
for its use (James, 1890: 383). 
James, presumably with Darwin's efforts in mind, added "That instincts, thus defined, exist on an 
enormous scale in the animal kingdom needs no proof' (ibid). Noteworthy here is the insistence on a 
distinction between anatomy and its "native aptitude". Following Darwin, James saw instinct as a 
process, as something that an animal, or its component parts, did. In making a distinct between 
anatomy and physiological process or bodily movement James marked a distinction between 
adaptations and behaviour. 
Having defined instinct James went on to take to task the "common way of talking about these 
admirably definite tendencies to act by naming abstractly the purpose they serve, such as self-
preservation, or defense [sic], or care for eggs and young" (ibid). He argued that "this represents the 
animal as obeying abstractions which not once in a million cases is it possible it can have framed" 
(ibid: 384. In opposition James suggested that instincts be conceived as "conforming to the general 
reflex type", "called forth by determinate sensory stimuli in contact with the animals body, or at a 
distance in his environment" (ibid). He defended the view that "mutual dependence" of organ and 
environment can be "so intricate and go so far" by appeal to the evidence. "The minuteness of 
adaptation thus shown in structure knows no bounds. Even so are there no bounds to the minuteness 
of adaptation in the way of conduct" (ibid: 385). 
The apparent synonymy of instinct and reflex exhibited in these comments belies James' concept 
of reflex. In criticising the attribution of abstract goals to instincts and their possessors, James 
promoted a compositional account of instincts. He took any given instinctive act to be comprised of 
distinct responses of indefinite number. In saying that instincts are best classified as being of the 
"general reflex type" he did not say that a reflex is purely physiological. On the contrary, James 
followed Schneider and forwarded "idea-impulses" and "imagination impulses" as expressions of 
instincts. By these terms James meant mental representations of simple states of affairs that bear just 
that sort of relation as do physical stimuli and response. Thus, in an example that he offered, the 
"idea" of food to the lion performs the function of initiating an "imagination" of obtaining food. 
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Having introduced the notion that instincts have a mental component, James argued that they may 
be modified by their history of success or failure. Accordingly, should a certain imagination-impulse 
that follows a certain idea-impulse fail to satisfy the conditions of the latter it will subsequently be 
adjusted. It is from this foundation that James went on to propose that, 
Wherever the mind is elevated enough to discriminate ... wherever, instead of plumping into action 
instantly at the first rough intimation of what sort of thing is there, the agent waits to see which one 
of its kind it is and what the circumstances of its appearance are; wherever different individuals and 
different circumstances can impel him in different ways ... we have a masking of the elementary 
constitution of the instinctive life (ibid: 392) 
We will return to James's definition and discussion of instinct when we look more closely at 
attempts to reconcile intelligence and instinct in Part III. We need only note for now the similarity of 
his account of instincts to that offered by Darwin, his emphasis on process and, moreover, mental 
process as fundamental to instincts in the human case. 
Writing in 1894, Conway Lloyd-Morgan defined instincts as; 
Complex groups of co-ordinated acts, which, though they contribute to experience, are, on their first 
occurrence, not determined by individual experience: which are adaptive and tend to the wellbeing 
of the individual and the preservation of the race; which are due to the co-operation of external and 
internal stimuli; which are similarly performed by all other members of the same more or less 
restricted group of animals; but which are subject to variation, and to subsequent modification under 
the guidance of individual experience (Lloyd-Morgan, 1894/1903\ 
He went on to demarcate the fixed and the flexible elements of his definition. Instinct is due, in its 
entirety, to the effects of selection on the nervous system of the species under consideration and 
intelligence is the extent to which the nervous system is susceptible to adaptive acquisitions from 
experience. In Lloyd-Morgan's definition we see the reprise of Darwin's criterion. Instincts are 
complex, adaptive, species typical- although not invariant- selected for, and are to be considered as, 
in some sense, continuous with and subject to experiential consequences. 
In 1901 L.T. Hobhouse, primarily a sociologist, offered this description of instincts in a volume 
titled Mind in Evolution: 
Instinct, in short, is a product of evolution ... its territory is not apart, but strictly continuous with 
other powers of organised beings ... It presides at a certain phase, and has, in due order, its 
beginning, its rise, its culmination, and its decline ... Among the higher animals, but particularly 
among the most developed insects, there are long trains of intricately adjusted actions ... 
independent of any intelligent apprehension of their ultimate end ... These form the instincts 
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proper, and of their genesis we can only repeat what has been said of reflexes and of structure in 
general. They arise from variations, the original source of which is unknown, but which depend for 
their permanence on their suitability to the requirements of the species (Hobhouse, 190 I: 53). 
Again with an eye towards Darwin, and, by virtue of comparison with Jaines and Lloyd-Morgan, 
the criterion of selection, adaptiveness, species typicality with variation and continuity with 
intelligence mark Hobhouse's approach. 
The next consideration of instincts that we will look at comes from James Angell. Angell's 
orientation to psychology is somewhat different from those we have encountered so far. A 
"mentalist" (to use F.B. Skinner's term), Angell's general position is revealed in the title of his book 
Psychology: An Introductory Study of the Structure and Function of Human Conscious (3rd ed., 
1906). Angell claimed that, 
They [instincts] represent structurally reformed pathways in the nervous system, and stand 
functionally for effective inherited coordinations made in response to environmental demands ... If 
the activity involves a number of acts, each one of which, considered singly and alone, is relatively 
useless, but all of which taken together lead up to some adaptive consequence ... it will be safe to 
call the action instinctive (Angell, 1906: 288-9). 
It is apparent that this is not a formal definition but rather a gesticulation. This follows from the 
manner in which Angell builds instincts - adaptively consequential activities, from reflexes - single 
acts. His point is that one can only conclude that an activity is an instinct by the specification of a 
"definite end dominating a series of acts" where the end can be determined as being adaptive. 
The difference thus pointed out [between reflexes and instincts] is founded theoretically upon the 
nature of the functions subserved by the two types of action ... It must be frankly confessed, 
however, that many cases are discoverable in which all distinctions seem arbitrary and fictitious. 
Too much stress should not be laid, therefore, upon the matter of ultimate differences. It is rather 
upon the identity of service to the organism that the emphasis should fall (ibid: 290). 
With a view to specifying the psychological aspect of instincts, Angell went onto say that "some 
reflex acts are essentially unconscious, whereas instincts, in the higher animals at all events, appear 
always to involve consciousness", 
In the earlier views of instinct we always fmd it contrasted with reason, as though the two were 
radically distinct. The keener insight of our own time shows us that although reason represents the 
individual's contribution to his own fate in terms of his own experience, while instinct represents 
the contribution of racial experience, the actual operation of the two factors often displays most 
intimate interrelations ... the great difficulty in studying instinct in human beings is due to the fact 
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that intelligence immediately comes in to transform the native reactions in accordance with the 
dictates ofthe individual's personal experience (ibid: 291). 
While retaining most of the elements that previous authors deployed in their definitions of instinct, 
Angell accentuated the notion of function. That is, he wanted to refrain from saying what is and what 
is not instinctive in behaviour until the results of the behaviour were known. This opened him up to 
the charge of being a teleologist. It also left him a conceptual tool that had no power to predict 
behaviour. Our chronology now brings us to probably the most influential instinct theorist in social 
psychology, William McDougall. 
It would appear to be difficult to over play the importance of McDougall," ... unquestionably one 
of the most striking and forceful figures in the psychology of his day" (Heamshaw, 1964: 186). 
McDougall's most successful and most widely read book is the Introduction to Social Psychology 
(1st edition, 1908) which" ... marked not only an epoch in McDougall's own development but an 
epoch in the history of psychology" (ibid: 188). Of the fifteen chapters that comprise Heamshaw's A 
Short History of British Psychology: 1840-1940 (1964) only three are devoted to a treatment of 
individuals; Alexander Bain, Francis Galton and William McDougall. Additionally, Robert Farr 
( 1986) supplements this observation with a note of approval that McDougall be treated in this 
manner. 
As Heamshaw' s comments suggest, McDougall's treatment of instincts represented a development 
of the concept. What was distinctive about his definition was a strong emphasis on the "conative, 
affective and cognitive" aspects. So, whilst there is no break with what we have already seen in 
McDougall's claim that, 
The human mind has certain innate or inherited tendencies which are the essential springs or motive 
powers of all thought and action ... These primary innate tendencies ... are probably common to 
the men of every race and every age (McDougall, 1908/23: 19). 
Something new can be discerned in the following, 
We may, then, define an instinct as an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which 
determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience 
an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard 
to it in a particular manner, or, at least, to experience an impulse to such action (ibid: 29). 
What is new is the emphasis on what we might call the phenomenological properties of instincts. 
The suggestion is that they organise our attention and imbue sensations with felt qualities; instincts 
make the world compulsive in some sense. Whilst such an emphasis is to be found in Darwin's The 
Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, McDougall suggested that an analysis ofthe 
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particular qualities of these mental events is necessary in any account of human instincts. What was 
consonant with previous definitions was the attributes of an instinct as being due to natural selection, 
their being species typical with variation, functional but fallible, and continuous with physiological 
and behavioural processes. Due to his importance and to the very modem flavour of both his account 
of instincts and the objections raised against it, we will return to McDougall in Part III when the old 
notion of instinct and the contemporary notion of psychological adaptations are compared. 
James Drever's Instinct in Man (1917) is a book length conceptual analysis of instinct. This may 
be taken as a sign of the muddied water the concept had come to inhabit. Almost sixty years after 
Darwin had skirted a formal definition due to the apparent obvious denotation of the term, Drever's 
volume was devoted to just such a definition. 
Drever was anxious to point out the heritage of the instinct debate and devotes much attention to 
the discussions which had preceded Darwin4• Drever's strategy was to clarify and reinforce the 
distinction between physiological and psychological senses of instinct. Let us first consider his 
physiological definition: 
As a factor determining the behaviour of living organisms, Instinct, physiologically regarded, is a 
congenital disposition of the nervous system, consisting in a definite, but within limits modifiable, 
arrangement and co-ordination of nervous connections, so that a particular stimulus, with or without 
the presence of a certain co-operating stimuli, will call forth a particular action or series of actions; 
this predisposition, biologically regarded, is apparently due to the operation of natural selection, and 
determines a mode of behaviour, which ensures a biologically useful end, without foresight of that 
end or experience in attaining it (Drever, 1917: 81). 
There is nothing new here. We have an emphasis on behaviour, natural selection, heritability, 
relative stupidity and functionality. However, Drever was much less forthright with regard to a 
general definition of psychological instinct. Rather, he seemed anxious to discuss actual instances. 
Still, instincts in their psychological manifestation are described by Drever as, 
... an innate impelling force guiding cognition, accompanied by interest or emotion, and at least 
partly determining action (ibid: 20) ... Psychologically, the only possible interpretation of 
instinctive behaviour seems to be in terms of specific impulse determining specific act, on 
presentation in perceptual consciousness of a specific situation (ibid: 1 07). 
And he added to this characterisation the claim 
That the instinct structure is a marvellous adaptation to the conditions in which it must function, and 
that this adaptation is the result of evolution, working in the main through natural selection, no one 
would attempt to deny (ibid). 
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By isolating physiological and psychological senses of the term instinct, Drever created room for 
his treatment of the "innate impelling force" which he labelled "Instinct-Experience". This concept 
then became central to his discussion. Drever followed McDougall with his emphasis on the 
emotional corollaries of instinctive dispositions to act and the role emotions play in the satisfaction 
of instinctive impulses. In Drever we find an early formulation of the notion of drive reduction and 
satisfaction as explanatory devices and, importantly, a way of discussing psychological drive that did 
not need to make direct reference to physiological underpinnings. 
Drever also developed Darwin's point concerning the fallibility of very precise responses to very 
precise stimuli. He proposed that a lack of rigidly mechanical responses can be adaptive under 
conditions of ecological instability. And, whilst Drever exhibited a tendency (probably in line with 
psychoanalysis) to counter James' claim that humans have more and not fewer instincts than other 
animals, he endorsed James' view that intelligence just is the successful manipulation of instinctive 
impulses. 
Whilst there was in Drever' s treatment much in common with his predecessors and with Darwin, 
and while he was clearly a proponent of instincts as evolved properties of humans, he also broke 
with what had gone before. As we will see in Part III when we will look at some of the reasons why 
instinct theory was rejected, his emphasis on intra-psychic processes and their analytical 
independence from behavioural processes generated objections to instinct theory that could not be 
fairly levelled at those who preceded McDougall. Let us now move on and see what John Watson 
had to say about instincts. An unthinking acceptance of the Standard Model thesis might promote an 
expectation seriously at odds with the facts. While I am inclined to suppose by appeal to chronology 
that James was more influential on what Ronald Fletcher (1957) called the "early doctrine of 
instincts" (by which he means that which preceded Lorenz and Tinbergen) than was Watson, 
Watson's view is more central to considerations ofthe SSSM. 
Watson devoted chapter VII of Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviourist ( 1919) to 
instincts. He effectively predefines the term by calling the chapter "Unlearned Behaviour: 'Instinct"'. 
Worthy of remark is the bracketing of the chapter with its predecessor, "Unlearned Behaviour: 
'Emotion'"5• What is implied by these is affirmed in the text, i.e. "there is no sharp line between 
emotion and instinct"(Watson, 1919: 262). Here is his fuller treatment; 
We should define instinct as an hereditary pattern reaction ... It might otherwise be expressed as a 
combination of explicit congenital responses unfolding serially under appropriate stimulation .... In 
every instinct of a more complicated type, we see that the human animal does the same thing, makes 
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some sort of adjustment. The fact accomplished (what he does) may or may not be adaptive (ibid: 
262). 
Having defined the term Watson then set out the conditions for its verification: " ... look upon 
every definite act that the infant performs at an early age, and hence without learning, as an instinct", 
adding, "In advance it may be said that if we look upon all untutored activity of the child as 
instinctive, we shall have to admit that man has a large repertoire of instincts" (ibid: 263). Watson 
then added qualifications to his definition. These comprise of a distinction between "the fully-
fledged pattern type" and "less spectacular acts". Instances ofthe former include fighting, running 
and swimming. Instance of the latter include sneezing, yawning, crying and defecation. He 
formulated the distinction in more familiar terms by calling the former "instinct plus habit" and the 
latter "pure instincts". 
Following Herbert Spencer and Edward Thorndike, Watson unpacked the phrase, "a combination 
of explicit congenital responses unfolding serially under appropriate stimulation", in terms of 
reflexes. However, he noted that this was an abstraction which permits of an analysis of an instinct 
into its component physiology. 
While there is nothing in Watson's definition and discussion of instincts that either breaks with or 
denies what had become orthodox he was keen to down play the role of intelligence. This is 
exhibited in the possibility that instinctive behaviours might be "non-adaptive or even anti-adaptive" 
(ibid:262). His reasoning behind the emphasis on the non- or anti-adaptive flowed from his view that 
as essentially mechanical acts instincts may be evoked when inappropriate for the conditions and 
needs facing the organism at any given moment. Still, we see the same essentials of heritability, 
function, the coupling with emotion, species typicality and fallibility. 
What was novel was not Watson's.basic approach but his subsequent attitude toward instincts. 
Having specified what they are via a list he openly derived from Thorndike and James, he went on to 
propose how they may be altered and extinguished. Watson sought to predict behaviour via recourse 
to instincts and he sought to control them via recourse to conditioning. We will return to Watson 
again in a later section ofthis chapter when we consider his influence on later writers who looked to 
replace the concept of instinct with that of habit. 
It was in the early 1920's that confidence in the concept of instinct amongst psychologists and 
social scientists began to break down (Collier, Minton & Reynolds, 1991). Papers such as Knight 
Dunlap's Are there any instincts? (1919) and Zing Yang Kuo's Giving up Instincts in Psychology 
( 1921) were amongst the first revolts from what was to develop into mainstream behaviourism. This 
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consideration gives us some context to Charles Cooley's discussion of instincts in his Human Nature 
and the Social Order (1922). 
Cooley's introduction to the volume is titled "Hereditary and Instincts". He quotes Darwin's 
"original sense ofthe word" (see above) as his preferred definition (Cooley, 1922: 18). He then goes 
on to argue for a form of development within the human lineage, 
... when investigators began to study our behaviour from the evolutionary point of view, they saw 
that if not instinctive in the strict sense it has yet grown out of instinctive behaviour, was historically 
continuous with it, and, in short, that there was no sharp line to be drawn ... (ibid: I 8). 
It is through seeing the status of instinct in humans vertically - that is, in terms of development 
through descent- rather than laterally- that is, in comparative terms, that Cooley came to the view 
that it is best, 
... to avoid the word "instinct" as applied to most human behaviour, which has nothing of the 
fixity of animal instinct, and speak instead of "instinctive emotion", since the emotional side of our 
activity clearly includes a hereditary element which seems to remain much the same under the most 
diverse manifestations (ibid: I 9-20). 
Thus, in his definition of instinct, if not in its role in his general account of social behaviour, 
Cooley resembled McDougall. He resorted to citations from Darwin's The Expression of Emotions in 
Man and Animals to support this view, and in doing so he rejects a reflex account of instinct in man 
because instinct does not manifest itself as reflex. Where instinct can be discerned is in reason 
because "reason is itself an instinctive disposition". 
Reason, in this view, does not supplant instinct, any more than the captain supplants the private 
soldiers; it is a principle of higher organisation, controlling and transforming instinctive energies ... 
a disposition to compare, combine, and organize the activities of the mind (ibid: 23). 
It is apparent that there is nothing substantially different here than that expressed by James thirty 
years pnor. 
Edward Tolman defended the concept of instincts in 1923 and 1924 before his mature and rather 
hedged definition in the glossary of the 1932 volume Purposive Behaviour in Animals and Men. In 
full: 
Instinct. This term, if it is to be retained at all, is to be used for all those demands and sign-gestalt-
readiness which practically all the individuals of a given species, irrespective of "special" 
environmental training, tend to exhibit. The term in this sense will cover all such varieties or phases 
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of response as are primarily due to innate endowment plus a biologically provided relatively 
"normal" or "standard" environment. 
In the case of man, or at any rate in the case of many of the lower species, there seem to be three 
main types of activity which qualify as instincts as thus defined, viz., (a) first-order and second-
order drives (q. v.), (b) certain chains of minor appetites (q. v.) and minor aversions (q. v.), which are 
to be found in especially developed form in birds and insects; and (c) certain innate discrimination 
and manipulation dexterities or skills. These latter are to be conceived as of the nature of capacities 
for successful discriminanda and manipulanda commerces-with (Tolman, 1932: 447). 
Let us briefly note what is portentous in this statement. First there is the suggestion that the concept 
is close to redundant. Then there is the link with the phenomenology of gestalt. Thirdly there is the 
deconstruction of instinct into the notion of drives, skills and orders thereof. 
But our main concern is with that which is conventional and here Tolman's definition exhibits a 
concern with the unlearned, the functional fit between behaviour and environment, and 
"endowment" which we may take to mean that which is inherited. He appears to differ from those of 
his immediate peers we have so far considered in the suggestion that instincts are not subject to 
modification. On other key aspects such as the selected basis of instincts and the nature of their 
psychological manifestation he is silent. 
As he made clear in the preface to Purposive Behaviour in Animals and Men, Tolman made use of 
a glossary as an aide memo ire and to keep the body of the text as uncluttered as possible. His actual 
discussion of the term instinct, principally in Chapter XX, 'Instinct, Chain Appetites and Aversions, 
Skills', reveals more of his stance. First of all Tolman discussed what he called the "convergence" 
view- that which asserts that inherited endowment and experiential maturation are inseparably 
linked such that neither concept is of use if deployed in isolation. He argued that "There can be no 
behaviour purely dependent upon innate endowment and none purely upon past training" (ibid: 304). 
Any suggestion to the end that behaviour can be dichotomised into the learned and the instinctive is 
undermined by two considerations; 
... First, because the individual, while in the embryonic stage, is provided in practically all species 
with a relatively standardized environment; and, second, also because of the fact that even after 
birth, an individual's own internal intra-cellular and inter-cellular environments remain relatively 
standardized ... there will be varieties, or phases, of response which may still usefully be called 
instincts because their maturation depends upon and requires interaction with only such relatively 
standardized environments (ibid: 304-5). 
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From these considerations he draws the conclusion that, "The term instinct can thus be retained" 
(ibid: 305). 
To complete our review of definitions of instincts we will look at two more. One of them shows 
how the concept travelled in a circle from and back to Darwin's basic and most conservative 
position. The other I take as a fair summary of definitions from James in 1890 to Tolman in 1932. 
Dunlap's (1932) definition of an instinct is straightforward. He began and ended with the "logical, 
and logically unobjectionable" distinction between responses that have and responses that have not 
been learned . 
. . . a learned response is one which has been formed by modifying a previous response. But the 
process must start somewhere. If we start with no responses we have nothing to modify. Therefore, 
there must be, in the animal, a certain initial equipment of unlearned responses (Dunlap, 1932: 38). 
I take Dunlap's view to be what Darwin was referring to when he said that instincts are just those 
actions performed "without experience". 
For his attack on instinct theory, Luther Bernard (1924) took as his starting point The New 
Standard Dictionary's definition of instinct. I am of the view that Bernard's critique worked so well 
just because the definition he concentrated on was such a reasonable and relatively uncluttered 
representation of the concept at the height of the debate in the mid-twenties: 
Reactions that are merely reflex or automatic, in the purely physiological meaning of these words, 
are not properly spoken of as instinctive. Instinct implies at least a low degree of consciousness; but 
its reactions are not learned or directed by conscious process or reasoning. The following 
characteristics are, therefore, attributable to every form of instinct: - (1) lt is adaptive, or directed 
toward some end; (2) that end is somehow connected with the welfare of the species or of the 
individual as a member of the species; (3) the reaction is psycho-physically complex; and (4) it is 
native or inherited and not learned. No other animal is as full of instincts as man (The New Standard 
Dictionary, 1922) 
4.3 The instinct debate refutes the SSSM 
What I hope to have demonstrated in the preceding section of this chapter is the length and 
something of the breadth of the instinct debate. If we omit Darwin's comments and concentrate only 
on those who called themselves psychologists, social psychologist or sociologists, our survey covers 
a period of over forty years. Forty years is forty percent of the "century" Tooby and Cosmides claim 
that the Standard Model has been "the consensus view" in the social sciences (Tooby & Cosmides, 
1992: 23). Moreover, the instinct debate cannot be consigned to one of the exceptional sub-
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communities that have resisted the SSSM. And with regard to the SSSM and social psychology, it 
can be seen that most of the instincts said to comprise human nature were social. Let us look at some 
comments that reinforce the first of these points before substantiating the second. 
Should one harbour doubts as to whether Darwin and Darwinism has ever been of import in the 
psychological and behavioural sciences consider the following passages. The first author is 
McDougall on the status of two competing paradigms c.l900. The second author is Cooley on the 
agreed authority of natural history c.l920. And the third is Bernard on the limits on the new 
"dogmatism". 
During the last century most of the workers in the social sciences were of two parties - those on the 
one hand who with the utilitarians reduced all motives to the search for pleasure and pain, and those 
on the other hand who, recoiling from this hedonistic doctrine, sought the main spring of conduct in 
some vaguely conceived intuitive faculty variously named the conscience, the moral faculty, 
instinct, or sense ... (McDougall, 1908: 14). 
McDougall went onto signal the point of change. 
Darwin, in the "Descent of Man" first enunciated the true doctrine of human motives, and showed 
how we must proceed, relying chiefly on the comparative and natural history method, if we would 
arrive at a fuller understanding of them (ibid). 
And then he outlined what he took to be the coming set of conditions. 
Happily this conception of psychology is beginning to prevail. The mind is no longer regarded as a 
mere tabula rasa or magic mirror whose function it is passively to receive impressions from the 
outer world or to throw imperfect reflections of its objects ... Nor are we any longer content to 
supplement this Lockian conception of mind with only two principles of intrinsic activity, that of the 
assC>ciation and reproduction of ideas, and that of the tendency to seek pleasure and avoid pain. The 
discovery is being made that the old psychologising was like the playing of"Hamlet" with the 
Prince of Denmark left out, or like describing steam engines while ignoring the fact of the presence 
of and fundamental role of the fire or other source of heat. On every hand we hear it said that the 
static, descriptive, purely analytical psychology must give place to a dynamic, functional, 
voluntaristic view of mind (ibid: 15-16). 
Cooley's comments confirmed McDougall's analysis. 
We have come in recent years to look upon all questions of human life from an evolutionary point 
of view. It may be worth while to recall something of what that phrase means. 
It means, for one thing , that all our life has a history, that nothing happens disconnectedly, that 
everything we are or do is part of a current coming down from the remote past. Every word we say, 
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every movement we make, every idea we have, and every feeling, is, in one way or another, an 
outcome of what our predecessors have said or done or thought or felt in past ages. There is an 
actual historical continuity from their life to ours, and we are constantly trying to trace this history 
to see how things come about, in order that we may understand then better and may learn to bring to 
pass those things we regard as desirable. 
It means also that if we go back we fmd that man and the other animals have a common history, 
that both sprang remotely from a common ancestry in lower forms oflife, and that we cannot have 
clear ideas of our own life except as we study it on the animal side and see how and in what respects 
we have risen above the condition of our cousins the horses, dogs and apes. Life, it appears, is all 
one great whole, a kinship, unified by a common descent and by common principles of existence; 
and our part in it will not be understood unless we can see, in a general way at least, how it is related 
to other parts. (Cooley, 1922: 1). 
Consider now Bernard's challenge to this "dominance" in the mid-twenties. Notice that it is a call for 
change in "mental and social science" and not a herald to the end that the desired change had come 
about. 
The uncritical assumption that instinct dominates the formation of habits and determines the 
character of institutions is due to the dominance of the biological viewpoint in modem mental and 
social science. The spectacular and transforming discoveries of Darwin and his contemporaries and 
successors ... are responsible for this dominance (Bernard, 1924: 8). 
However; 
Doubtless reflex and tropism are basic to human activity, just as they are to the behaviour of sub-
human types. But the greater synaptic flexibility and habit-forming power of man render it possible 
for him to build his behaviour patterns very extensively upon this foundation, with the result that the 
instinctive element in action is largely lost in the larger volume of superimposed acquired behaviour 
content. .. The paucity of respect [among instinct theorists'] for sociology has been equalled only 
by the smallness of their knowledge of what is has to offer in the way of an environmental analysis. 
Their approval of psychology has been largely limited to its biological aspects ... (ibid: 11). 
Aside the "appalling ignorance of the facts of sociology and social psychology", Bernard was of the 
view that devotion to the concept of instinct had led to, 
... a profound dogmatism and cocksureness about a matter which has no better foundation in theory 
to support it than a crude analogy. In this analogical assumption the biologists have been guilty of a 
method of violating the canons or tests of scientific truth for which they have strongly condemned 
the sociologists (ibid: 12). 
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The message is clear. Although there is a marked difference on the desirability of the doctrine of 
instincts, McDougall, Cooley and Bernard all say clearly that the doctrine was widely accepted. 
More widely accepted still was the acceptance that Darwinism was the soil in which psychology 
must be rooted. 
The second point that pertains to my argument that the instinct debate refutes the SSSM with 
respect to social psychology concerns the social nature of most of the instincts put forward by 
theorists. Collier, Minton and Reynolds claim that "Introduction to Social Psychology remains a 
landmark in social psychological thought" indicates this (Collier, Minton and Reynolds, 1991: 19). 
They label McDougall a "social-instinct theorist" in light of the suite of instincts McDougall 
proposed and his argument that instincts build and colour the social world humans inhabit. 
To demonstrate that the instincts proposed were often about, or orientated toward, social thought 
and behaviour we can drawn upon the work of Bernard (1924). In his study of how the term instinct 
was used and applied he produced a list of sorts or groupings of instinct (also see chapter 9). Each 
group added different numbers of specific types. For example, what Bernard called the "aesthetic 
instincts" contained fifty-one instances. Of the twenty-three groups, the altruistic, anti-social, 
ethical, family, gregarious, play, retaliative, self-assertive, self-display, and sex instincts are 
obviously social, and the imitative, religious, self-abasement and work instincts are arguably social. 
Furthermore, the groupings that are undeniably social contribute over half to the total number of 
specific types (825 against 763). Adjust this ratio to account for the arguably social types and the 
balance is 987 against 601. 
A third point that casts further doubt on the validity ofTooby and Cosmides' thesis is the fate of 
the instinct concept after the term itself fell out of favour in the 1930's. Whilst the term was dropped 
from mainstream social psychology (see Herrnstein, 1974) the concept went on. Itc;lid so in three 
guises. 
4.3.1 The fate of the instinct concept 
There are three answers to the question as to what happened to the concept of instinct. One of these 
is that it was rejected by behaviourism and replaced by the concept of habit. As we have seen 
(chapter 3, section 3, 'Social psychology and behaviourism') behaviourism was never fully 
embraced by social psychology. Nonetheless, in the spirit of this and the last chapter, it is worthwhile 
looking at how the term habit replaced instinct because we can discern Darwin's influence on 
behaviourism. I will show in what ways proponents of the concept of habit took themselves to be 
consistent with his thinking. The second answer as to the fate of instinct in social psychology shows 
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that it never really disappeared. Rather, the concept was broken-up and a less contentious 
terminology was used to represent the core notions. I hope to show that concepts which were 
derivatives of instincts lived on in psychology in the form of the ideas of dispositions to behave 
toward functionally defined ends. And the third answer is that it has returned in the guise of 
adaptations. In this section we will look at the first two answers. In chapter 8 'Instincts and 
adaptations' I will present a case for the third. 
4.3.1.1 Instincts as habits 
It is important to note that behaviourists (broadly conceived) considered themselves to be good 
Darwinians. Indeed, viewed from a certain angle, behaviourism would seem to be the most 
Darwinian of the major schools of twentieth century psychology. It flowed from pragmatism, 
concentrated on a pragmatic view of learning and it brokered no principled distinction between 
species. John Watson clearly took himself to be true to Darwin. To justify the position that, "The 
behaviourist ... recognizes no dividing line between man and brute" (Watson, 1913: 15 8) and the 
benefits of homology over analogy he appealed to advances made in biology courtesy of Darwin in a 
very modem tone; 
The whole Darwinian movement was judged by the bearing it had upon the origin and development 
of the human race ... It is strange that this situation should have remained the dominant one in 
biology for so many years. The moment zoology undertook the experimental study of evolution and 
decent, the situation immediately changed. Man ceased to be the centre of reference (ibid: 161). 
Skinner too thought he was true to Darwin. 
You have precisely the same problems with operant behaviour that Darwin faced with evolution. 
Natural selection and operant conditioning are very similar. Both move purpose from before to after. 
This explains origination (Skinner in Cohen, 1977: 280). 
Nevertheless, behaviourism took the quest to replace instincts with habits and their formation as 
sound in evolutionary terms. Darwin issued the licence. 
How unconsciously many habitual actions are performed, indeed not rarely in direct opposition to 
our conscious will! ... Habits become easily associated with other habits, with certain periods of 
time, and states of the body. When once acquired, they often remain constant throughout life. 
Several other points of resemblance between instincts and habits could also be pointed out. As in 
repeating a well known song, so in instincts, one action follows another by a sort of rhythm; if a 
person be interrupted in a song, or in repeating anything by rote, he is generally forced to go back to 
recover the habitual train ofthought (Darwin, 1859: 192). 
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Darwin developed this line of thought in a comparison of what he took to be an obvious exhibition of 
a habit (an acquired action pattern) to the behaviour of a caterpillar building a hammock: if 
interrupted the caterpillar too will return to stage one of the "very complicated" operation. For 
Darwin the distinction between habit and instinct was not to be discerned in their exhibition - "the 
resemblance between what was originally a habit and an instinct becomes so close as not to be 
distinguished"(ibid: 192)- but in their origin. In Darwin's view, part ofthe difficulty stemmed from 
the fact that "slight variations of instinct might be profitable to a species" (ibid: 192). It is not 
difficult to see that a consequence of this is that whilst the possibility of variations is a result of 
natural selection, the cause of the variation exhibited is due to factors extrinsic to the organism. 
Darwin viewed habits as a form of functional adjustment bounded by the problems and needs faced 
by an organism in the course of its lifetime. 
He returned to and reinforced this point in The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals; 
... although some instincts have been developed through long-continued and inherited habit, other 
highly complex ones have been developed through the preservation ofvariations of pre-existing 
instincts- that is, through Natural Selection (Darwin, 1872/1998: 47). 
One of the earliest and most persistent critics of instinct theory was Knight Dunlap. Seizing on 
Darwin's conflation, he attempted to pick apart how one might be able to distinguish between 
instincts and habits; 
At the present time, I can see no way of distinguishing usefully between instinct and habit. All 
reactions are defmite responses to defmite stimulus patterns, and the exact character of the response 
is determined in every case by the inherited constitution of the organism and the stimulus pattern. 
All reactions are instinctive: all are acquired. If we consider instinct, we find it to be the form and 
method of habit-formation: if we consider habit, we find it to be the way in which instinct exhibits 
itself. Practically, we use the term instinctive reaction to designate any reaction whose antecedents 
we do not care, at the time, to inquire into; by acquired reaction, on the other hand, we mean those 
reactions for whose antecedents we intend to give some account. But let us beware of founding a 
psychology, social, general, or individual, on such a distinction (Dunlap, 1919: 92). 
What is especially noteworthy in this passage, aside it being an implication of Darwin's view, is the 
classification of the issue into theoretical and practical components. Dunlap suggested that any 
insistence on the pursuit of instinctive designations was, in effect, a resignation of the pursuit of 
cause. 
As the debate moved on through the twenties, amongst other difficulties, advocates of instincts 
could not shake off the apparently obvious fact that the behavioural repertoire of organisms comes to 
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be comprised of actions that were not evident in infancy. This left open the possibility that in their 
mature expression instincts were only explicable in terms of the concrete experiences of their 
possessors. In other words, 
... that instincts or inherited action patterns do not appear originally in defmite form, ready for the 
task of mediating adjustments ofthe organism to its environment, but that all instincts must be 
educated by learning (Bernard, 1924: 5). 
That Bernard went on to deny that the foregoing is a sound argument to the end that instincts are 
habits gives us some indication of how tenacious was the concept of instinct. He suggested that to 
say "all instinct must be educated by learning" "is rather a denial of the existence of instinct, or at 
least of definite inherited complex action patterns". And furthermore, "Such an admission would 
establish at once the primacy of environment and habit in the determination of individual character 
and of social adjustments and institutions" (ibid: 5). These words of Bernard describe with some 
accuracy the moves that presaged the switch of interest from instincts as inherited adaptations to 
their development as "serviceable habits". 
Dunlap's position in Habits: Their Making and Unmaking (1932) returned to and seized upon the 
difficulty of distinguishing instincts from habits and sought to establish the later as primary. 
Dunlap's overall case rests on what we might call the criterion problem: 
To maintain a contrast between unlearned reflexes and responses which are in part due to learning, 
we must in some way identify the unlearned, original reflexes [but] the distinction between the 
responses which are customarily listed as reflexes and other responses is not absolute, but it is a 
matter of gradation; and many reflexes are so modifiable that there is extreme difficulty is 
ascertaining what the original, unlearned reflex was. (Dunlap, 1932: 38). 
His next step is to show that one solution to this problem- Watson's recommendation that we 
observe and itemise the behaviours of the newborn - renders a list of instances of instinct that is too 
impoverished to explain the bulk of normal adult behaviour. Next Dunlap looked to show that 
another solution- the classification as instincts of all first-time responses- renders a list that would 
be being added to right up until death. Dunlap suggested that, by incorporating into the definition of 
instinct the qualification that it needs to be an unlearned response, one simultaneously denied the 
concept a criterion of satisfaction. He rested this point on the fact that, at the time of his writing, 
psychology was not in possession of a clear grasp of what a learned response was. 
In Dunlap's final approach habits are located between instincts and learning. In his hands, the 
concept of habit can accommodate that in the notion of instinct which ties humans to the rest of 
nature and that in the notion of learning which gives flexibility of response from one generation to 
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another. What was not dropped was the suggestion that the invocation of instinct amounted to a 
failure of interest in the causal antecedents of a given behaviour and, therefore, the absence of a 
scientific account. This I take to be the fundamental stance which behaviourists came to adopt. 
Habits became synonymous with instinct before being taken as superior in the construction of causal 
accounts of behaviour. 
I am not suggesting that behaviourism is of a piece with Darwinism. What Darwin meant by a 
"new footing" was not what Watson meant in his paper of 1913, Psychology as the Behaviourist 
Views it. The comparative psychology that appeared to be there was lost in the detail of accumulated 
and artificial stimulus-response matrices that came to be what behaviourism was in practise. In its 
disdain for grand theory, faculty psychology and cognition, behaviourism drifted away from 
evolutionary theory and the attendant respect for the differing natural histories of species. It missed 
the key point that Breland and Breland were to make long after the instinct debate: organisms are 
disposed toward certain behavioural patterns over others and are plastic only in relation to these 
dispositions (Breland & Breland, 1961 ). Behaviourism also imported a certain form of Lamarckism. 
The idea that the native environment of an organism could safely be ignored tells us that, along with 
a species-universal notion of association rules that differ only in their sequential complexity, 
behaviourism held a concept of behavioural plasticity that defied the speed at which adaptations 
could appear. The trouble with inferring a plasticity that affords substantial behaviour change within 
the lifetime of the organism is that, at least implicitly, it implies the past of the species need not be 
taken too seriously. What I am suggesting is that behaviourism took itself to be consistent with 
evolutionary theory. 
4.3.1.2 "Driving adjustments" 
The first sustained and influential shots against instinct theory were fired after the first world war. 
Amongst the responses was Tolman's Can instincts be given up in psychology? ( 1922). The paper is, 
essentially, a rhetorical piece which tried to show how impoverished psychology would become 
should it reject instinct- and with it evolutionary theory- altogether. But at the same time as 
defending instincts, Tolman also showed what was to be the fate of the concept. Tolman, in an 
attempt to further refine the definition of the term, suggested that the more modest "driving 
adjustment" take its place. We have here the beginning of what we might call the break-up of 
instincts as an explanatory monolith. The following is a list (it is not exhaustive) of terms that 
represent the break-up. It conveys something of what happened to the concept of instinct in social 
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psychology during the twenties, thirties and forties. I will pay attention to one of these ideas so to 
illustrate the point that instincts were not given up in psychology- Kuo 's "units of reaction". 
"Fundamental desires"- Dunlap, Elements of Scientific Psychology ( 1922). 
"Human proponent reflexes"- Allport, Social Psychology (1924). 
"Native impulse's"- Ellwood, The Psychology of Human Society, (1925) 
"Primary desires"- Dunlap, Civilized Life ( 1934) 
"Motives"- Gurnee, Elements of Social Psychology (1936) 
"Dependable motives"- Woodworth, Psychology (1929) and, later, Klinberg, Social 
Psychology (1940, 1953). 
"Drives"- Murphy, Murphy and Newcomb, Experimental Social Psychology (1937). 
"Viscerogenic and psychogenic needs"- Murray, Explorations in Personality (1939) 
Kuo's proposed alternative to instincts were "units of reaction", proposed in a volume titled 
Psychology without Heredity (1924). The title reflects his place amongst the least compromising 
critics of instincts. Indeed, so anxious did he seem to be to dispense with the concept, I am of the 
view that he rather misrepresents those he attacks: for example, he attributes to McDougall a 
dogmatism and a rigidity that is not evident in his writing (i.e. Kuo, 1921). As Tolman suggested, 
then, there is some irony in Kuo's alternative to instinct in understanding "man's native equipment". 
For Kuo "units of reaction" were "the elementary acts out of which various coordinated activities 
of later life are organized". They are reflexive in character and best described in physiological rather 
than neurological terms. Perhaps most importantly, Kuo rejects any notion that these early 
behaviours are "teleological" or have biological significance aside the "vegetative actions" such as 
eating, pain avoidance or excretion. 
Units of reaction are shaped by natural selection in the course of their development within the 
lifetime of an individual. Their results determine their future. This process of adjustment slows but 
never ceases thus allowing the individual to accommodate novelty throughout the lifespan: "On the 
whole, the plasticity of habits depends upon the richness of experience of the organism. The more 
experience or the more variety of stimuli it has, the less fixed and rigid are its organized reactions" 
(Kuo, 1921: 661). 
With regard to predicting the course and final shape that units of reaction might take, Kuo' s "chief 
contention" was that, 
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The type of integration of the elementary acts into complex reaction systems largely depends on the 
nature of the environment. .. If a man is born and raised in a highly civilized community, he may 
acquire a powerful trend of parental care which he extends to humanity as a whole and even to 
animals. On the other hand, if he is brought up in a savage tribe where the custom of cannibalism 
prevails, he may acquire a habit of taking pleasure in killing. At one time the same native equipment 
may be developed into compassion, while at others it may be developed into cruelty (Kuo, 1921: 
661). 
The similarity with Watson's "manifesto" is apparent. So too is the similarity with other authors 
who were keen to dispense with the term instinct but found use for some of its basic properties. 
Though there is variation in the list of concepts cited above, none entirely dispensed with a 
biological construal of motivation and the view that motives orientate individuals toward things that 
need to be achieved even if the final attainment comes through an acquired adjustment of initial and 
unlearned behaviours. 
4.4 Boring's trap 
My position is this: if one takes Tooby and Cosmides' lower estimate and views their Standard 
Model thesis as an historical account of the past sixty years in social psychology, then the instinct 
debate cannot be levelled against it. However, if one takes their upper estimate of the SSSM as being 
dominant for 100 years then the instinct debate refutes the thesis of the SSSM. It does so because the 
duration and extent to which instincts were put forward as explanatory devices in social psychology 
shows that the Standard Social Science Model is not a reliable representation of the late nineteenth 
and first quarter of the twentieth century. If we take James as our starting point, and the early thirties 
as the time of the demise of instinct theory, then the period over which instincts were a live issue 
covers forty years ofTooby and Cosmides century of the SSSM6. Few theoretical standpoints have 
been so extensively and lengthily dominant. 
Furthermore, instinct theory was positively Darwinian in cast- indeed, so much so that the instinct 
debate would not have taken place in the form that it did had it not been for Darwin and his 
influence. Whilst there has been a passing acknowledgement of this fact from within evolutionary 
psychology (e.g. Cosmides & Tooby, 1989), the caveat is added that the theorising was shallow (e.g. 
Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske & Wakefield, 1998). The definitions of instinct that configured 
the debate included the majority of key Darwinian notions, i.e., adaptive, heritable, selected for, 
species typical, unlearned, variable in expression, subject to modification, having a psychological 
dimension, and behavioural in manifestation. The predominance of instincts for and about social life 
shows the concept was of especial interest to social psychologists. This point is reinforced given that 
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no instinct theorist was more influential than McDougall and no volume more widely read than his 
Introduction to Social Psychology. 
Tooby and Cosmides thesis is further undermined when we look at what happened to the instinct 
concept. On the one hand it was converted into habit. On the other it was downgraded into notions 
such as "driving adjustments". Both notions can be traced back to Darwin. 
We will return to the concept of instinct again in Part III, 'Evolutionary Social Psychology without 
Adaptations'. To bring this part of the dissertation to a close I want to try and draw a lesson from the 
failure ofTooby and Cosmides' account ofthe intellectual history of social psychology. To do so I 
will draw upon Boring's APA presidential address of 1929, a year or so before the instinct debate of 
the early twentieth century ceased to be dominant. 
Edwin Boring's 1929 APA Presidential Address was titled The Psychology of Controversy. In the 
paper, Boring mined some of the controversies which constituted psychological debate in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to support the case that scientific movements have traits 
comparable to those of the protagonists themselves. 
Boring argued that the psychologist as "knower" of "the human mind that is both subject and 
object of his work", does not, in fact, enjoy any superiority over other scientists. This claim rests 
upon the argument that " ... yet not the behaviourist, nor the 'gestaltist', nor the purposivist, nor the 
late functionalist, nor even the introspectionist himself has yet to succeed in maintaining clear vision 
with the eye rotated through 180° to see the mind that is at work" (Boring, 1929: 97). Still, Boring 
was keen to place psychological research within the wider enterprise of scientific inquiry. He did so 
by showing that psychology was rooted in and driven by controversy, just as were the "exact 
sciences" . 
. . . I have come reluctantly to the conclusion that scientific truth, like juristic truth, must come about 
by controversy ... It seems to me that scientific truth must transcend the individual, that the best 
hope of science lies in its greatest minds being often brilliantly and determinedly wrong, but in 
opposition, with some third, eclectically minded, middle-of-the-road nonentity seizing the prize 
while the great fight for it, running off with it, and sticking it in a textbook for sophomores written 
from no point of view and in defence of nothing whatsoever (ibid: 98). 
Whilst taking this view to be "personally abhorrent" Boring claimed it to be the "verdict of the 
history of science". The claim is supported by a series of examples from psychology, including 
controversies that involved "ancients of the late nineteenth century" such as Mesmer, Fechner, 
Wundt and Stump, and contemporaries such as Titchener and Baldwin. Boring was keen to highlight 
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the language that coloured those debates, pointing out not just their rhetorical bent but also the air of 
personal antipathy. 
On a more promising note, Boring's second objective was to elucidate what he called the 
"negativism of progress". 
With respect to scientific movements there seems to exist something like Newton's third law of 
motion: action equals reaction. You cannot move - in the sense of starting a movement- unless you 
have something to push against. .. Science can actually, by the empirical method ... lift itself by its 
own bootstraps, but the result is not what we call a "movement" because motion can be defmed only 
with respect to a frame of reference. A movement must move with respect to something, and 
progress must move away from something, if the movement is to command observational attention. 
It is therefore the business of the founders of new schools, the promoters and propagandists, to call 
persistent attention to what they are not ... (ibid: 1 08). 
Boring gave a series of examples. One of these was the duel between functionalism and 
structuralism. In Boring's view, the dependency of apparent progress on negativism is tempered by 
the observation that some controversies are "often one sided because directed against no particular 
opposition". 
In those days the opposite of functionalism was structuralism, but nobody - except perhaps some 
graduate students- ever called himself a "structuralist". Titchener adopted the phrase "structural 
psychology" and abandoned it long before it went out of use. No, the functionalist had to have 
something definite to push against, and it was only they who talked about "structuralists" (ibid: 
110). 
It was Boring's view that observed progress so depends upon negativism that many of the apparent 
"fights" in psychology are, in fact, against "windmills" (ibid). 
One is unable to read The Psychology of Controversy in light of the tenor, tone and testaments of 
Tooby and Cosmides' account ofthe history of social science and fail think that what held in 
Boring's time holds now for evolutionary psychology and the Standard Social Science Model. 
Boring's contention was that the controversies of psychology elucidate the psychology of 
controversy. This, in turn, tells us something about the nature of scientific enterprise. My reason for 
discussing Boring's ideas are slightly different. I am of the view that evolutionary psychology has 
needlessly embroiled itself in an unwinable controversy from which it needs to extricate itself. 
First, as I have shown, psychological and behavioural thinkers have for long periods been 
immersed in the implications of Darwinism. It is plainly and factually incorrect for evolutionary 
psychology to deny this. And it is disingenuous to down-play it. Evolutionary psychologists who use 
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the term "Standard Social Science Model" and rhetorical equivalents (see the introductory comments 
in chapter 3) undermine their own much vaunted rigor. On Boring's account, they invite comparison 
with the arch windmill fighters oftwentieth century psychology, the behaviourists (Boring, 1929: 
11 0). 
Second, the Standard Model thesis encourages neglect of an extensive literature of carefully 
constructed arguments and closely fought debates that, at bottom, agreed on so much (see chapter 4). 
Now, whilst we may take Boring's point that "Respect for parents may be laudable and yet hinder 
the free development of youth", I am of the view that evolutionary psychology could profit from an 
emphasis on those agreements. Let us consider this in a little more detail. 
The instinct debate was comprised of two main antagonisms. The first ofthese was a discussion 
aimed at settling upon and refining terms. The objective was to develop the core notion of an instinct 
into an idea that would encompass mental content, mental processes and behaviour. It was 
acknowledged that not every natural phenomena was an instinct- even some things that were 
deemed to be adaptive- and a principled means of valid denotation was sought. The second sort of 
antagonism appears to have crept into the debate at a later stage. This second sort was more overtly 
confrontational and it marked the end of the instinct debate as a progressive exercise. It consisted of 
opposing sides, if you will, rather than schools. Dewey and Watson exemplify this difference. Both 
first embraced instincts, accepting them as a fact of human psychology and behaviour, albeit 
adopting different stances (Dewey, 1896; Watson, 1916a). Both later came to oppose instincts: I 
have in mind here Dewey's volume Human Nature and Conduct ( 1921) and Watson's Behaviorism 
( 1930). As opponents they sought not to discern to what extent instincts illuminated psychology and 
behaviour but to present a case to the end that the answer was "negligible". Schools of thought that 
sought to refine the concept of instinct gave way to sides which sought to undermine one another's 
basic position. In my view, evolutionary psychology has needlessly engaged itself in this second sort 
of antagonism. It may be able to extricate itself from this situation by retracting the thesis of the 
SSSM. Aside being closer to the facts of the history of social science in general and social 
psychology in particular, by retracting the thesis of the SSSM evolutionary psychology may be able 
to build upon past thinking. It can address those objections and problems that faced instinct theory 
rather than imply that any such objections are false by virtue of being motivated by something other 
than genuine critical inquiry. I am suggesting that evolutionary psychology can escape Boring's trap 
by using the history of psychology rather than becoming, prematurely, part of it. Using the terms 
Boring applied to behaviourism, I am suggesting that evolutionary psychology "is past its prime as a 
movement because movements exist upon protest" and it no longer needs to protest" (ibid: 111). 
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; 
1 It is also noteworthy that, just as did Wilson over one hundred years later, he based his argument on the 
behaviour of insects. 
2 A note on William James (1842-1910): James read Spencer's First Principles as an undergraduate. He was in 
Cambridge when The Descent was published in 1871, and his letters to friends at the time suggest that he was 
familiar with its contents (Richards, 1987). James' first lecture course of his own device was titled "Natural 
History 2: Physiological Psychology". It was explicitly concerned with the implications of evolution for the 
philosophy of mind and action. Spencer's Principles of Psychology was used as the core text. However, 
Spencer's volume increasingly served as a source of criticism for evolutionary thinking in psychology. James 
believed that Spencer's Lamarckism was an assertion to the effect of what we might call environmentalism-
that is, James thought Spencer to be advocating a form of what Tooby & Cosmides call the SSSM. He thought 
that Spencer saw the mind as overly passive in light of the need to be flexible. James argued in "Spencer's Law 
of Intelligence" that behaviour and its underlying physiology is not in a direct correspondence to the 
environment (not in some lock and key sense) but that behaviour is a result of a physiological response to 
problems. 
3 Cited in Drever, J., 1917: 17. 
4 Hearnshaw (1964) suggests that Drever's emphasis on the literature prior to Darwin was, in fact, designed to 
undermine McDougall's claims of originality. 
5 Every other page in each of these two chapters is headed with "Hereditary Modes of Response: Emotion" and 
"Hereditary Modes of Response: Emotion" respectively. I have not been able to ascertain if this method of 
presentation was due to Watson. 
6 Writing in 1955, Beach goes considerably further than the conclusion forwarded here: 
Although there are militant opponents of the instinct doctrine among present-day psychologists, it is 
undoubtedly correct to say that the concept of instincts as complex, unlearned patterns of behaviour 
is generally accepted in clinical, social, and experimental psychology (Beach, 1955: 408). 
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Part IT: The Environment of Evolutionary Adapted ness 
Chapter 5 The justification and conceptual role of the EEA 
. Summary of chapter 5 
Tooby and Cosmides (1990b, 1992) promote a concept called the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness 
(EEA) and place it at the heart of evolutionary psychology. The EEA refers to the set of conditions that created 
modern humans, it is their natural history. The role of the EEA as a concept is to furnish forth a specifically 
human psychology. The EEA marks a distinction between evolutionary psychology and other Darwin-inspired 
approaches to mind and behaviour, i.e. between the adapted mind approach and the adaptive mind approach. In 
this chapter we look at the concept of the EEA in use and the assumptions that it makes about natural history. 
5.1 Introduction 
I have, I hope, cast serious doubt on the historical validity of the Standard Social Science Model as 
the prevailing orientation in 20th century social psychology. It may be granted that, since the collapse 
of instinct theory, there has not been a sustained and explicit attempt to address questions in social 
psychology and the social sciences more widely from an evolutionary point of view. However, from 
this state of affairs it does not follow that atheoretical models of human behaviour and concomitant 
models of human nature have dominated social psychology. This part of the dissertation presents 
arguments to the end that the alternative view of social psychology presented by evolutionary 
psychology requires a conceptual device that is flawed. 
In this chapter an outline of the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA), its usage and its 
conceptual role will be presented. In the following chapters two classes of criticism ofthe EEA will 
be discussed. Of these, one class may be characterised as empirical, the other as conceptual. 
Empirically, the EEA can be criticised on three specific counts. One, it is contrary to the 
palaeoarcheological evidence to classifY the genus Homo as hunter-gatherers. Two, the EEA consists 
of both a set of physical and social causes. And three, the fossil evidence we have of the EEA does 
n9t predict and cannot account for novel behaviours that have emerged since. Conceptually, the EEA 
can also be criticised on three specific counts: that it is circular, that when not circular it invokes a 
vicious regression, and that it fails to deal with the problem of meaning in minds that are not, by 
definition, human. Let us now look further at the term "Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness." 
John Tooby and Leda Cosmides argue that the EEA is critical to our understanding of extant 
human psychology. The term, which entered the psychological lexicon courtesy of John Bowlby 
(1969), has become a common part of the terminological apparatus of evolutionary psychology (e.g. 
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Badcock, 2000; Buss, 1994, 1995; Buss, Haselton, Shackleford, Bleske & Wakefield, 1998; 
Campbell, 1999; Cartwright, 2000; Crawford, 1998b; Corballis & Lea, 2000; Foley, 1995c, 1996a, 
1996b; Gaulin & McBurney, 2001; Irons, 1998; Janice & Krebs, 1998; Kohn, 1999; Leubbert, 1999; 
Miller & Fishkin, 1997; O'Neil, 1998; Orians & Heerwagen, 1992; Riadh, 1998; Ridley, 1993; Rose, 
2000; Rose & Rose, 2000; Segal, 1998; Stevens & Price, 1996; Symons, 1979, 1990, 1992; Sinuts, 
1990; Thornhill, 1997; Wright, 1994), and it is at the heart of the enterprise. It is argued that the EEA 
is the environment which the human mind evolved to cope with and function in. We are to use this 
device as an overlay to the tenets of evolutionary theory if we are to be successful in constructing a 
principled model of the set of adaptations that is the phenomenon of mind. The supposition is that 
the EEA is our natural environment in the sense that it is the past and not the present that we evolved 
to cope with and act in. Accordingly, "the past explains the present" (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b). 
Let us now be a little more precise and look at Tooby and Cosmides' definition of the EEA. 
The "environment of evolutionary adaptedness" (EEA) is not a place or a habitat, or even a time 
period. Rather, it is a statistical composite of the adaptation-relevant properties of the ancestral 
environments encountered by members of ancestral populations, weighted by their frequency and 
fitness-consequences (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b: 386-7). 
Whilst other writings of theirs reiterate this definition, neither Tooby and Cosmides, nor those that 
take their lead, are so consistent as these passages suggest. In practise, the EEA is not reliably treated 
as "a complex statistical composite" of the past. In practise, and in terms of natural history, the EEA 
is typically characterised as being co-terminus with the Pleistocene (Barkow, 1992; Caporael & 
Baron, 1997; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Crawford, 1998b; Foley, 1995, 1996; Krebs & Denton, 
1997; Liken, 1995; Miller & Fishkin, 1997; Orians & Heerwagen, 1992; Profet, 1991, 1992; Tooby 
& Cosmides, 1990b, 1992). 
"Pleistocene" is the geological and palaeoanthropological term that covers the c.2 million year 
period prior to that which has seen the emergence of modern man, Homo sapien sapien. (The 
latest/current period is referred to as the Holocene). The beginning of the Pleistocene, also known as 
the early Pleistocene, saw the emergence of the genus Homo - the genus that encompasses modern 
man. We will have reason to return to some of the established geological and palaeoanthropological 
terminology in due course. 
In addition to "Pleistocene" there are a number of other terms which are more or less synonymous 
and are more or less interchangeable with the EEA. These include "the ancestral environment" (e.g. 
Crawford, 1998b; Mashman, 1997; Pinker, 1997; Proulx, 1999; Richardson, 1996; Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1990b; Watson, 1998; Wright, 1994), the "environment of selection" (e.g. Dennett, 1995) 
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and various uses ofthe term "heritage" (e.g. Bryne, 1999; Foley, 1995c; Orians & Heerwagen, 
1997). It must be noted, however, that these terms are not identical to the EEA. When used, they are 
typically done so to weaken the direct temporal and phylogenetic consequences of the mapping of 
the EEA onto the Pleistocene (e.g. Foley, 1996a). 
The reason for this comparative temporal isolation is clear. If we want to be species specific, if we 
want to furnish forth a human psychology, we must look to those aspects of the past that are 
responsible for what we take to be specifically human. David Buss displays this reasoning in relation 
to the important case of human sociality; 
It is unlikely that our huge brains - the 900 cubic-centimeter advantage we have over chimpanzees-
have evolved to help us pick berries or avoid snakes. These survival problems are all solved by 
chimps with a much smaller brain. 
It is far more likely that humans evolved such large brains as a consequence of the complexities of 
social living and social competition that includes forming coalitions, executing a rich repertoire of 
short-term and long-term mating strategies, negotiating the intricacies of complex kin networks and 
social hierarchies, forming long-term reciprocal alliances, and socializing children for years or 
decades (Buss, 1997: 399). 
The Pleistocene, in practice, is the EEA for all of those features, supposed or extant, that are 
particular to humans. Accordingly, Tooby and Cosmides, notwithstanding their claim that "The EEA 
is not a place or a habitat, or even a time period" (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b: 386), concede that; 
... for most ordinary analytic purposes, the EEA for a species (i.e. for its collection of adaptations) 
can be taken to refer to the statistically weighted composite of environmental properties of the most 
recent segment of a species' evolution that encompasses the period during which its modem 
collection of adaptations assumed their present form. We have used the word "Pleistocene" in this 
sense to refer to the human EEA, because its time depth was appropriate for virtually all adaptations 
of anatomically modem humans ... (ibid: 388). 
Having specified what period is being referred to by the term the "EEA" - its temporal aspect - we 
can also specify its spatial aspect. The place ofthe EEA is Africa. More precisely, it is 
predominantly eastern and, to a lesser extent, southern African (Wilson & Cann, 1992). This placing 
of the EEA follows the majority view of palaeoanthropologists that modern humanity is "Out of 
Africa" (Tattersall, 1997). However, we cannot be as sure of its location as we can its duration for 
there is some debate on the matter of where hominid development prior to modern man took place 
(Stringer, 1990). Again, we will have cause to revisit this issue when we discuss the social and the 
physical EEA in chapter 6. 
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5.2 What the EEA adds to evolutionary psychology 
It is important to consider why we might need a concept in addition to evolutionary theory to 
develop an evolutionary psychology. The first and most obvious motivation stems from the fact that 
evolution is a general theory, mathematical in nature, which claims to account for the functional 
features of any self- or sexually-reproducing organism. It is not specifically about humans. In fact, 
applied to all the distinct species that have ever existed, the human story would be difficult to find 
such would be the size of the library. Motivated as such, the EEA is a tacit admission that 
evolutionary theory in and of itself is not entirely adequate as a generator of hypotheses about 
psychological adaptations. As we will see, to suppose there is something right about an evolutionary 
approach to human psychology involves nothing more than the assumption that humans are evolved 
instances of an evolved species, species as a whole are exhibits of functional design in light of 
selection pressures and brains are no exception. This is indeed surely true. But we would have no 
need for a concept over and above evolution if evolution theory was adequate in and of itself. Let us 
now look at the need for the EEA in more detail. We can do so by first asking what it is that an 
evolutionary approach adds to our speculations about human psychology. 
Robin Dunbar ( 1988) has suggested that the proper question we should be asking about human 
psychology and behaviour in light of modern evolutionary theory is not whether the principles apply 
but to what extent. The (perfectly reasonable) assumption behind Dunbar's question is that since 
evolutionary theory is correct, it must have something to say about products of the process of natural 
selection, including modern humans. The answer to Dunbar's question is that evolutionary theory, in 
and of itself, says of humans only the following: 
• They will seek to have sex (i.e. to reproduce, to enter and maintain sex-based relations) 
• They will behave differently towards kin than they will toward non-kin (i.e. exhibit nepotism) 
• They will seek and, if at all necessary, compete for resources 
Furthermore, evolutionary theory says that, 
• Historically speaking, sex, kin and resource acquisition are what humans are about 
• Functionally speaking, sex, kin and resource acquisition are what humans are for 
It is for the reader to decide on the profundity of these statements. I am of the view that any 
statement which lays claim to certainty is, axiomatically, profound. What it is that these statements 
tell us for certain is what sorts of ends humans will consistently pursue and why they will do so (on 
the assumption that the given event can reasonably be linked to sex, social interaction or resource 
manipulation). However, I am also of the view these statements do not provide the sort of detail that 
psychological, social and behavioural science seeks, e.g. what class of humans do what sorts of 
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thing, approximately when, and, in the case of social psychology, to what other classes or sorts of 
group. 
What I would like to do in this section is discuss what that an evolutionary approach adds to 
questions and answers of the general sort social psychology deals with. This task breaks readily into 
two: an evolutionary approach to hypotheses (i.e. questions) and an evolutionary approach to 
conclusions (i.e. answers). The second task will be addressed in a later chapter. Here we will explore 
the way in which an evolutionary approach adds to or enriches our hypothesis generation. The 
answer is threefold. 
Firstly, it doesn't. Not being conversant with evolutionary theory does not, of necessity, restrict 
what it is one may postulate about psychology and behaviour. Evolutionary theory does not 
somehow open up lines of inquiry into human psychology and behaviour that could not, in principle, 
have been pursued otherwise. As was suggested above, evolutionary theory points us toward sexual 
behaviours, kin and non-kin relations and resource acquisition. But it is apparent these subjects have 
long been of interest to social psychology. For example, Tajfel (1970) and his followers were not, 
and did not need to be, inspired by an evolutionary approach to investigate in- and out-group 
formation and its persistence to formulate Social Identity Theory. 
Second, it promotes hypotheses that serve only to confirm the theory from which they are derived. 
Because evolutionary theory, in and of itself, says so little (however profound), hypotheses drawn 
directly from it must be relatively modest. Again, strictly speaking, hypotheses will be of the sort, 
"Humans will seek sex", "Humans will behave differently toward kin than they will toward non-kin" 
and "Humans will seek resources". It is not clear that there have ever been substantial bodies of 
thought in social psychology that would deny these statements. Accordingly, they have the 
appearance of being obvious. Certainly they are obvious to any that have or do subscribe to 
evolutionary theory and they appear to be obvious on inspection of the long-standing concerns of 
social psychology. An evolutionary approach simply adds justification to hypothesis generation in 
the areas of sex, kin and non-kin relations and resources acquisition. It tells us that natural history 
sanctions an emphasis on sex, kin relations and resource acquisition. This leads us to the third point 
that is raised when we ask in what way does an evolutionary approach add to hypothesis generation: 
it acts as a constraint. 
Subscription to the basic tenets of evolutionary theory limits what we might say to be the case of 
human psychology and behaviour. It cautions against negations of just those hypotheses it promotes. 
It recommends that we take a deeply skeptical approach to hypotheses to the effect that humans will 
not seek sex, humans will not discriminate between kin and non-kin and will not seek and, if 
necessary, compete for resources. Additionally, an evolutionary approach promotes skepticism that 
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such claims are historically sound and that a basis for them can be discerned in human anatomy and 
physiology. 
In light of these considerations I suggest that we accept the conclusion that, in actuality, 
evolutionary theory adds nothing to hypothesis generation about the nature of modern humans. At 
best it acts as a constraint, recommending only that we do not seek to test hypotheses that are, at 
bottom, negations of its principle tenets. What the preceding considerations do show is why it is we 
need to invoke something like the EEA. Now we can look further into the question as to what it is 
that the EEA adds to psychology. 
By invoking the EEA, evolutionary psychology is arguing that questions about the nature of 
modem humans demand that we become natural historians. To say something specific about human 
phenotypes and morphology one needs to isolate the natural history of the lineage. After all, the story 
of human evolution, strictly speaking, begins when the story of life on earth begins. We can now see 
that inclusive fitness has generated Homo sapien sapien. But this need not have been the case. 
Inclusive fitness necessarily applies to all sexual reproducers. The necessity of natural selection is 
what is meant by "Universal Darwinism" (Badcock, 2000; Dennett, 1995; Plotkin, 1995; Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1992). The great power of evolutionary theory is that it is not specifically or exclusively 
about humans. Darwin and Alfred Wallace did not appeal to the human species to demonstrate 
natural selection and the bulk of their peers did not require them to do so. However, the trouble with 
the very generality of evolutionary theory for social science is that it is not anthropomorphic. 
To make evolutionary theory an account about humans we must reach back into our natural 
history. Although there have been periods when very many species have suffered extinction (see 
Leakey, 1986), it is thought that total extinction of life on earth has never occurred. Thus there is a 
strain of continuity. But there is also some point at which the overall story begins to contain within it 
a genesis of the human: a point at which something like humanity began to be, in retrospect, possible 
because nature the tinkerer, at some point, began to tinker with something human-like. There are any 
number of possible points at which this became the case and there are a variety of views on this (see 
Foley, 1995c). A conservative view would posit the appearance of the great apes at the far end of this 
possible spectrum, the divergence of the australopithecine's from Pan troglodytes in the middle, and 
the appearance ofhominids (c.2 million years ago) at the near end. The EEA concept focuses our 
attention on those parts of the past which promise to add human detail. And it promises to add 
empirical detail because, though we may not be able to visit it, statements about it are, in positivist 
terms (Ayer, 1936) terms, verifiable at least in principle. 
The role of the EEA in evolutionary psychology is to: 
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• "Humanise" the general process of evolution 
• Psychologise that which is particularly human 
• Isolate key selection pressures in order to posit universal psychological adaptations 
• Overcome the analogous nature of comparative psychology and generate a homologous theory of 
psychology 
These considerations show that the EEA concept is vulnerable to criticisms that are not applicable 
to evolutionary theory. As a device, the EEA can fail- and with it attempts at an evolutionary social 
psychology that depends upon it. Ultimately, it is conceivable that we can accept that minds are 
evolved without being able to generate the adaptationist psychology proposed by Tooby and 
Cosmides. Let us now look at Tooby and Cosmides' argument in more detail. We can begin by 
considering the following passage; 
Wilson (1975) defmed an adaptation as "any structure, physiological process, or behaviour pattern 
that makes an organism more fit to survive and reproduce in comparison with other members of the 
same species". However, I would replace Wilson's word ~akes with the phrase made an ancestral to 
emphasize that adaptations came into being in an ancestral environment. (Crawford, 1998: 278). 
Here we are listening to a joint editor of volumes titled Sociobiology and Psychology: Ideas, Issues 
and Applications and Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology: Ideas, Issues and Applications. And 
here we see the proposed difference between sociobiology and evolutionary psychology writ plain. 
Fitness and functionality for the former is here and now, for the latter it is there and then. The role of 
the EEA is to determine what adaptations made ancestral Homo fit to survive and reproduce. The 
supposition is that the EEA caused modern humans. 
Let us now see how Tooby and Cosmides sanction this approach in evolutionary psychology. In a 
sub-section of The Psychological Foundations of Culture titled The Evolutionary Contribution to 
Integrated Explanation they present The Peculiar Nature of Biological Functionality. Its task is to 
reposition the concept of teleology. 
In certain narrowly limited ways, then, the spontaneous process of evolution parallels the intentional 
construction of functional machines by human action. But, whereas machines built by human 
engineers are designed to serve a diverse array of ends, the casual process of natural selection builds 
organic machines that are "designed" to serve only one very specialized end: the propagation into 
subsequent generations of the inherited design features that comprise the organic machine itself 
(Tooby & Cosmides, 1992: 53). 
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Tooby and Cosmides claim to subscribe to the "standard biological terminology" expressed in the 
statement "design features are selected for to the extent that they promote their inclusive fitness" 
(ibid: 53). They call this view "design-propagation". Their next move is to dismiss the idea that 
designs can be propagated by anything other than natural selection. The (seemingly ubiquitous) 
"benevolent deity or extraterrestrial being" is dismissed by an accusation that the world is not 
arranged for "human convenience". Viz, 
Wild horses could be born with saddle-shaped backs, luggage racks, and a spontaneous willingness 
to be ridden: chronic bacterial infections could jolt humans with caffeine every morning 45 seconds 
before they need to get up (ibid). 
And the possibility that pure chance is responsible for good design is also dismissed on the charge of 
human convenience. 
Similarly, the non-living world could be full of intricate functional arrangements not created by 
humans, such as mountains that naturally mimic hotels down to the details of closet hangers, electric 
wiring, and television sets (ibid). 
By showing that the world is not designed intelligently or perfectly, Tooby and Cosmides create 
room for natural selection to be the only viable account of any sort of biological design and 
organisation 1• Natural selection is the only known process able to create "peculiar" forms of semi- or 
sub-functional design. Imperfections in organisms demonstrate that natural selection is not 
teleological. 
The next move makes a return to inclusive fitness. Tooby and Cosmides' own "standard biological 
terminology'' for inclusive fitness, "design-propagation", suggests that to subscribe to inclusive 
fitness entails subscription to the idea that organisms, including humans, are reproduction 
maximisers: that first and foremost, humans are about reproduction. The obvious question, then, is, 
Why not study them that way? Why not treat them as if totally disposed toward the goal of 
immortality via sex and kinship. Their rejoinder, 
A life history of successfully achieved reproduction (including kin reproduction) requires 
accomplishing the entire tributary network of preconditions for and facilitation's of reproduction in 
complex ecological and social environments. Of course, this includes all of the information 
gathering, inference, and decision-making that these tasks entail. For this reason, humans display a 
diverse range of adaptations designed to perform a wide and structured variety of subsidiary tasks .. 
. (ibid: 54). 
To this point their argument is not quite finished. In saying that, "Individual organisms are best 
thought of as adaptation-executors rather than as fitness-maximisers", Tooby and Cosmides are 
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saying that psychology must break down design-propagation as a whole into the tasks that comprise 
the whole. Most importantly, we must establish what these tasks were and not what they are or might 
be for any given extant human or population. Accordingly, the implication of the following is that 
social psychology must become overtly historical; 
Natural selection cannot directly "see" an individual organism in a specific situation and cause 
behaviour to be adaptively tailored to the functional requirements imposed by that situation .... 
Selection acting over evolutionary time has constructed the mechanisms we have inherited in the 
present, and it is this set of mechanisms that regulates our behaviour- not selection directly (ibid: 
54). 
Tooby and Cosmides conjoin the propositions that minds are adaptations, that adaptations are 
modular, and that adaptations are our collective inheritance from the past. They then show how 
evolutionary psychology distinguishes itself from what they call Darwinian Social Science: viz., " 
humans as fitness maximisers (fitness-teleology) versus adaptation-executors (adaptationism)". Here 
is the example they use to illustrate their point: 
Fitness teleologists may observe a situation and ask something like, "How is Susan increasing her 
fitness by salting her eggs?" An adaptionist would ask, instead, "What is the nature of the evolved 
human salt preference mechanisms - if any - that are generating the observed behaviour and how 
did the structure of these mechanisms mesh with the physiological requirements for salt and the 
opportunities to procure salt in the Pleistocene?" (ibid). 
Tooby and Cosmides place in the very front row of evolutionary psychology the idea that it has 
and uses knowledge of the past. Moreover this knowledge is very specific and it is of the very distant 
past of(to use Foley's phrase) "humans before humanity". The conceptual role of that human past-
the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness- is to generate hypotheses. And these hypotheses, if 
confirmed, are then taken to be statements about the component parts of human mental functioning. 
Our next task is to show how the concept of the EEA is used in practice. 
5.3 The EEA in use 
In this section we will look at ways in which a prominent evolutionary social psychologist appeals to 
the past and how the concept of EEA is used in practice. The examples given pertain to what is, 
arguably, amongst the most important aspects of social psychology- important in that these aspects 
of behaviour have traditionally been of considerable interest - sex and mating. 
Before we look at the EEA in use, I want first to explicate the method by which one may determine 
whether or not the concept of the EEA is, or has been, invoked. To see if any given hypothesis or any 
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account of any given psychological or behaviour data invokes the EEA (or a functional equivalent), 
all that is required is to ask the question: does the hypothesis or account make an assumption(s) 
about a non-extant organism and/or the environment to which it was adapted and/or needed to adapt 
to? In practice, the organism in question is typically a hominid and the environment is the group in 
which that hominid functioned. Where one finds such an assumption one finds an appeal to the EEA. 
As an instance, imagine any evolutionary account of language. Because it is widely accepted that 
chimpanzees do not possess language as it is possessed by modern humans (Brown, 1986), and 
because australopithecines appear to have had a brain akin to that of chimpanzees (in terms of size 
and endocasts ), the advent of language occurred by virtue of the features of the EEA. As a general 
rule, then, take it that the EEA is being invoked whenever a behaviour or trait not evident in the 
known repertoire of extant great apes is supposed and/or whenever a selection pressure that is not 
known to have exerted itself on the great apes is supposed. (Should one wish to be narrower, we may 
replace the category "great apes" with African apes.) 
To reinforce the point, we can look at it this way: the EEA is not being invoked when some appeal 
is being made to a general evolutionary principle such as parental investment. Any period in natural 
history may be invoked to support ideas to the end that humans are, in some sense, governed by 
parental investment. And any sexually reproducing species will offer a model for comparison. The 
EEA is invoked when one wishes to say something particular, species-specific and/or build a model 
of the adaptation(s) that govern parental investment in modern humans. 
Having clarified a rule-of-thumb which will tell us when the EEA is being invoked we can now 
look at some examples. Those I give are taken from the work of David Buss. Buss is probably the 
foremost and most prolific evolutionary social psychologist researching sex and mate choice. Here I 
will focus on his contribution to The Adapted Mind. This choice enjoys the benefit of being based on 
one ofthe most extensive studies conducted into mate preferences. (Buss, 1989a; Buss eta/, 1990). 
The work has also been influential and very widely read. First published in Behavioural and Brain 
Sciences in 1989, at the time of writing it has been cited by other authors in science and social 
science journals 319 times (Web of Science citation search, 24/05/01 ). The examples I give show 
how the EEA is invoked, what it is supposed to have consisted of, and what sorts of claim it 
supports. In the chapter Mate Preference Mechanisms: Consequences for Partner Choice and 
Intrasexual Competition (1992a) Buss assumes that, 
o Hominid females lived well beyond menopause and that males with a preference for mating with 
"older" women would have been subject to negative selection (ibid: 250). 
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• Hominid males were able to understand and transmit information regarding the "reputation" of 
females, "i.e. knowledge gleaned from others regarding the age, health, condition, appearance, 
behaviour, and prior sexual conduct of a female" (Buss, 1992a: 250). Additionally, "Observed 
cues or reputation suggesting that a female has diverted (or might divert) [reproductive value and 
potential] to another male should be disfavoured; those suggesting fidelity should be favoured. 
One cue that appears to be afforded by reputation is chastity- the lack of prior experience in 
sexual intercourse. Still another consideration is nurturance - which could provide a cue to good 
mothering skills .... To the degree that prior sexual experience by males provides this clue [to 
promiscuity] females also should value chastity in a potential mate" (ibid: 250-1 ). The clear 
implication is that it is known that something like monogamy or at least serial monogamy was 
the norm in hominid populations. 
• Hominid males potential r max value was enhanced by virtue of their "capacity to sire offspring 
across the lifespan [and] into the fifties, sixties etc." (ibid: 250). 
• Hominid females both preferred resource-holding males and were capable of judging whether a 
potential mate would acquire resources by virtue of "ambition, industriousness and intelligence" 
(ibid: 251 ). 
• What is frequently referred to as "Machiavellian Intelligence" (Byrne & Whiten, 1988)- tactical 
deception in chimpanzees and some other primates - had developed in the EEA such that 
hominid females would "lie about their age, alter their appearance, and conceal prior sexual 
encounters". Hominid males, on the other hand, would "exaggerate their resource holdings, 
inflate perceptions of their willingness to commit, and feign love to induce a female to mate with 
them" (Buss, 1992a: 252). This ability (and, indeed, need) to deceive is allied to the ability in 
hominids of both sexes to adopt and successfully deploy either long or short term mating 
strategies according to some (implicitly or explicitly) perceived benefit. 
• That "tactics" employed by hominids in the EEA included "deception and dissembling", 
bragging, the alteration and improvement of appearance, emotional manipulation and derogation 
of competitors via the manipulation of their reputation (ibid: 251-252). 
• Additionally, in keeping with the appellation of a capacity to construct a theory of mind 
sufficiently complex to deceive a conspecific about one's age or emotional attachment, hominids 
are invested with the capacity to accurately judge one another's intelligence. Amongst other 
things, hominid intelligence is said to comprise of "understanding ... capacity to cope with 
changing circumstances ... a host of social skills involved in negotiating complex interpersonal 
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arrangements, intricate constellations of allies and foes and extended kin networks" (ibid: 255-
6). 
These assumptions are about the past, and they are presented as facts, or quasi-facts of the natural 
history of modern humans. As facts about the past Buss uses them to propose further facts about the 
present. Let us briefly look at two other examples from other evolutionary social psychologists of 
how the EEA is used in mating studies. The assumptions each makes are, I think, apparent. 
In contrast to environments encountered by some humans today, that involve relatively low levels of 
parental investment (e.g., father-absent societies), the stable pattern for humans over hundreds of 
thousands of years is likely to have been one that included maternal and paternal involvement with 
offspring and emotionally intimate relations between mates .... Because Pleistocene mothers were 
apt to have spent much of their time gathering (to provide the primary food source for the family), 
fathers - perhaps even more so than today - were apt to have been heavily involved with their 
offspring for a large percentage of time each day. (Miller & Fishkin, 1997: 199). 
Because of the small size of groups, the nomadism, the lack of alternatives to mothers' milk for 
nourishing young, the mother and her mate would have been the primary target of succorance 
requests by the child. This kind of child played a major and active role in sustaining a high level of 
parental investment. Even though other members could assist the parents, it would be unlikely that a 
system of substantial surrogate caretaking would develop (Drapter & Harpending, 1988: 358). 
Bear in mind that Tooby and Cosmides claim that for each supposed problem there is in the 
modern human mind an adaptation. Following the adapted mind view, Miller and Fishkin, and 
Drapter and Harpending are arguing that these adaptations are fixed mechanisms in the human mind. 
The situations in which these adaptations are embedded constitute the natural environment of 
humans. The EEA, as depicted, is the inescapable and unalterable condition to which humans are 
attuned. It has fixed our mental functions just as surely as it has fixed the properties of our hearts. Let 
us now follow Tooby and Cosmides' advice and see if these assumptions are consistent with those 
disciplines that concern themselves with the natural history of the human lineage. In the next chapter 
we will look at the palaeoanthropological and archaeological evidence of human evolution. 
1 I leave it the reader to think of how very much more convenient a place the world would be should "Wild 
horses ... etc." 
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Chapter 6 Empirical problems in trying to specify the EEA 
Summary of chapter 6 
This chapter aims to explicate more fully than has hitherto been the case the difficulties of recovering the 
details of the EEA. Specifically: the evidence which suggests that Homos prior to Homo sapien sapien were 
not hunter-gatherers in the same sense as are modem humans and neurological differences are considered; the 
problem of discerning which of the several hominid species issued Homo sapien sapien and a distinction 
between physical and social forces of selection is discussed; and the tendency to take as natural history the 
constituent propositions of evolutionary theory is criticised. The general conclusion is that Too by and 
Cosmides underestimate the difficulty of ascertaining the natural history that their program demands and 
evolutionary psychologists overlook the fossil record. 
6.1 Introduction 
The problem of reconstructing the past has been indicated by a number of authors (e.g. Corballis & 
Lea, 2000; Gould, 1991, 1997, 2000; Rose, H, 2000; Sober, 1984, 1988), but they have not been 
fully examined with the Tooby and Cosmides and the EEA in mind. The reason for this appears to be 
due to" ... the belief that late twentieth-century people can know the human psychological 
architecture of our early ancestors with any degree of certainty and accuracy is difficult to take 
seriously" (Rose, H. 2000: 118). Accordingly, " ... many social scientists looking at the construction 
of the family produced by EP [evolutionary psychology] see them as embarrassingly like the 
Flintstones" (ibid). Still, as Rose points out, there are disciplines that seek to discover and describe 
the pre-history of our species. It is to the findings of these projects that we turn to too see if the EEA 
as used is supported by the evidence. In order to support the criticisms that comprise the next three 
sections we can take licence from Tooby and Cosmides. This is granted by their plea that the 
psychological and behavioural sciences be integrated. A brief exploration of the aspect of their 
Integrated Causal Model that Tooby & Cosmides call "conceptual integration" is necessary 
(Cosmides, Tooby & Barkow, 1992; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Recall that conceptual integration 
differs from vertical integration in that the former insists on no epistemic privileges for one 
discipline over another. 
Conceptual integration has been such a powerful force in the natural sciences not only because it 
allows some scientists to winnow out improbable hypotheses or build aesthetically pleasing bridges 
between disciplines, but because it has been crucial to the discovery of new knowledge ... 
Evidence about cultural variation can help cognitive scientists decide between competing models of 
universal cognitive processes; evidence about the structure of memory and attention can help cultural 
anthropologists understand why some myths and ideas spread quickly and others do not; evidence 
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from evolutionary biology can help social psychologists generate new hypotheses about the design 
features of the information processing mechanism that govern social behaviour; evidence about 
cognitive adaptations can tell evolutionary biologists something about the selection pressures that 
were present during hominid evolution; evidence from palaeoanthropology and hunter-gatherer 
studies can tell developmental psychologists what kind of environment our developmental mechanism 
were designed to operate in; and so on. 
. . . by calling for conceptual integration in the behavioural and social sciences we are neither calling 
for reductionism nor for the conquest and assimilation of one field by another. Theories of selection 
are not theories of psychology; they are theories about some ofthe causal forces that produced our 
psychology. And theories of psychology are not theories of culture; they are theories about some of 
the causal mechanism that shape cultural forms. In fact, not only do the principles of one field not 
reduce to those of another, but by tracing the relationships between fields, additional principles often 
appear (Cosmides, Tooby & Barkow, 1992:11-12). 
Now, there are a number of noteworthy implications in this passage. However, it is the general 
tenor to which I wish to draw attention. Tooby and Cosmides' attitude toward the history of the 
social sciences notwithstanding, there is a clear suggestion that disciplines enjoy no privileges over 
one another; they sit in no "epistemological or status hierarchy". Tooby and Cosmides invite us to 
examine the evidence produced and found by palaeoanthropology and archaeology. Moreover, their 
case about the utility of the past and its power to explain the present rests upon what it is that the past 
actually tells us. We can begin by seeing if evolutionary psychology's most common model of 
humans withstands scrutiny. I have in mind here the supposed synonymy of the EEA and hunter-
gatherers. 
6.2 Hunter-gatherers as the EEA 
Treating the EEA as synonymous with the Pleistocene, or the ancestral environment as synonymous 
with Pliocene and Pleistocene, is a means of bracketing a set of problems. A common shorthand is 
used for the set of problems that amounted to the Pleistocene. It is "hunting and gathering". More 
precisely, it is common for evolutionary psychologists to precis the archaeological and 
palaeontological records into an EEA that is identical to the suite of problems faced and solved by 
extant hunter-gatherers (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Wilson & Daly, 
1992). Viz., 
If our goal is to understand evolved human propensities ... It seems reasonable to seek out those 
humans today who experienced a social environment most similar to that of our Pleistocene 
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ancestors: Such humans would be most likely to manifest behaviour that provides a window on our 
human evolutionary heritage. (Miller & Fishkin, 1997: 218). 
Turning the EEA into a set of problems more or less equivalent to those faced by extant and 
documented hunter-gatherers circumvents the profound difficulty of reconstructing the past. Thus, 
the rejoinder to the claim that the EEA is unknowable is that we do not need to recreate it because it 
is exhibited in the present (and an extensively recorded recent past). On this account the means of 
subsistence deployed by earlier forms of Homo, through to the appearance of Homo sapien sapien 
c.l 00 000 years ago and up to the advent of agriculture 10-15 000 years ago was a blend of hunting 
and gathering. Thus Cosmides, Tooby and Barkow state: 
... our ancestors spent the last two million years as Pleistocene hunter-gatherers, and, of course, 
several hundred million years before that as one kind of forager or another .... The few thousand 
years since the scattered appearance of agriculture is only a small stretch in evolutionary terms, less 
that 1% of the two million years our ancestors spent as Pleistocene hunter-gatherers (Cosmides, 
Tooby & Barkow, 1992: 5)1• 
Accordingly, that specific form of living, that set of problems, is indelibly stamped on a mind 
adapted to solve them. Taken as a whole, then, the claim is that the modern mind is, essentially, a 
hunter-gatherer machine by virtue of the fact that it evolved to guide its possessor through that 
particular form of subsistence. In addition, the forms of social life that are either conducive to, or are 
a product of (or some combination of the two), hunting and gathering also create social problems and 
needs that the mind is adapted to negotiate. 
This view is taken from anthropology. The "Man the Hunter" hypothesis appears to have reached 
its apogee following publication of Lee and DeVore's edited volume ofthe same name in 1968. 
Subsequently Glynn Isaac, amongst others, promulgated this view (e.g. Isaac, 1977, 1978). In 
Foley's (1988) view, Man the Hunter became, in substantial part, an "axiom" of hominid evolution, 
engendering a homologous model ofthe taxa. Lewis Binford (1985) uses the term "consensus view". 
For evolutionary psychology the difficulty of this position is two-fold. On the one hand, the 
consensus view of the late sixties and seventies has crumbled because there is no firm evidence to 
the end that hom in ids other than Homo sapien sapien were hunter-gatherers in the sense that Homo 
sapien sapien are hunter-gatherers. On the other hand, it may be that typing modern humans as 
hunter-gatherers is unjustified. Explicating the reasons for this doubt necessitates a furnishing of 
some more information from the palaeoanthropological record. 
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6.2.1 Hunting and gathering, but not as we know it 
Let us assume that conceptual integration, as expressed by Tooby & Cosmides, is sincerely held-
and we may in this instance take it to be sincere given that anthropologists are cited in support of the 
Homo the hunter-gatherer view. In this case we would expect Tooby and Cosmides to obey their own 
dictum and accept that a best or definitive characterisation of "hunter-gatherer" is not to be found in 
the psychological sciences. This is a reasonable position. The term "hunter-gatherer" rarely appears 
in dictionaries or encyclopaedias of psychology, it rarely appears in the indices of textbooks and it 
was not a currency of psychological discourse prior to the advent of evolutionary psychology (just as 
claims for the originality and newness of evolutionary psychology would suggest). Under these 
conditions the following argument may be developed. 
• Anthropology furnishes the most complete description for the term "hunter-gatherer" 
• Evolutionary psychology defers to the furnished term 
• Anthropology holds to the view that Homo's prior to Homo sapien sapien were not hunter-
gatherers in the same sense that Homo sapien sapien is taken to be. 
• Therefore, what we see as extant hunter-gatherer behaviour and the hunter-gatherer "form of 
life" does not furnish evolutionary psychology with an EEA. 
The key premise in this argument is the third: anthropology holds the view that Homos prior to 
Homo sapien sapien were not hunter-gatherers in the same sense that Homo sapien sapien is taken to 
be. Let us examine some of the reasons to doubt that hominids in general and, more particularly, 
Homos prior to Homo sapien sapien were or even could have been hunter-gatherers in the modern 
sense. 
• Homos prior to Homo sapien sapien are speciated according to morphological differences, most 
notably brain size and organisation as indicated by cranial shape and capacity (Stringer, 1992). 
These differences are taken to imply behavioural differences not stasis (Mellars, 1990). 
• The earliest "archaic" (i.e. African Homo heidelbergensis) male forms, whilst more or less 
modern in biomechanical terms, were more robust than modern forms. Their bones were heavier 
and they had greater muscle mass (Wood, 1992). These differences imply a different diet to that 
required by Homo sapien sapien (Aiello, 1992). Moreover, the evidence suggests that the sexes 
were more dimorphic. If anything, this implies that the division of subsistence labour between 
the sexes was more acute than seen in modern forms (Foley, 1988). 
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• The evidence suggests that Homo's prior to Homo sapien sapien were not central place foragers 
(Binford, 1985). This suggests that they did not share food in anything like the same way as do 
Homo sapien sapien hunter-gatherers. 
• The brain size of pre "archaic" forms (i.e. Homo erectus) suggests that females neither needed or 
had the same amount and sort of fat and protein to support foetal brain development during 
gestation (Aiello, 1992). 
• Although it is accepted that the hominid line as a whole is distinguished by its bipedalism, the 
pelvic anatomy of all but the immediate precursors to Homo sapien sapien suggests that they did 
not enjoy mobility or speed to match our own (Day, 1985). This has implications for what was 
hunted, how it was hunted, and why. 
• If tool manufacture and use is taken to indicate something about diet- as it customarily is (e.g. 
Isaacs, 1972)- then the evidence suggests that modern hunters-gatherers do not subsist in a 
comparable manner even to immediate predecessors. The archaeological record suggests two 
sorts of marked difference. The tool technology of moderns shows variety across geographical 
space within regions compared to similarity across the continents of Asia, Africa and Europe for 
other Homos. And the tool technology of moderns shows repeated innovations as opposed to 
stasis of design over tens and hundreds of thousands of years (Me liars, 1990). Even as presented 
by a prominent advocate of evolutionary psychology, the sophistication of Homo sapien sapien 
tool manufacture and use has no predecessor (Pinker, 1997: 199) 
• There appear to have been multiple radiation's out of Africa into Europe and Asia following 
what is taken to be the first radiation of erectus c.l million years ago (Foley, 1987a). These 
radiation's are notable in two senses. Firstly, most were doomed (Tattersall, 2000). Secondly, 
those that enjoyed prolonged success restricted themselves to temperate, tropical and sub-
tropical climates in the Old World continents (Foley, 1987a). The implication is that pre-
moderns Homos were far more habitat specific than Homo sapien sapien. Turner ( 1984) suggests 
that this tie to certain habitats is in keeping with large carnivorous mammals in general. It is not 
consistent with the range of environs and climates Homo sapien sapien and extant hunter-
gatherers are known to successfully occupy. 
• There is reason to suppose that a number of Homo lineages were extant at the same time 
(Tattersall, 2000). Further to co-existence (and in the case of neanderthalis and Homo sapien 
sapien this is taken to be almost certain, see Trinkaus & Shipman, 1993; Klein, 1996), there is 
the possibility of competitive replacement. (Competitive replacement simply refers to 
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competition between Homo species over the same resources.) There are two implications of this. 
The first is that two distinct forms of subsistence were in operation (ibid). And the second is that 
these differing modes of subsistence were the result of distinct selection pressures. 
The various forgoing considerations have led to the collapse of the orthodoxy of "Man the Hunter" 
(Foley, 1988; Binford, 1985). Robert Foley maintains that whilst it probable that early hominids did 
hunt, their diet was not heavily dependent on meat. On balance, Foley concludes that it is" ... 
untrue to say that early hominids were full hunter-gatherers in the same way as modern hunter-
gatherers" (Foley, 1988: 211). He goes on, 
Overall, there is a declining willingness among palaeoanthropologists to accept the existence of 
modem forms of subsistence behaviour among anatomically pre-modem humans. It seems quite 
probable that the earlier hominids did eat meat, but that this was not integrated into a central place 
foraging and food-sharing system as found among modem hunter-gatherers (ibid: 212). 
Despite being omnivorous there is no reason to assume that their foraging behaviour was of the same 
level of organisation as modem hunter-gatherers in terms of planning depth, scheduling, subsistence 
activity and foraging flexibility. In the absence of clear-cut evidence for central place foraging similar 
to that of modem hunter-gatherers, inferences about the social and sharing behaviour of early 
hominids must be tentative only. In other words, if the term hunter gatherer is to mean more than just 
wild resource omnivory (in which case it would include baboons, chimpanzees and many other 
animals!), then early hominids were neither human nor hunter-gatherers, (ibid: 215). 
In light of these considerations from "an adjacent discipline", and in this case the one to which we 
must turn to for advice about the EEA (Cosmides & Tooby, 1989: 40), we must conclude that the 
casual assumption that the EEA or the Pleistocene is in some sense equivalent to hunting and 
gathering is unwarranted. Accordingly, Foley suggests that we revise the claim that 
Cultural man has been on earth for some 2 000 000 years; for over 99 percent of this period his has 
lived as a hunter-gatherer ... Of the estimated 80 billion men who have ever lived out a life-span on 
earth, over 90 per cent have lived as hunter gatherers" (Lee & De Yore, 1968a: 3. Cited in Foley, 
1988: 208). 
Should we revise our chronological scheme subsequent to the conclusion that palaeoanthropologists 
are unwilling to "accept the existence of modern forms of subsistence behaviour among anatomically 
pre-modern humans", the hunter-gatherer foundation for evolutionary psychology that Tooby and 
Cosmides recommend is weakened. On the standard and conservative assumption that the genus 
Homo is c.2 million years old and that Homo sapien sapien is 100 000 years old, hunter-gathering as 
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we know it to be exhibited by Homo sapien sapien has occupied 5% of that period. Should we insist 
on a very close tie between tools and subsistence the period is shorter still (Mellars, 1990). 
There is a cautionary tale here. One of the key reasons why the "Man the Hunter" hypothesis was 
doubted was due to the variety of hominids that lived during the Pleistocene. That there were several 
distinct Homo species prior to Homo sapien sapien encourages and tallies with the idea that they 
embodied marked differences in subsistence. These differences are the evidence that evolution has 
taken place. Accordingly, for evolutionary psychology to "air brush" these differences undermines 
the very evidence it alludes to for scientific support. 
6.2.2 Are modern humans hunter-gatherers? 
Research conducted in the name of evolutionary psychology appears to absorb the debates within 
archaeology and palaeoanthropology about hominid subsistence behaviour by adopting a relaxed or 
loose conception of hunter-gatherers. For example, if we look at the work of Buss (see above) we get 
the impression that hunter-gatherer means that Homos in the EEA lived in groups of undefined size 
but not in the thousands: men did the hunting and it is suggested that sharing took place but it is not 
said how often they hunted, or with whom, precisely, they shared: women did most of the gathering 
and possibly assisted one another with childcare. And so on. A relaxed treatment of the term hunter-
gatherer seems to be constructed and constrained by importing only those putative forms of meat 
eating and acquisition provided for us by social and cultural anthropology. Unfortunately this move 
invites a difficulty. By weakening the definition of hunter-gatherer such that Homos prior to Homo 
sapien sapien may be classed as hunter-gatherers we introduce the possibility that modem humans 
are not best characterised as hunter-gatherers. The reasoning is as follows. 
Most considerations of the cognitive capability and plasticity of Homo prior to Homo sapien sapien 
take into consideration their means of subsistence (e.g. Me liars, 1990; Mithen, 1996; O'Donnell, 
1999). Combinations and proportions of hunting and/or scavenging and/or gathering and/or foraging 
are used in support of a given profile and estimate of the cognitive capabilities of a given species. 
The extent ofthe cognitive capability proposed of the given Homo is constrained by the means of 
subsistence it is known to have been capable of devising. What are taken to be quasi- or pseudo-
scientific accounts aside2, the bulk of accounts of the Pleistocene in terms of the minds of its 
occupants appeal to the evidence of material and social technology (Clark, 1997; Foley, 1992; 
Jowlett, 1992; Mellars, 1990; Potts, 1992; Rensch, 1972). Slight alterations in assumptions ofwhat 
ratios of hunting, gathering, and foraging amounted to the subsistence sum of a given Homo radically 




The supposed cognitive capability of a given Homo may be enhanced by the insertion of what we 
might call a reversion clause: a given Homo may have been capable of reverting to a previous form 
of subsistence. In this way, cognitive capacity is cumulative. The reversion clause is not matched 
with what we might call a prospective clause. This is to say, it is not assumed that the archaeological 
evidence expresses only a fraction of what the organism was in fact capable of from a cognitive point 
of view. Thus, a given Homo is not taken to be capable of, say, a pastoral existence if there is not 
evidence that it lived a pastoral existence. Material evidence is taken as the final arbiter. 
Accordingly, 
Because modem hunter-gatherers are often presumed to provide a reasonable picture of early human 
foragers, and living apes are closely related to modem humans, studies of these two groups might 
provide an insight into early hominid life. Such field studies are no doubt significant, but any more 
specific inferences about the behaviour and ecology of early hominids must rely on material 
evidence from the geological record. (Potts, 1992: 326). 
A consequence of approaching cognitive capacity via the evidence permits one to argue that 
modern humans are not hunter-gatherers. We need only look toward population numbers together 
with the archaeological record. Consider the following. Although subject to variation of c.±40 000 
years, Homo sapien sapien is commonly estimated to be 100 OOOyears old (Ardley, 1961; Corballis, 
1991; Foley, 1987c, 1995c; Wood, 1997; Tattersall, 2000). Whilst a hunter-gatherer subsistence 
accounts for 85-90% of that time for most populations (obviously for all of the period in the case of 
current hunter-gatherers) it is only true to say with any certainty that modern man can hunt and 
gather. It seems likely the historical record will show that, 500 000 years hence, hunting and 
gathering will have formed 15% (or so) of our total history, and 1 million years hence it will have 
formed less that 8%, and so on (unless an argument can show that we will revert to a hunter-gatherer 
subsistence). The point to be made is that it may be premature to say that modern man is, in some 
essential sense, a hunter-gatherer. 
In addition, on consideration of the geological and archaeological record for modern humans we 
find (alongside art, abstract media of exchange, symbol systems) a completely novel form of 
subsistence to have come about in the form of agriculture. Moreover, estimates of population growth 
suggest that very many more Homo sapien sapiens in terms of brute head-count have existed in and 
exhibited this form of subsistence than hunting and gathering (Rensch, 1972; Tooby & Cosmides, 
1992). The same sort of argument can be proposed for industrialised populations. In other words, a 
concentration of hunter-gatherers and hunter-gathering as a form of subsistence because they and it 
exhibit the modem mind functioning in its "natural" setting is of no especial help because it is not at 
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all clear that modem man is a hunter-gatherer per se. It follows that it may be a romantic perversion 
to talk of any concomitant environment as natural to him. 
It needs to be noted that this is not to say that Homo sapien sapien cannot subsist as a hunter-
gatherer any more than it is to say that earlier Homos could not revert to means of subsistence that 
preceded hunting and gathering. Obviously the modem mind exhibits the facility to adopt a hunter-
gatherer strategy, but it also exhibits the facility for agriculture. That facility is not something 
palaeoanthropologists assume to be a characteristic of Homo prior to Homo sapien sapiens so far as 
the archaeological record can be taken to exhibit their behavioural repertoire. 
It has been pointed out that declining to declare Homo sapien sapien a hunter-gatherer because the 
future might preclude such a characterisation has some peculiar implications3• For example, might 
we say that modem humans are not really dimorphic? That is, might we be on the way to morphic 
convergence, thus casting doubt on what current evolutionary thinking has to say about mate choice? 
The best reply to this is the evidence as it stands: it is clear that modem humans are on some sort of 
trajectory that takes them away from hunting and gathering; it isn't clear that we are on paths of 
divergence from gross morphological characteristics of our hominid ancestors. 
6.3 The EEA and the minds of its occupants: the plurality of our ancestors 
Darwin (1871, also see Foley, 1987a) made the point that the apparent uniqueness of modern man is, 
in part, due to the extinction of near relatives on the phylogenetic tree. To illustrate this point let us 
imagine that chimpanzees and bonobos become extinct tomorrow. On the assumption that Pan 
troglodytes are our nearest relatives, our nearest extant relatives would then be gorillas. At the close 
of tomorrow's world we would appear to be that much more unique in comparison to the natural 
world available to observation today. However, in terms of natural history in the fullest sense we 
would be no more or less unique than has ever been the case. 
Were it the case that there were no chimpanzees to study, it may be taken that the task of 
evolutionary psychology would be that much more difficult. This would be for two reasons. Firstly, 
comparative psychology would be weakened due to the widely held belief that chimpanzees are our 
nearest comparitor. And secondly (following Dennett, 1995), our knowledge of what is actual, and 
not just possible, in primate design space would be weakened. These considerations indicate why 
those species that are taken as transitional between pan and modern humans are of such importance 
and interest. Were we able to study them our knowledge of our own evolution and condition would 
be enhanced. The EEA is, in effect, a notional study of some or all of these organisms. In looking to 
pre-modern Homo's- to the actual past (in addition to the mechanisms of evolution that brought 
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those pasts about)- the concept of the EEA is a necessary step if we wish to be species-specific in 
our generation of hypotheses. Species-specificity is the prime motivation behind the EEA. 
However, for an evolutionary social psychology there are difficulties with this notional study. 
These difficulties flow from accepted facts about the organisms that constituted the EEA (taken as 
the Pleistocene) or, more broadly, the ancestra l environment of the hominids (taken as the Pliocene 
and the Pleistocene). The first difficulty is that these organisms were almost certainly not in 
possession of a neurology like that of modern humans- the size oftheir brain's alone testify to this. 
This suggests that these organisms were not psychologically identical to modern forms. Secondly, 
the EEA produced and sustained a plurality of distinguishable hominids and we do not know the path 
of the Homo sapien sapien lineage through those distinct lineages that have thus far been identified. 
Let as deal with each of these problems in turn. 
6.3.1 Minds not modern 
Why might it be common for textbooks and edited volumes of biological anthropology to employ 
images which invite the comparison of human, hominid and great ape skulls (e.g. Clark & Willermet, 
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seat of Homo behaviour and uniqueness is taken to be in their minds. As we will see, there is a good 
deal of debate concerning how many distinct species and minds have come about and become extinct 
since the divergence of the hominid lineage from a species that is assumed to be something akin to 
an extant chimpanzee or something that may be considered to be a hybrid of an extant gorilla and a 
chimpanzee (see Foley, 1987c, 1995c; Ruvolo, 1997; Tattersall, 1995, 1997; Wood, 1992; Wood & 
Brooks, 1999). Conservative estimates are of the order of ten. More liberal estimates suggest twenty 
or more (Tattersall, 2000). What is agreed is that these organisms were not in possession of brains 
that characterise Homo sapien sapien. Figure 1 offers a simplified account of brain growth in 
hominids over the last two million years. 
Summary of Figure 1 Brain growth in hominids 
2.0- 1.6 million years ago Homo habi/is had a brain size of 450-750 ml 
1.8- 0.4 million years ago Homo erectus had a brain size of 800-1250 ml 
0.4-0.1 million years ago (archaic) Homo sapien had a brain size of 1100-1350 ml 
0.12- 0.03 million years ago Homo neanderthalensis had a brain size of 1200-1750ml 
0.13- 0.06 Homo sapien sapien had a brain size of 1500-1700 ml 
Note: The information in, and summary of, Figure I is taken from Foley, 1995 and Tattersall, 1995. The graph and the 
written summary are simplified to the extent that they suggest as neat and progressive a development in brain size as the 
data permits. It could be represented quite differently, showing much sharper distinctions between the brain size of 
proposed species through time. 
For the purposes at hand, the point to be drawn from the graph and its written summary is that we 
simply do not know what exactly it was that psychologically mediated the EEA. Even on the 
assumption that we could fully specify the physical characteristics of the EEA and the morphology 
of the hominids that populated it, we could not, in principle, be sure that what we would see would 
have the same meaning, sense or reference to us as it did for our predecessors. From any standpoint 
this is a problem. In Gibsonian (Gibson, 1979) terms, for example, it would not offer us the same set 
or type of affordances. Nor can we be confident that, although a belief-desire analysis of their 
behaviour might be plausible, we could stipulate the nature of their beliefs and desires. Similarly, we 
have no idea of their IQ or short term memory capacity. 
This problem can be thought about further using Dan Sperber's distinction between the "proper 
domain"- the EEA, and the "actual domain"- the extant environment (Sperber, 1994). Sperber 
classifies the difference between the two as the "domain mismatch". This distinction, although not 
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l 
deployed by Sperber as it is here, does serious harm to the potential utility of the EEA when we use 
it to illustrate the mismatch between the brains and minds (rather than just the ti me and place) that 
might consider the EEA as content. Nothing in the argument depends on any assumptions about a 
relationship between brain size and intelligence. In fact, the problem of a mental mismatch would be 
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cons iderably reduced if there were a simple linear relationship between cognition, its depth, breadth, 
type, and brain size. However, although it is not altogether unreasonable to make some assumptions 
of this type (Beran, Gibson & Rumbaugh, 1999), such a relationship has not been demonstrated 
(Badcock, 2000; Byrne, 1999; Corballis, 1999; Deacon, 1992), and in abandoning behaviourism 
academic psychology, at least implicitly, acknowledged this . Whilst we can make some informed 
guesses about the power, fl exibility and dispositions of Homo habilis, erectus and sapien minds, 
being guesses they are not especially helpful to cognitive psychology or detailed behavioural 
analysis, and certai nly not to phenomenology or hermeneutic forms of psychology. It seems high ly 
unlikely that we will ever have an understanding of the minds of those organisms that occupied and 
amounted to the EEA that we currently have of chimpanzee minds. I take th is as a crippling to our 
chances of coming to a really precise understanding of the selection pressures behind the growth in 
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hominid brain size and cognitive capacities. As it turns out, whilst this is a very serious obstacle to 
the adaptationist program as inculcated in the adapted mind thesis ofTooby and Cosmides, it need 
not be fatal to the sort of evolutionary social psychology we will look at in chapter 9. 
6.3.2 Which lineage? 
It is time now to complicate the picture. Figure 1 (above), in depicting brain growth in the Homo 
lineage, ignores the tree of speciation following the development of the hominid line after divergence 
from an unspecified African ape c.8-5 million years ago. Figure 2 (taken from Foley, 1995 and 
Tattersall, 1995) offers a fuller though still a conservative depiction of what existed and when over 
the past c.5 million years. 
There are two implications of this diversity for evolutionary psychology. The first we will pursue is 
the point that the lineages named are considered to be distinct species. The second concerns the fact 
that, in winnowing the number of hominid species down to one, evolution appears to have judged 
that the others were not well adapted. 
Terms such as Australopithecus afarensis and Australopithecus africanus, Homo habilis and Homo 
erectus refer to species of hominid. Hominids as a class are those species thought to have appeared 
since the split with the pongoid clade. In assuming that they are species and not varieties, I am 
following the orthodox view of most recent palaeoanthropologicalliterature. However, the debates 
concerning precisely which fossil form is and which is not a distinct species from another fossil form 
is vigorous (e.g. Tattersall, l995t These debates indicate some of what is at stake when a given 
lineage is said to be speciated from another. The extent of hominid speciation, especially that within 
the Pleistocene, has consequences for evolutionary psychology and any suppositions concerning the 
proximate mechanisms of those organisms which constituted it. Asking the question "What is a 
species?" indicates what some of these consequences are. 
An orthodox and generally accepted answer to this question is that offered by Mayr; "Species are 
groups of actually or potentially interbreeding populations, which are reproductively isolated from 
other such groups". To clarify this definition we can be more precise about the term "reproductively 
isolated". Following Butlin & Ritchie (1994), it can be consider in two ways: intrinsic isolation and 
extrinsic isolation, and pre- and post-copulation isolation. 
Precopulation 
For organisms to be classed as members of the same species they need to, 
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1. be present in the same locality at the same time 
2. be sexually receptive at the same time 
3. recognise one another as potential mates 
4. stimulate one another as potential mates 
5. (in the case of primates) achieve intromission 
Postcopu/ation 
It is then necessary that, 
6. fertilisation is achieved 
7. a healthy zygote develops 
8. the offspring achieves puberty 
9. the offspring is fertile 
10. the offspring obtains mates via the same cycle 1 - 9 
11. the cycle I - I 0 is reiterated 
Any interruption or barrier to any of the stages results in a failure to reproduce. Intrinsic barriers 
usually mean that the two organisms are not con-specifics ("usually" because con-specifics can be 
reproductively incompatible). Extrinsic barriers are usually the result of geographical and/or 
temporal contingencies. Intrinsic barriers present a stronger case for classifying two organisms as 
distinct species. A failure to achieve stage 6, for example, may be taken to mean that there are 
definite biological or genetic barriers. Extrinsic barriers, on the other hand, often result from a failure 
to achieve stage 1. Such a barrier is often the first stage in speciation. 
As is orthodox, let us now assume that the hominid line descended from one great ape species. T.o 
account for subsequent speciation within that lineage we may next assume that the organisms which 
constituted the lineage subsequently dispersed such that geographical isolation resulted in speciation. 
To do so avoids having to specify any intrinsic biological factors. However, at a later point in time, 
when the fossil evidence suggests that certain of these lineages were temporally and spatially co-
terminus, one is forced to suppose that intrinsic factors were responsible for their continued 
speciation. There is a clear and plausible implication of this. It is that temporally and spatially co-
terminus hominids were speciated by virtue of their respective psychological make up. 
-92-
To advance the point let us assume that, in the absence of the extrinsic barriers of time and place, 
speciation was maintained by virtue of a failure of step 7 (a healthy zygote does not develop), step 8 
(offspring do not achieve puberty) or step 9 (offspring are not fertile). If speciation was maintained 
between, for example, Homo rudolphensis, habilis, ergaster and erectus by virtue of a failure of step 
7, 8 or 9, then we could maintain that whilst attracted to one another as mates these lineages were 
sufficiently distinct biologically to continue as distinct species. Whilst a biological distinction 
sufficient to count as speciation is not a trivial matter, this does not necessarily imply that these 
organism were psychologically distinct 
Consider now step 3 (two organisms do not recognise one another as potential mates) or step 4 
(they do not stimulate one another as potential mates). These stages are classed in zoology as mating 
signals. Mating signals include the message, the messenger, and the recipient. Complex signalling 
involves a chain of such messages, receptions and responses. I tis reasonable to assume that such 
chains were typical of hominids given their prevalence and comparative length in primates. 
Continuing with our example, if speciation was maintained between rudolphensis, habilis, ergaster 
and erectus by virtue of a failure of step 3 or 4, the implication is that a psychological difference 
amounting to a speciation barrier existed between Pleistocene hominids. These psychological 
barriers could have prevented reproduction even if these lineages were quite capable of achieving 
stages 6 to I 0 (Butlin & Ritchie, 1994). 
The fossil evidence promotes the assumption that Homo lineages were divided by psychological 
factors. Whilst it m_ay be an error to read precise claims about intelligence and cognitive capacity 
into empty skulls, crania from different lineages are themselves sufficiently different to support such 
a view. The difficulty that this presents for evolutionary psychology comes from the fact that 
palaeoarcheology does not present a unified view as to which of the later Homos is the direct 
ancestor of Homo sapien sapien. This too has implications. There is the danger that we might pick 
the wrong ancestor and in doing so pick the wrong set of psychological adaptations -a composite 
picture would neither capture the truth nor permit precision. But there is also the danger that we pick 
a species that has demonstrated, by virtue of it being extinct, that it was not, ultimately, well adapted. 
We could specify a suite of adaptations that, together, could not and would not have rendered the 
species even semi-functional in extant environments5· 6 • The Pleistocene, if you will, killed most of 
the decedents of our nearest ancestor, the chimpanzee. The natural history of the hominids is not one 
of seamless adaptationism. 
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6.4 The physical and the social EEA 
The variety of Homo lineages promotes a distinction between two construals of the EEA, the 
physical and the social. This follows from the fact that similar environments produced distinct 
outcomes: if climate, fauna, flora, as selection pressures were at times and places similar then 
speciation must have been influenced by other features of the world that Homo lineages occupied. 
The dominant proposal is that the other features were social. This raises the question as to whether 
the important problems of the past are tractable. Let us look further at the idea that modem brains are 
a result of social selection pressures. 
The natural organ that is the modem human brain has come about with relative speed in 
evolutionary terms (Corballis, 1999). Moreover, its size and physical organisation distinguishes it 
markedly from all but the very late Homos (Beran, Gibson & Rumbaugh, 1999). This aspect of 
human anatomy is the single most significant fact of our evolution from the point of view of 
psychological and behavioural science. In light of this importance, and in consideration of the finely 
balanced debates about other aspects of our anatomy, it may seem surprising that there is something 
nearing a consensus on the view that the human brain is a product of the degree and manner of our 
sociality (Baron-Cohen, 1996; Buss, 1995, 1997, 1998; Byrne, 1999; Corballis, 1991; Dunbar, 1988, 
1997; Haslam, 1997; Humphrey 1976, 1983; Jolly, 1966; Plotkin, 1995; Whiten, 1999; Whiten & 
Byrne, 1988{ The general theme of the argument is that the need to negotiate larger social 
groupings of "Machiavellian"8· 9 others is the single most significant selection pressure toward 
elaboration and enlargement of the neo-cortex. Pinker displays the rudiments of the reasoning thus: 
There's only so much brain power you need to subdue a plant or a rock, the argument goes, but the 
other guy is about as smart as you are and may use that intelligence against your interests. You had 
better think about what he is thinking about what you are thinking he is thinking. As far as brainpower 
goes, there's no end to keeping up with the Joneses (Pinker, 1997: 193). 
To see why sociality can have a particularly strong influence we need to keep in mind the fact that 
there is no evolution- there is no change- if there is no selection pressure (less genetic drift). Static 
environments render stasis in a species. Additionally, not all selection pressures are equal; that is, the 
size of their effects are distinct; and not all selection pressures are equally pertinent on the 
assumption that what one wishes to explain is precise. In the case of sociality as a selection pressure 
in the Homo line, there are grounds to suppose a runaway effect when one complex adaptation is 
pitted against another and when both are (all things being equal) examples of the most sophisticated 
"pieces" of Darwinian engineering/computing known. Such forms of competition and the 
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consequences are referred to in much of the literature as "evolutionary arms races" (e.g. Sigmund, 
1993). 
If this view is correct, the nature of the arms race could have centred on a number of different 
problems engendered by increased sociality. Suggestions have included the need to construct 
adequate theories of others intentions (Baron-Cohen, 1996), the need to communicate (Pinker & 
Bloom, 1992), and the various benefits that flow from successful tactical deception (Byrne & 
Whiten, 1987). Either way, encephalisation due to sociality means that the selection pressures that 
amounted to the EEA were psychological and exerted by con-specifics. The clear implication is that 
the selection pressures responsible for human brains are social in character. The difficulties of 
reconstructing the physical past are readily apparent. To build an evolutionary psychology that 
generates hypotheses via the engine of the EEA - in other words, an adaptationist psychology - we 
must go beyond that task and specify social selection pressures. We must reconstruct the social past. 
What is the extent of the task facing those who wish to produce evidence to show that a given social 
pressure exerted itself over a period sufficient to come to fixation in Homo? Consider first the 
following passage. 
They have set out early, this band of six purposeful individuals, striding across rolling, grassy 
terrain punctuated here and there by flat-topped acacia trees. The sky hovered between gray and 
pink as the sun rose close to breaking the line of hills in the east, on the other side of the vast lake ... 
Everyone had heard the sabre-toothed cats during the night, repeated choruses of throaty moans, a 
sure sign of a hunt in progress. Even though the band felt itself relatively safe at its riverside camp a 
mile from the lake, there was always tension when sabre-toothed cats were near. Only a year ago a 
child had been attacked when he strayed from the watchful eyes of his mother and her companions. 
Returning hunters, the same group of men who were setting out this day, arrived just in time to drive 
the predator away. But the boy had died some days later from the loss of blood and the kind of 
rampant infection that can be so deadly in the tropics. Not surprisingly, this morning's discussions 
urged extra care on the women and their offspring, gathering tubers and nuts near the camp, and the 
men on their hunt. These men too were predators. (Leakey & Lewin, 1992: 3-4). 
As the language of the piece suggests, this is an entirely imaginary and fictitious scene. The 
authors accept this. It is a work of scientific fiction. As a prelude to a volume concerned with 
biological anthropology and palaeoanthropology, it is also an expression of the goal of those 
disciplines. In its detail, the passage represents the kind of story that palaeoanthropology seeks to 
establish as facts about the Pleistocene. It may be read as a sort of wish-list and it betrays what is not 
yet empirically established. The assumptions made in the passage are the goals of 
palaeoanthropology. Let us look more closely at what the assumptions are: 
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• It is known that the hunting party took place in a specific place, at a specific time by specific 
hominids; 
• The relationship toward specific neighbouring organisms is known, encompassing predators, 
prey and their respective behaviours; 
• The home-range is known; 
• The nature of intra-sexual competition is known between both males and females, and the nature 
of inter-sexual competition is known; 
• The nature of parental investment is known, together with kin and reciprocal strategies toward 
that end; 
• The development path of children is known, including sex differences; 
• The length of puberty for both sexes is known; 
• The occurrence and length of menopause is known; 
• The size and constitution of the group is known; 
• These organisms had an aesthetic sensibility; 
• These organisms had language and used it in known ways to known ends. 
All of these remain objectives for biological anthropology. Some are closer to being realised than 
others. For example, time, place, the anatomy of the hominids and the fauna and flora around them is 
fairly well established. But others are open to a wide range of speculations. Moreover, whilst they 
remain objectives there is, at present, no agreed means of establishing which hypotheses are best 
supported (Clark, 1997; Clark & Willermet, 1997; Leakey & Lewin, 1992). 
If we are unable to say with any certainty how large hominid groups were and how they were 
constituted demographically and economically, how are we supposed to say with any degree of 
specificity what sort of group living problems these organisms faced? The questions repeat 
themselves for every claim in the list that refers specifically to the social dispositions, proclivities 
and behaviour of these organisms. As Tooby and Cosmides suggest, if we cannot specify the 
problem we cannot specify the algorithm that solves it. It is legitimate to insist that evolutionary 
psychology be in possession of evidence as to what the problems were before it asks us to accept 
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evidence for solutions. It is, I think, also legitimate to wonder whether the precise formulation of the 
social problems that characterised the EEA is, in actuality, an empirically tractable exercise. 
Unfortunately, the sociality account of encephalisation presents a further difficulty. The rapid 
growth in hominid brain size does not appear to have abated through the two million years since the 
emergence of the Homo line, and it appears to have accelerated in the past 500 000 years. This 
creates a problem regarding the point at which one "stops" the evolution of the Homo lineage and 
establishes the stability required to document problems and their resultant adaptations. It creates 
difficulties in setting the parameters of the EEA. To flesh this point out, consider the following. 
As the information presented in section 3, 'The EEA and the minds of its occupants', suggests, the 
last two million years have featured a degree of change in the Homo lineage which is atypical of 
large mammals in general. This is a fact of the current palaeoarcheological record10• For instance, 
there is no evidence that other primates have undergone anything like a comparable amount of 
neuroanatomical change in the same period. Indeed, early palaeontology used the stasis of great ape 
anatomy as the benchmark of hominid change (Falk, 1983). Although there are disputes concerning 
the gradualism and optimality of evolution, Tooby and Cosmides' version of evolutionary theory 
used to inform evolutionary psychology is essentially adaptionist (Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, 
Bleske & Wakefield, 1998; Symonds, 1992; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). In short, this amounts to the 
orthodox view of step-wise, steady change devoid of the "hopeful monsters" and grand extinctions 
said to be implied by punctuated equilibrium, the main alternative (see Gould and Lewontin, 1979; 
Dennett, 1995). The EEA, then, is that period wherein Homo sapien sapien gradually emerged from 
the genus Homo by virtue of gradual changes in the characteristics of the ecological and social 
environment. 
Changes in human genotypes are brought about by genetic recombination via sexual reproduction 
and genetic mutation. It is widely argued (e.g. Ridley, 1993; Williams, 1975) that sex has succeeded 
because it guarantees change: genetic recombination sees to it that any given organism will not be 
identical to any that preceded it (in the case of monozygotic twins, that any given pair will not be 
identical to those that preceded them). Sex allows a species to escape the vicissitudes of change 
through mutation alone. Whilst sexual recombination allows for the evolution of the species, we 
cannot be certain that it has dictated the shape and speed of change in the Homo lineage. We also 
need to look for instabilities (though not chronic instability such that the lineage becomes extinct by 
virtue of the constraint on the speed of phenotypic adaptation determined by sex and mutation) in the 
environment. The sociality account of encephalisation suggests that pressures created by this 
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instability were exerted by con-specifics. So, the difficulty presents itself; how do we specify the 
EEA in terms of variable and changing forces that brought about Homo sapien sapien? 
As I hope to have shown, we do not know of what the social EEA consisted even when construed 
as static. The problem of saying what the social environment was for, say, Homo erectus, is acute 
and central. This problem is compounded given that the environment(s) in question were not static. 
This makes it difficult to specify what counted in, or was typical of, this changing situation. Because 
it is the nature and reasons for social change that we need to understand, even if a time slice 
(including all details of the physical environment, the brains that mediated that environment and the 
meaning of the organisms had for one another) could be specified it would not generate a reliable 
account of extant psychology. The point is that an evolutionary social psychology in which the EEA 
is central is probably not a tractable enterprise. 
6.5 The EEA and ARE 
By typing the EEA as synonymous with the Pleistocene (or the Plio-Pleistocene) and restricting the 
organism in question to hominids, I am following the practice of evolutionary psychologists in being 
quite specific in temporal and spatial terms. As we have seen, this practise appears to follow Tooby 
and Cosmides who, along with others, repeatedly use the term Pleistocene alongside hunter-gatherer 
to denote the EEA (e.g. Buss, 1994; Crawford, 1998b; Sherman & Reeve, 1997; Irons, 1998). 
Despite this practise, Too by and Cosmides have also stressed that the supposition of a singular 
unified EEA is an error. An alternative term for the needed "ancestral conditions" proposed by 
William Irons (1998) is the "Adaptively Relevant Environment" (ARE). The concept of ARE says 
that, for any given adaptation, there is specific set of problems. Each adaptation has, if you will, its 
own particular EEA and any given EEA may or may not be co-terminus with any other EEA. This 
move seems to be designed to offset the problems associated with reconstructing a particular past in 
all of its aspects. However, it imports at least three problems of its own. To begin with it defies the 
notion that, whilst modular, the mind acts in concert. Secondly, the ARE appears to weaken the 
prospect that we might work toward constructing a unified set of ancestral conditions. And third, it 
invites slippage between ultimate and proximate causes. 
To suppose that we can carve the mind up into functional elements is the penultimate goal of 
evolutionary psychology- the ultimate goal being a computational (or machine) description of those 
elements. The ARE presupposes this goal to have been achieved. The EEA has the potential benefit 
of being open minded as to what selection pressures acted to generate modern minds. Invoking 
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adaptively relevant environments suggests that we already know which selection pressures are 
pertinent: we simply search natural history to find them. 
Whilst it may be reasonable to assume that extant human minds are modular, it is not legitimate to 
shop around through natural history and piece this modularity together. It is not reasonable to assume 
that one can look in place y at timex and specifY the problems that led to selection for a given mating 
strategy in females, for example, and quite separately look in place w at time z and specifY the 
problems that led to selection for a given mating strategy in males. The mating strategy of females at 
any given time just is, in large part, the problem encountered by males, and vice versa. Similarly one 
cannot separate, say, the form of subsistence employed by a given hominid from, say, the precise 
characteristics of its reciprocal altruism. And so on. Additionally, in spreading selection pressures 
the ARE probably makes the task of reconstructing the past more and not less difficult. 
One benefit of the EEA as confined to the Pleistocene is that it sets a temporal parameter on 
physical and ecological facts and forces. It gives us at least a notional opportunity to confine all of 
the past to a critical past. Why do I say "notional"? Well, let us assume that we are able to fully 
specifY a period oftime that we could call the EEA. When we recall why it is evolutionary 
psychology postulates the EEA it is because Tooby and Cosmides have successfully argued that we 
cannot understand the present less an understanding of that particular past. One can witness this 
process in operation in evolutionary psychology texts, papers and studies. For example, Wrangham 
and Wright ( 1997) advert to the behaviour of male chimpanzees to explain the nature of aggression 
exhibited by human males. The assumption is made that the behaviour of chimpanzees sets a certain 
scene for the EEA ofhominids. As a strategy, the assumptions satisfies the general demand that "to 
understand any particular process of evolution, we need to know where it started from, what 
selective pressures were acting on what kind of gene pool in what kind of ecosystem - physical, 
biological, social, and cultural" (Lea, 1999: 21 ). This EEA is then fleshed out from the chimpanzee 
base line to provide the adaptations that have generated modern humans. The point is that a past 
preceding the really informative past- the EEA- is required for the construction of that past. Such a 
demand repeats itself for that particular past: to understand that past we would need to understand a 
specific past that preceded the one of interest. If "the past explains the present" (Too by & Cosmides, 
1990b) is to be adopted as general rule of evolutionary psychology, it follows that a past prior to the 
past of interest explains the past of interest. A consequence of this is that we would then seem to 
have a regression, proposing pasts to explain pasts to explain pasts. The EEA cuts this process off. It 
specifies a set of problems specific to the Homo lineage in light ofthe assumed condition of the 
species. The ARE, on the other hand, is a trap door. On the one hand there is the vanishing empirical 
-99-
----------------------
tractability of the series of pasts. And on the other, aside the problem of posting some sort of 
constraint on how many ARE's we might need to be confident that we have enough to specifY each 
individual adaptation, there is a negative relationship between the difficulty of reconstructing pasts 
beyond the most immediate and their explanatory power11 . Whilst our understanding of the 
organisms that preceded Homo sapien sapien is very much incomplete, still more so are their 
predecessors. For example, in the Wrangham and Wright case, where a second EEA is posed, there 
is the problem that we simply do not know that what we see as an extant chimpanzee existed in its 
current form before the advent of the australopithecines (Wood & Brookes, 1999)12 . 
6.6 Ultimate and proximate causes 
The ARE invites us to ignore parameters on time and species. In doing so, I am of the view that it 
further compounds the difficulties that evolutionary psychology already has in maintaining a 
distinction which, it claims, differentiates it from sociobiology and Darwinian social science. An 
important part of the distinction rests on that between ultimate and proximate causes. Let us first 
discuss the distinction between ultimate and proximate causes. Next, we can look at some examples 
of slippage between the two. Finally, and it is here that the central point of this section is made, we 
can examine how and why conflation's of ultimate and proximate causes are not considered 
legitimate according to the tenets of evolutionary psychology as proposed by Tooby and Cosmides. 
The distinction between ultimate and proximate cause is ancient and Dews bury ( 1999) has shown 
that it was discussed by instinct theorists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. However, 
the prevalence in biological thought of the distinction between and the concepts of ultimate and 
proximate cause is frequently attributed to Mayr (1961, 1974, 1983, 1994)13 . 
The ultimate-proximate distinction is quite simple. "Ultimate" refers to causes that precede an 
organism's life. "Proximate" refers the properties of the organism that are caused by ultimate forces 
and are themselves causal. 
Ultimate causes are the principles of natural selection. They are those principles that are taken to 
be universally applicable. The first of these is, of course, that self-replicating organisms will be 
selected for in conditions of finite resources. Indeed, so fundamental is this cause that it is the 
necessary condition for life of any description; 
What is life? ... From a Darwinian perspective, it is the reproduction by systems of new and similarly 
reproducing systems that is the defming property of life. An organism is a self-reproducing machine ... 
the logic of Darwinism would apply equally well to self-reproducing robots, self-reproducing plasma 
vortices in the sun, or to anything else that reproduces with the potential for heritable change (mutation) 
(Tooby & Cosmides, 1992: 50). 
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Other, and slightly more modest ultimate causes include the typical effects and constraints that 
flow from sexual reproduction, sexual dimorphism, the extent to which a species is r or K selected, 
the percentage of an organisms life that is pre-pubescent, the dispersal of the higher investing sex, 
sex ratios, and inclusive fitness. Proximate mechanisms are the final actual working effects. 
Proximate mechanisms seen as causes, on the other hand, are those features of an organism that, 
having been shaped by ultimate causes, actually produce behaviour and the outcomes upon which 
natural selection acts. Ultimate causes operate independently of a given species. For example, 
ultimate causes were responsible for generating the set of proximate causes that constituted the brain 
of say, Australopithecus afarensis. That particular configuration of proximate causes no longer exist 
but the ultimate causes do. 
Evolutionary psychologydistinguishes itself from sociobiology and Darwinian social science 
(Buss, 1995; Symons, 1992) by virtue of its emphasis on proximate mechanisms and the effects that 
they produce. Proximate causes are instantiated in evolved psychological adaptations. The emphasis 
on proximate causes distinguishes the adapted mind view from the adaptive mind view. It is in the 
form of the proximate causal role of psychological adaptations that the past is taken to be 
informative about the present. 
6.6.1 Slippage between ultimate and proximate causes 
Consider the following passage; 
Selection operated across ancestral hominid populations according to what were, in effect, systems of 
categorisation, screening cross-cultural variability for any recurrent relationships that were relevant to 
the solution of adaptive problems. To be thoroughly metaphorical, natural selection scrutinised the 
structure of human cultural and social environments, searching for regularities that could be used to 
engineer into our evolved architecture effective techniques for adaptive problem solving. Thus, the 
issue is: During the Pleistocene, were there any statistical and structural uniformities to human life from 
culture to culture and habitat to habitat, from any perspective -no matter how subtle or abstract or 
unobservable- that could have been used by species-typical problem-solving machinery for the 
adaptive regulation of behaviour and physiology? (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992: 88). 
Now consider the proposed list of instances of "species typical" universal proximate causes that 
natural selection has produced in humans; 
Adults have children; humans have a species-typical body form; humans have characteristic emotions; 
humans move through a life history cued by observable body changes; humans come in two sexes; they 
· eat food and are motivated to seek it when they lack it; humans are born and eventually die; they are 
related through sexual reproduction and through chains of descent; they turn their eyes towards objects 
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and events that tend to be informative about adaptively consequential issues; they often compete, 
contend, or fight over limited social or subsistence resources; they express fear and avoidance of 
dangers; they preferentially associate with mates, children, and other kin; they create and maintain 
enduring, mutually beneficial individuated relationships with nonrelatives; they speak; they create and 
participate in coalitions; they desire, plan, deceive, love, gaze, envy, get ill, have sex, play, can be 
injured, are satiated; and on and on. (ibid: 89). 
From this list it is concluded that, 
... human architectures are "pre-equipped" (that is, reliably develop) specialised mechanisms that 
"know" many things about humans, social relations, emotions and facial expressions, the meaning 
of situations to others, the underlying organisation of contingent social actions such as threats and 
exchanges, language, motivation and so on (ibid: 89). 
In other words, Too by and Cosmides want to say that the list of universals tells what proximate 
adaptations constitute human minds. The remainder of the task of evolutionary psychology is specify 
exactly how it is that these adaptation-mechanisms work. However, their list, with the possible 
exception of"plan" and "envy", is comprised of ultimate causes. It is nothing more than a statement 
of "the logic of Darwinism" that "would apply equally well to self-reproducing robots, self-
reproducing plasma vortices in the sun, or to anything else that reproduces with the potential for 
heritable change (mutation)". It says nothing specifically about humans. Whilst it is true that "adults 
have children" it is also equivalent only to the claim that organisms reproduce. Similarly, we may 
ask how informative it is to say that humans have a species-typical body form? Or that humans come 
in two sexes? What would it be like if it were not the case that "humans eventually die"? And who is 
arguing with the claim that humans "eat food and are motivated to seek it when they lack it"? Or, 
that "they are related through sexual reproduction and through chains of descent"? 
6.6.2 The illegitimacy of conflation 
Again, recall the need for the EEA; it generates the suite of adaptations that were formed prior to 
their extant exhibition in modem humans. Accordingly, accepting the focus on proximate 
psychological mechanisms as the key features of modem humans entails the acceptance of such 
mechanisms as the key features of the organism that formed the EEA. Such an account needs to 
show not only that a suite of ultimate causes exerted pressure on ancestral hominid populations, it 
also needs to show precisely how these ultimate causes exerted pressure and what proximate 
adaptations arose as a consequence. 
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Let us make this point as clear as possible. On the one hand, the unifying feature and power of the 
very broadest of ultimate causes (i.e. natural selection of resource-consuming reproducers in 
conditions of finite recourses), through means ofhertitablity causes (i.e. the operation of inclusive 
fitness on distributed units such as genes), and onto condition-specific causes (e.g. those that operate 
on sexually dimorphic species) is the fact that they are not species specific. Ultimate causes are not 
said to, nor do they, necessarily generate the same proximate outcome in all species. Although we 
must not violate the constraint of ultimate causes in the construction of evolutionary accounts of 
mind and behaviour, in and of themselves they do not generate for us a specifically human 
psychology. This is one of the precise and distinct points made by evolutionary psychologists in 
contention with sociobiology and it is why Tooby and Cosmides have highlighted the EEA. On the 
other hand, the unifYing feature of proximate mechanisms as causes is that they are species-specific 
in their manifest operation. This is immediately apparent in that they need to be orchestrated toward 
achieving reproductive success via con-specifics. If a given spcies suite of proximate mechanisms 
was not causally efficacious toward the end of reproduction in some prior place/time then, by 
definition, that form of organisation will not be expressed in the present. 
Conflation between ultimate and proximate cause comes when an example of the former is 
stipulated in place of the latter. The leap from saying that "humans have sex" to the assertion that 
humans have a sex module(s) is an example. Amongst other things, this sort of conflation misses the 
point that the proximate mechanisms of other con-specifics probably provided the source of the 
selection pressures behind the particulars of human psychology. The reiteration of ultimate causes in 
the stead of proximate mechanisms reveals impatience with the details of natural history. We can test 
for slippage between ultimate and proximate causes by asking the question; would the proposed 
cause operate on any sexual organism? I suggest that the ARE is an invitation to post ultimate causes 
as proximate mechanisms just as Too by and Cosmides already have. 
6. 7 Conclusion 
It is not necessary to engage in a lengthy discussion of philosophies of science before saying that the 
bulk of experiments and quantitative research have as their cornerstone the null hypothesis. 
Subscription to the null hypothesis involves an obligation. The obligation is on the data (of whatever 
type) to demonstrate itself as improbable courtesy of the assumption that it is the null hypothesis that 
has to be displaced. The null is never disproved. It is rejected in favour of the alternative, the original 
hypothesis14 . Evolutionary psychologists also subscribe to this method. Buss for example, argues that 
evolutionary psychology adheres to "normal paradigm science" when it develops "hypotheses about 
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the psychological mechanisms that have evolved in humans to solve particular adaptive problems 
under ancestral conditions" (Buss, 1995: 4) that are then accepted or rejected according to the result 
of the chosen test. 
Now, given that evolution by natural selection in the guise of inclusive fitness theory is not itself 
being tested because it is deemed to be beyond reproach by evolutionary psychologists (Buss, 1995; 
Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b, 1992; Symonds, 1987, 1992), we may ask what it is that is being tested. 
The answer is the EEA. Prima facie, hypotheses in evolutionary psychology test claims about 
psychological mechanisms. In doing so they also test assumptions about species-specific selection 
pressures that operated in the past. A key question raised in this chapter is whether one may make a 
principled choice between two alternative assumptions of this type given the manner in which 
evolutionary psychology treats evidence which pertains to the EEA. 
Recall that we can see if any given hypothesis or any account of any given psychological or 
behavioural data invokes the EEA (or a functional equivalent), by asking if the hypothesis or account 
makes an assumption(s) about a non-extant organism and/or the environment to which it was adapted 
and/or the need to adapt to id5 I have argued that where one finds any such assumption one finds an 
appeal to the EEA. 
It may then be asked as to what sort of assumptions about the past underlay ostensibly competing 
hypotheses. What evidence is there in the fossil and archaeological records to support the 
assumptions? Is the evidence equal to the explanatory power assigned to it? It is not inevitable that 
hypotheses based on the EEA must go beyond the very evidence used to justify the activity of 
constructing such hypotheses. It is possible to allow the evidence to constrain hypotheses. And it is, 
of course, possible for two differing hypotheses to be derived from the same evidence. However, I 
hope to have shown that evolutionary psychologists tend to have little regard for the archaeological 
and fossil records. Assumptions that go far beyond the available evidence are routinely made. The 
past is applied to in order to legitimise hypotheses and arguments but disregarded in its detail. 
Probably the prime and most pervasive example of this disregard for the fossil evidence is the 
assumption that all Homo lineages were hunter-gatherers. The available evidence on hominid 
subsistence behaviour is taken by prominent researchers in the field of palaeoanthropology to mean 
that modern hunter-gatherers exemplify only themselves and that pre-modern forms of Homo did not 
behave as Homo sapien sapien has. The orthodox stance in biological anthropology is that they were 
cognitively incapable of doing so. From these consideration I have drawn the conclusion that hunter-
gatherers are not especially illuminating about the past because they did not exist in the past. 
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The assumption that pre-modem forms of Homo did not posses the behavioural repertoire of 
modem hunter-gatherers is buttressed by the size of their brains. Evolutionary psychology routinely 
appeals to species that were not in possession of our neurology. It is, of course, legitimate to do this 
but only if one is open about the comparative nature of the work. To invest early forms of Homo 
with the behaviours that they are often invested with is illegitimate. Additionally, the various pre-
modem Homo forms were themselves neurologically distinct from one another and there is no firm 
agreement as to which of these modern humans are the descendants. Failure to accommodate these 
issues in the depiction of the EEA sets evolutionary psychology adrift from its goal of building an 
accurate and detailed theory of human nature courtesy of conceptual integration with adjoining 
disciplines. 
Aside the self-infliCted failure to be constrained by the evidence, evolutionary psychology faces the 
prospect of never being in possession of evidence that will show what intra- and inter-psychological 
selection pressures existed in the past. This is a real problem posed by evolution itself. Appeal to the 
theory and ultimate causes does not dissolve the emphasis on proximate mechanisms as selection 
pressures. 
Frustration with the incompleteness of the fossil record in relation to the aim of specifying 
proximate psychological mechanisms may be offset by a fuller concentration on what is known 
about the natural history of modem humans. What there are in the way of facts about the past can tell 
us something about selection pressures in the Pleistocene. But the frustration is not helped by appeal 
to statistical composites exemplified by the ARE approach. The ARE ensures that we lose the 
specificity wanted by a human psychology. It does this by further muddling the distinction between 
ultimate and proximate causes. The ARE also involves a spurious method of building the suite of 
adaptations presumed to comprise the human mind because adaptations have to co-exist in an 
organism at every step in their development. 
Still, the problems detailed in this chapter are empirical in nature. It would be as premature to say 
that evidence to come will not go some considerable way toward solving them as it is to assuming 
that they are already solved. The next chapter looks at a different class of problems. These are 
conceptual in nature. 
1 It is not clear what the "several hundred million years" refers to. The orthodox estimate for the age of 
mammals is 60 million years and primates 35 million years. 
2 I have in mind Foley's attitude toward Elaine Morgan's Aquatic Ape hypothesis 
3 I owe this point to A. C. Campbell. 
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4 Biologists adopt a variety of techniques to establish genealogical relations between species. Three of the main 
techniques are as follows. Cladistics: This approach is strictly genealogical. Relationships are posed on the 
basis of family trees where a 'family' is taken as several generations of progeny. Phenetics: This approach 
emphasises phenotypic similarity. Relationships are posed on the basis of gross physical characteristics. 
Taxonomists: This approaches attempts to balance genealogy and adaptive similarity. Relationships are posed 
via family trees of progeny that are similarly adaptive. Thus a behavioural element is included. 
5 We will look further at some of the issues that arise from the idea that our ancestors were not perfectly 
adapted even to their own environments in chapter II "Adaptations, Exaptations, Spandrels and By-products". 
6 Indeed, it may be the case that we pick the right lineage only to find it in the Homo sapien sapien form 
drifting toward its own extinction. I am assuming here that the current western trend toward something less 
than replacement value continues. 
7 And, albeit from a slightly different perspective, Kavanhah (1996). But see Badcock (in press) for an 
alternative view from the standpoint of genomic imprinting. 
8 Whiten and Byrne's two volume series Machiavellian Intelligence I and 11 rest on the entirely correct 
assumption that evolution is, from bottom to top, about competition, and this manifests itself in tactical 
deception in the great apes and very probably humans. 
9 The notion of Machiavellian intelligence is, in part, attractive because it does not simply type sociality, it also 
offers a reason for the brain growth that is such a distinctive feature of Homo evolution. It achieves this by 
stating that an evolutionary arms race has taken place. More specifically, the arms race was one between 
intellects. But it also to be noted that the hypothesis is generous enough to allow a quasi-Machiavellian 
intelligence which is not centered on those behaviours that Byrne and Whiten favour. For example, we may 
suppose an equally flexible, duplicitous intelligence to have focused on coalition building rather than coalition 
manipulation. There is a healthy banality about the rudiments of Bryne and Whiten's approach. 
10 This fact withstands the technical possibility that hominid brains could have expanded and contracted in size 
several time over c.6 million years (Pinker, 1997) for such fluctuations in selection pressures would probably 
have rendered a given lineage extinct. 
11 There is an analogous argument that illustrates this criticism. Suppose we were to say that no word is to be 
understood less an understanding of at least one other word. Thus, wl is dependent on w2. The implication that 
w2 is prior to wl is obvious. Reapplying the principle for w2 generates a dependence on w3. And so on. To my 
knowledge, this argument is not in fact deployed in the psychology of language or linguistics. 
12 
"[the fossil record of apes] after about 8 million years ago includes scanty remains of Pleistocene gibbons 
and oran-utans, dental remains of a recently extinct Pleistocene giant ape (Gigantopithecus) and Pliocene 
fossils of uncertain affinity, all from south eastern Asia. There is no record of chimpanzees or gorillas at all. 
(Kelly, 1992: 224) ... the fossil record of the gorillas and chimpanzees is a complete blank (ibid, 227)." 
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13 Although the distinction is common, the terminology is not entirely fixed. For example, "Distal" is 
sometimes used in place of"ultimate" (Dewsbury, 1999). Mayr (1993) suggests we use "evolutionary cause" 
in place of "ultimate". 
14 In practice, it appears to be the case that debates in psychology (and probably in other social sciences) are 
not, in fact, between null and experimental/research hypotheses. The debates are between competing research 
hypotheses, often derived from distinct theories. 
15 As we said, the organism in question is typically a hominid and the environment is the group in which that 
hominid functioned. 
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Chapter 7 Conceptual problems created by the EEA 
Summary of chapter 7 
Analysis of the EEA is supposed to tell us what modem humans are adapted to and for. This chapter builds 
upon the last and looks at the two basic ways of viewing the past. First the proposal that we assume the past 
and the present are identical is considered. The difficulty with this proposal for evolutionary psychology is 
that it is not evolutionary. Instead it implicitly encourages us to continue with the plurality of approaches that 
constitute current social psychology. Second the proposal that the past and present are distinct is considered. 
The difficulty with this proposal for Tooby and Cosmides' adaptationist program based on the EEA is that 
many behaviours routinely performed by modem humans cannot be said to depend on adaptations. 
7.1 Introduction 
Taken as natural history, natural selection is an explanation of how novelty can occur. Any given 
species is, by definition, novel (Foley, 1987a; Mayr, 1996; Noble & Davidson, 1996), and if it isn't 
novel it isn't new. That natural selection can generate real novelty- that is, novelty of type and not 
just variation- is, arguably, the most fundamental and one of the most controversial of Darwin's 
claims in his time (Desmond & Moore, 1991 ). 
In accounting for the existence and generation of novelty, evolutionary theory enjoys a peculiarity 
as a scientific theory. As John Dewey (1922) and George Herbert Mead (1934) pointed out, at any 
given point in time one could not predict what species would be extant at a future point in time 
(provided there was a sufficient lapse of time to allow, in principle, sufficient genomic change to 
come about) 1• Plotkin (1997: 11-15) discusses this issue in terms ofthe difference between 
evolutionary theory and theory in "classical" physics and chemistry. He maintains that the latter are 
concerned with "now and forever causal explanations" and that such explanations are inappropriate 
and inadequate in evolutionary biology. The reason for this is because local and temporal causes 
generate change (effects) such that the original causes cease to be either efficacious or even extant. 
Thus, we may postulate the cause of a given adaptation knowing that the cause may no longer exert 
itself. 
This chapter is largely concerned with the apparent fact that evolutionary psychology does not 
appear to know what do about speciation and the concept of novelty. Whilst it gestures towards an 
acceptance that invocations of the past beyond the emergence of Homo sapien sapien necessarily 
invokes another species (as we have seen any invocation of the Pleistocene does this), in practice it 
ignores the concept and implications of speciation. In the parlance of biological anthropology, Too by 
and Cosmides are radical "lumpers"2• As indicated in the last chapter, I am of the view that the 
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assumption that pre-modern forms were psychologically identical to earlier forms of Homo is 
anthropomorphic. It also ignores the orthodox view that those forms were distinct species and it 
ignores the implications of speciation. When a new species comes into existence, at the very 
minimum this involves a new combination of previously evolved adaptations. Given that an 
organism is a concert of adaptations, the new arrangement implies novelty on some criteria. 
Still, evolutionary psychology does accept that something about the past and present are different. 
This is shown by its use of Sperber's term "domain mismatch" (introduced in chapter 6, section 3, 
'The EEA and the minds of its occupants: the plurality of our ancestors'). In this chapter I want to 
look further at the notion of a domain mismatch. First we will look at the consequences of 
underplaying it. Following that we will look at the difficulties that arise for the adaptationist 
approach by invoking a domain mismatch so to accommodate the idea of maladaptive behaviour. 
This will lead us onto alternative terms to describe psychological mechanisms as producers of 
organised behaviour. 
7.2 The null hypothesis: the EEA as a version of the present 
As we have seen, the EEA is the main way by which evolutionary psychology distinguishes itself 
from Darwinian social science (also called the "correspondence program" Tooby & Cosmides, 
1990b; Badcock, 2000). Tooby and Cosmides accuse Darwinian social science of resting on a logical 
flaw (see also Symonds, 1992). Barkow (1992) calls this the flaw of functionalism. The flaw resides 
in the assumption that events (or outcomes) precede their causes. Thus, looking to current behaviours 
that are fitter than others (in that they generate more reproductive success), and then supposing that 
there are adaptations underlying these behaviours, generates a cause from an effect. This discovery, 
the cause, is then traced forward to reproduce the present. The charge is that Darwinian social 
science is circular3. 
Tooby and Cosmides do not deny that there is some utility in what Sherman and Reeve ( 1997) 
have called the backwards method, but they caution against the investment of too much faith in it 
(Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b). Their argument is that evolutionary psychology can escape any 
suggestion of circularity via recourse to the EEA. Rather than looking to the present for clues as to 
what is adaptive and building the past accordingly, one begins with a scrutiny of the past and builds 
the present accordingly (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990b, 1992). In the first instance, the search is not for 
adaptive features of extant organisms but for adaptive features of non-extant organisms, i.e. the now-
extinct hominid predecessors of Homo sapien sapien. One generates one's hypotheses according to 
what unknown members of another extinct species consisted of and did. Such a scheme carries no 
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obligation to specify any extant feature or behaviour as adaptive. Extant feahtres or behaviours are 
not to be categorised according to their current effectiveness toward the end of inclusive fitness. 
Rather than taking the present as an effect into the past to determine its cause, the past as a cause is 
brought into the present and its effects are assessed. This method has one obvious difficulty: is it 
plausible to hold that accounts of the EEA are free of implicitly or explicitly held assumptions about 
modern humans? The concern hinges on the likelihood that the encephalisation of modern minds is 
due to sociality. Here we can build on the discussion in chapter 6, section 4, 'The physical and the 
social EEA'. 
The view that Homo sapien sapien brains are as they are because of sociality implies that our 
lineage has been engaged in what we might call a "social arms race". This phrase in and of itself 
reveals little. At a minimum it refers to the problem of assessing the intentional states of other 
equally sophisticated systems. (Tooby and Cosmides are themselves confident that this is so; 
"humans everywhere include as part of their standard conceptual equipment the idea that the 
behaviour of others is guided by invisible internal entities, such as "beliefs" and "desires"-
reflecting what Dennett calls "the intentional stance", Tooby & Cosmides, 1992: 89). Should such an 
arms race be responsible for the particular character of modem minds it suggests that, if the evolved 
psychology of modern humans should exhibit one thing, it would be the tendency to devote energy 
and time into having some reliable knowledge as to the intentions of important others. Moreover this 
tendency is compulsive- it is what modem humans do. The consequence of this is that a proposal 
which demands a method ofthought that the theory in question considers unlikely, if not 
contradictory, must be treated with scepticism. It is not plausible to think that we can go to the past 
in an open-minded condition in light of evolutionary accounts of encephalisation. This may be why 
the tendency to treat the past as a version of the present is evident in the literature of evolutionary 
psychology. Consider the following passage: 
... the size of intimate human groups has changed little across evolutionary time ... The absence of 
genetic kin is probably the greatest difference between the [typical academic] department's social 
organization and that of a hunter-gatherer tribe ... In terms of the sociality of the situation, the way 
kinship, reciprocity, group size, resource distribution, and so on impact on social organization of a 
typical group, the sociality of a modem academic department may differ little from that of our 
Pleistocene ancestors (Crawford, 1998: 287). 
Whilst one may be amused by the analogy Charles Crawford promotes here, amongst other things, 
it is remarkable that an author who subscribes to inclusive fitness theory should so casually dismiss 
the fact that a hunter-gatherer tribe and a modern academic department differ on the dimension of 
their constitution of kin. However, such an attitude toward some of the fundamentals of evolutionary 
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theory is not uncommon. Consider again the examples of the natural history and our Homo ancestors 
given in chapter 5. For Buss, the occupants of the EEA were, at bottom, us, Homo sapien sapien. In 
this vein, Crawford argues that, "the most plausible hypothesis about the EEA current environment 
differences is that ancestral and current environments do not differ vis-a-vis any particular 
adaptation, and that the proper course of action is to make a null hypothesis" (Crawford, 1998: 285). 
In taking this view toward proposed differences, Crawford is saying that the past explains the present 
because the past just is the present and the present just is the past. And he endorses this view as a 
methodological assumption. 
We can see this assumption at work in the typing of the EEA as that which we see exhibited by 
modern hunter-gatherers (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992).1t is at work in the characterisation of the pre-
modern mind as essentially modern in its approach to mating behaviour (e.g. Buss, 1989, 1992, 
1994; Daly & Wilson, 1992). And it is at work in the characterisation of Homo aesthetics (Orians & 
Heerwagen, 1992; Kaplan, 1992). 
So what is wrong with this approach? Why not, in effect, class as the EEA only the period from the 
emergence of Homo sapien sapien to, say, the beginnings of agriculture c.l5 OOOBC? Such an 
approach would rebut many of the objections raised in the preceding chapter. For example, 
• We overcome the difficulties of typing the EEA as the set of problems faced by hunter-gatherers. 
The new EEA allows us to define our "natural" method of subsistence as that portrayed by Homo 
sapien sapien for most of its history since its emergence c.1 00 000 years ago. 
• We find anatomical and cranial stasis in the fossil record. This allows us to define the minds of 
the occupants of the EEA as that which occupy our own heads and quashes the shortcomings of 
the comparative method and difficulties about suppositions concerning, for example, natural 
affordances and meaning. 
• We have a more tractable task in specifying the physical conditions of the EEA. This enables us 
to be more precise about lifestyles and diet. 
Unfortunately this move fails for three reasons. One, because Tooby and Cosmides work on the 
assumption there is no evidence that there has been evolution within Homo sapien sapiens, the EEA, 
construed as the past of modern humans, as opposed to their lineage, loses its force as an 
evolutionary argument. Evolutionary psychology then becomes a form of history as opposed to an 
exercise that draws upon natural history. Two, there is no non-question begging means of selecting 
which behaviours are and which are not "natural": the diversity of Homo sapien sapien environments 
(e.g. technologies, institutional behaviours, social systems, religions) makes it impossible to choose 
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between them in any principled manner without importing notions that pre-date Homo sapien sapien 
(see Bernard, 19244 ; Foley, 1996a). Should we select certain features of Homo sapien sapien 
environments (e.g. monogamy) we are back with the piecemeal accumulation of detail about the self-
contained system of cause and effect. We continue with the more convention activity of generating 
explanations around "an axis of variation rather than type" (Foley, 1996a: 195). And three, should 
we ignore the problems of doing so, and assume the null hypothesis of their being no difference 
between our ancestors and ourselves aside certain environmental differences, we find that the EEA 
amounts to a form of the SSSM. It differs from the SSSM in that the cluster of causes are located in a 
pre-agricultural past rather than the immediate past and present. 
Let us consider in more detail the grounds for making this third point. I am saying that if we ignore 
the idea that in using the term "Pleistocene" we simultaneously invoke non-modern ancestors, as 
does evolutionary psychology in practise, then evolutionary psychology is in the same position as 
any other psychologicaVbehavioural science- searching for intra-species universals (see Daly & 
Wilson, 1988). What we add are some general statements to the end that, say, humans want to eat, 
have sex and form friendships because of evolution. 
When it is said that the EEA invokes a mismatch the mismatch is typically between late 
Pleistocene and modem industrial environments. To use a favoured example, one difference between 
then and now is in the abundance of sweet and fatty foods. The same brain that took all it could in 
the way of such foods in the past was being adaptive. The same brain that does it now is, 
unwittingly, being maladaptive. However, in order to generate the basic adaptation, an assumption 
must be made as to the prior condition of the mind - about its initial condition prior to being shaped 
by the EEA. Accordingly, evolutionary psychology assumes that the mind prior to being shaped by 
the EEA is, on some criterion, simpler or devoid of certain content-dependent mechanisms. 
Now, when we look to be more precise about the source of the change that brings about a given 
adaptation than the catch-all" the EEA", Tooby and Cosmides point outward from the mind. The 
sources of change are problems posed by the world, by changes to the existing mode of life. Marx 
appears to sum-up the position quite nicely. Consider the following passage in light of the insistence 
of evolutionary psychology that the modern mind is a relic of the hunter-gatherer past. 
The social relations within which individuals produce, the social relations of production, are altered, 
transformed, with change and development ofthe material means of production, ofthe forces of 
production. The relations of production in their totality constitute what is called the social relations, 
society, and, moreover, a society with a unique and distinctive character. Ancient society, feudal 
society, bourgeois (or capitalist) society [i.e. any society], are such totalities of relations of 
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production, each of which denotes a particular stage of development in the history of mankind (Marx, 
1849: 156). 
My point here is straightforward. Whilst not a tabula rasa in its developed condition, the concept of 
the EEA invokes a mind that is relatively free of content-dependent mechanisms in its initial 
condition. The forces that impinge on this relatively simple mind and render it complex in a human 
sense human are social and environmental. 
7.3 Domain mismatches and maladaptive behaviour 
According to Tooby and Cosmides, "For a Darwinian, there is no escaping the past" (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1990b: 420). This idea legitimises their claim that, 
Although widespread current behaviours have consequences in terms of inclusive fitness at the 
present time, these present consequences are entirely irrelevant to explaining the adaptations that 
produce these behaviours. If these adaptations are to be explained ... they must be explained in 
terms of their contribution to inclusive fitness during past encounters with ancestral conditions ... 
For this reason, human behaviour is not well explained by attempts to show how it corresponds to 
contextually appropriate fitness pursuit (ibid). 
It is the distinction between the past and the present that creates room for the notion of a domain-
mismatch5. And it is the notion of mismatch that creates room for the possibility that the present as 
input into adaptations generates maladaptive behaviour because the present misleads adaptations in 
some sense. This reasoning allows Tooby and Cosmides to discuss maladaptive behaviours in 
adaptationist terms. 
However, the notion of maladaptation - the idea that adaptations generate non-adaptive behaviours 
or trains of thought - admits of only one sort of change. The change is in the problems faced by the 
organism. The change is out there in the environment, outside the organism (Kahn, 1999). Tooby 
and Cosmides construe the EEA as continuous with the present in terms of what exists in human 
heads. This is why the issue of a "domain-mismatch" rather than a "mechanism mismatch" is an 
issue in evolutionary psychology: there is no talk of maladaptive behaviour stemming from changes 
to adaptive mechanisms with the result that they become non-functional in the same environment 
(unless adaptations are damaged). In accordance with my claim that evolutionary psychology does 
not appear to understand the evolution of novelty, its message is that you can take the woman out of 
the EEA but you can't take the EEA out of the woman. Accordingly, the maladaptive move is an 
admission that there are important differences between the past and the present. But the failure (or 
unwillingness) to concede that the difference is in the heads of forms of Homo forces evolutionary 
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psychology into admitting that the novel behaviour exhibited by extant humans are not the product of 
adaptations. However, the insistence that novel behaviours be anchored to adaptations creates a 
serious difficulty for adaptationist accounts. To see what this difficulty is we will need to be clear as 
to the meaning of the terms exaptation, spandrel and by-product, and to refresh our definition of 
adaptation. 
7.3.1 Adaptations, Exaptations, Spandrels & By-products 
Whatever may be said to be the origin ofpurposive action (of whatever form or nature), 
psychological and behavioural science does not seriously doubt that action has its seat in the human 
brain. This is simply to say that "no brain, no purposive action" and it is a demonstration the basic 
commitment to materialism in psychology. Evolutionary psychology shares this basic commitment. 
Primafacie, that human behaviour is, to use the term favoured by Hinde (1958) and Bowlby (1969), 
"labile", implies that adapted psychological mechanisms are functionally labile. However, whilst the 
emphasis Too by and Cosmides place on the tightness of fit between the past and psychological 
adaptations wins them the notion of maladaptive behaviour, a cost is an implicit denial that 
adaptations are so labile as they would appear to be. In this section we will look at some of the 
difficulties this position creates for adaptationism. The heart of the matter is that, if one insists on 
saying that extant modern humans are adapted to an environment other than that which they inhabit 
and a style of subsistence other than that which they pursue, many of their current behaviours defy 
an adaptationist account. It will take some time to work through the terms. The reader may take this 
as a reflection of the muddle that ensues if one is serious about the past as an explanation for the 
present. 
Much of our focus will be Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske & Wakefield's paper Adaptations, 
Exaptations & Spandrels (1998). This paper, together with peer commentaries and a reply to those 
commentaries, is the most recent and fully articulated defence of evolutionary psychology against 
the claim that exaptations and spandrels are lethal to the enterprise as presented to date (e.g. Tooby 
& Cosmides, 1992; Buss, 1995). 
The first task of the analysis is to define the terms adaptation, exaptation, spandrel and by-product. 
The second is to trace out some of the implications of these definitions. And the third is to show why 
the terms exaptation, spandrel and by-product jeopardise evolutionary psychology as promoted by 
Tooby and Cosmides. Before we go on let us briefly consider why Tooby and Cosmides and 
evolutionary psychology as part of the adaptionist program concede that humans mind are comprised 
of anything other than adaptations. 
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7.3.1.1 Scruffy engineering 
The concession amongst evolutionary psychologists that natural selection does not produce optimally 
"engineered" organisms is not new. We can trace the idea back to Alfred Wallace's 1896 paper The 
Problem of Utility: Are Specific Characters Always or Generally Useful? This paper was Wallace's 
response to George Romanes' volume Darwin and after Darwin in which, in Wallace's words, 
Romanes' argued "that the majority of specific character are not and never have been useful, but ... 
persist and constitute the main external differences which we observe between species" (Wallace, 
1896: 4). Wallace argued against this view. His contention was with the term "majority". He 
accepted that "certain growths, appendages [and] markings, which are of no use to the organism, do 
occasionally appear" (ibid: 6), but he argued that for them to constitute the majority of a species 
defies the logic of specialisation inherent in natural selection. He emphasised the role of "appended" 
characteristics such as shape, colour and size as being precisely the features that distinguish one 
species from another. But he also conceded that apparently useless appendages can become useful 
over time and with changing circumstances. 
The first explicit consideration of the possibility that psychological adaptations may undergo a 
change in function appears to have come from Chauncey Wright. In a paper titled Evolution of Self 
Consciousness ( 1873), Wright argued that the opportunism and economy of evolution that he took 
Darwin to have clearly demonstrated suggested that changes of adaptive function for any given 
adaptation may be regarded, in principle, as common place. 
New uses of old powers arise discontinuously both in the bodily and nebtal natures of the animal, 
and in its individual developments, as well as in the development of its race, according to the theory 
of evolution, although at their rise, these uses are small and of the smallest importance to life 
(Wright, 1873: 246). 
There are two points to be made with regard to this debate, especially in light of the extensive use 
Wallace, Romanes and Wright make of Darwin's considerations. The first is that "the problem of 
utility" -the question as to what characteristics of what organisms are to be regarded as adaptations 
-has long been an issue in evolutionary theory. And the second point, and this is the key to 
Wallace's objection to Romanes, is that "although non-utilitarian characters do undoubtedly appear 
in the normal course of variation, no agency has yet been detected adequate to the extension ofthese 
useless peculiarities" (ibid: 9). In other words, Wallace is claiming that natural selection only covers 
those characteristics of known function. We can refer to feature as "scruffy engineering". It denotes 
nothing more than the fact that organisms are other than optimally designed. 
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By being "other than optimal" a design is other than perfectly suited and matched to the problem is 
solves. As we have seen, evolution can be expected to generate other than optimal adaptations. It 
does so in three ways. Firstly, evolution predicts variation within a species. In principle, then, only 
one of these variations could even be considered as optimal. Secondly, natural selection, being 
"blind", cannot anticipate changes that will impinge on the operation of otherwise optimal solutions. 
Thirdly, natural selection tinkers with extant designs with the result that they tend to be adequate 
rather than optimal. In contemporary parlance the concepts that are used to unpack the notion of 
scruffy engineering are referred to as exaptations, spandrels and by-products. 
7 .3.1.2 Definition of terms 
Adaptations: Tooby and Cosmides (1992) define an adaptation, "stripped ofcomplications and 
qualifications" as, 
( 1) a system of inherited and reliably developing properties that recurs among members of a species 
that (2) became incorporated into the species' standard design because during the period of their 
incorporation, (3) they were coordinated with a set of statistically recurrent structural properties 
outside the adaptation (either in the environment or in other parts of the organism), (4) in such a way 
that the causal interaction of the two (in the context of the rest of the properties of the organism) 
produced functional outcomes that were ultimately tributary to propagation with sufficient 
frequency (i.e. solved an adaptive problem for the organism) (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992: 61-62). 
Following Tooby and Cosmides, Buss eta! (1998) state that an adaptation is, "an inherited and 
reliably developing characteristic that came into existence as a feature of a species through natural 
selection because it helped to directly or indirectly facilitate reproduction during the period of its 
evolution". The solving of an adaptive problem is the function ofthe adaptation. If it fails to solve a 
given problem, it is not an adaptation by definition. In accordance with Williams' (1966) discussion, 
Tooby and Cosmides and Buss eta! agree that the necessary and sufficient conditions for a feature to 
be properly labelled as an adaptations are that the feature in question be (a) complex, (b) economic, 
(c) efficient, (d) reliable, (e) precise and (f) functional. 
(a) By complex it is meant that the feature exhibits non-accidental design characteristics. 
(b) By economic it is meant that the feature exhibits materiaVmetabolic parsimony. 
(c) By efficient it is meant that the feature exhibits algorithmic parsimony. 
(d) By reliable it is meant that the feature exhibits iterated performance. 
(e) By precise it is meant that the feature exhibits discrimination. 
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(f) By functional it is meant that the feature exhibits a specific fitness utility. 
There are two other important aspects of adaptations so far as evolutionary psychology is 
concerned. The first is that they attain their status as adaptations before the present: they are products 
of the past and they are not to be judged by their ability to fulfil the set of conditions detailed above 
in the present. The second is that adaptations are a sort of singularity. This is not to say that they map 
to single genes (although they might, adaptations are not to be defined in terms of the number of 
genes responsible). It is to say that they are individual and individuated modules. In sum, adaptations 
are always a product of a problem. Problems are always to be viewed as historical. Adaptations are 
always to be viewed as features of the phenotype by virtue of the fact that they are genetically 
heritable. 
Exaptations: Exaptations are defined by Buss eta/ (following Gould, 1991, 2000) as an inherited 
and reliably developing characteristic that originally came into existence as an adaptive feature of an 
organism but the characteristic has since been, 
a. further modified to fulfil some further distinguishable function, or, 
b. co-opted to fulfil some further distinguishable function without distinguishable 
modification 
The certain dependence of an exaptation on a prior adaptation and the need for an exaptation to fulfil 
the necessary and sufficient conditions of an adaptation (conditions (a) to (f) as defined above) lead 
Buss eta/ to label exaptations as co-opted adaptations. 
Spandrels: The source of the term "spandrel" is to be found in Gould and Lewontin's 1979 paper, 
The Spandrels of San Marco and the Pang/ossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptionist 
Programme. Gould and Lewontin define a spandrel as an inherited and reliably developing 
characteristic of an organism that originally came into existence by virtue of an adaptive feature but 
the characteristic is not itself adaptive. This definition has since been reiterated (i.e. Gould, 1991, 
2000). Following Gould, spandrels are defined by Buss eta/ as being, in the ftrst instance, a non-
functional by-product of an adaptation. Their caveat is that such features have since been, 
a. co-opted by the organism to fulfil a function in light of an additional adaptive problem, 
but has not been, 
b. modified in order for it to fulfil that further distinguishable function 
The certain dependence of a spandrel on an adaptation and the need for a spandrel to fulfil the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of an adaptation (conditions (a) to (f) as defined above) lead Buss 
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eta/ to re-label spandrels as co-opted spandrels. Again, there is the further question as to when these 
conditions need to be fulfilled: in the present or in the past. I will return to this point in due course. 
By-products: By-products are defined as incidental, non-adaptive features of adaptations. Given that, 
from a functional point of view, exaptations just are adaptations aside their necessary dependence on 
adaptations and the possibility that they may be specified as such under present conditions, I suggest 
that we allow a second form of by-product. This second form is defined as incidental, non-adaptive 
features of exaptations. 
Similarly, given that, from a functional point of view, spandrels just are adaptations aside their 
necessary dependence on adaptations and the possibility that they may be specified as such under 
present conditions, I suggest that we allow a third form of by-product. This third form are defined as 
incidental, non-adaptive features of spandrels. 
A by-product of either form may be negatively characterised as exhibiting none of the features of 
either adaptations or exaptations. That is to say they are not complex, economic, efficient, reliable, 
precise or functional. 
7 .3.1.3 Implications of the definitions 
The first and foremost implication of the definitions given of adaptations, exaptations, spandrels and 
by-products is that any given feature of an organism or species may be properly characterised as one 
or another (in the logically exclusive sense of the term "or"). This is to say that organisms can be 
exhaustively accounted for in terms of adaptations, exaptations, spandrels and by-products. The 
second implication is that any given feature is not attributed a given definition a priori. This is to say 
that whilst an organism can be exhaustively accounted for in terms of adaptations, exaptations, 
spandrels and by-products it is an empirical issue as to which features or proposed mechanisms are 
given which label. The third implication is that any given feature may at, any given prior point in 
time, be alternatively defined. This is to say that domain-mismatches permit of changes in which 
ascription we give any given feature or mechanism. None of these implications breach selectionist 
constraints. To say that any given feature of an organism or species may be properly characterised as 
one or another is simply to say that it must fulfil the conditions of the selectionist term. To say that 
any given feature is not attributed a given definition a priori is simply to say that any given feature 
needs to be shown to fulfil the conditions of the term and does not do so axiomatically. And to say 
that any given feature may at, any given prior point in time, be alternatively defined is simply to say 
that the function of any given feature may change in terms of its contribution to fitness. 
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It is the third implication -changes in the definitional ascription of features - which I want to 
discuss next for it is the most obvious consequence of granting Tooby and Cosmides the notion of 
maladaptive behaviour by recourse to a domain mismatch. This discussion will take the form of an 
instance-by-instance examination of the plausibility and general conditions under which any given 
feature may undergo a change of ascription from one definition, as being an exaptation for example, 
to being another, for example a by-product. 
7.3.1.4 Changes of ascription 
As has been shown in the discussion of the EEA, adaptionist accounts have the problem of balancing 
the changes in environments that give rise to adaptations and specifYing sufficient stasis at some 
point in time in order to take an inventory of an organism's adaptations: the inventory is the 
adaptionist account. To make this task clearer let us take as an example the germane case, the c.6 
million year period that has seen the emergence of humans from chimpanzees. 
To bridge the gap, or difference, between Pan troglodytes and Homo sapien sapien adaptionist 
accounts have to posit new or changed adaptive problems in order to generate a causal engine for 
those differences. And it then needs to "stop" or freeze the change in order to fix the adaptation and 
allow it to go to fixation in the population. If one accepts the idea of the ARE this process of start-
stop may need to be reiterated for each individual adaptation (Buss eta!, 1998; Irons, 1998). The 
number of iterations is conceptually, if not technically, irrelevant on the assumption that the general 
procedure will yield a specification of an adaptation. 
The thrust behind the concept of the EEA comes from the fact that in order to generate and specifY 
the basic characteristics and proper definition for a given feature one must show what caused or 
brought it about; i.e. one must specify the problem. As Plotkin (1995) suggests, problems are either 
lethal to a species because it cannot cope with or adjust to them, they are lethal to strains of a 
species, lethal to individuals of a species or they are solved by virtue of a feature. The evolution of a 
species is, on the one hand, the history of its problems, or, on the other, the history of the features 
generated by those problems. The two histories are complementary but not symmetric. They are 
complementary in the sense that problems and features enjoy a certain goodness of fit - if this fit 
cannot be shown then one is matching the wrong problem to a given feature or vice versa. They are 
not symmetric in that, whilst consecutive problems are not constrained by the speed at which an 
organism can adapt, adaptations are. If we are to avoid tautologies on the one hand and change 
constrains on the other, in order to offer an evolutionary explanation of a feature we must be 
prepared to specifY a change of ascription for any given feature. This does not violate selectionist 
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thinking. Changes of ascription are just stages of evolution so long as we limit ourselves to 
ascriptions that are naturally occurring products of the evolutionary process. Let us now return to the 
notion of maladaptive behaviour and see how it depends upon adaptations functioning in ways other 
than those they are designed for. 
Tooby and Cosmides argue that maladaptive behaviour occurs because we are not wholly adapted 
to current environments. Indeed evolutionary psychology is, in part, founded on a rejection of the 
idea that we are well suited to the present. It accuses such thinking as being the fountainhead of 
tautological "just-so" stories (e.g. Symons, 1992) and as responsible for "hyperadaptiveness" and 
"instantaneous Lamarckianism" (Tooby and Cosmides, 1990b).lt argues that humans are adapted to 
an environment- and thus a suite of problems - other than that which the bulk of us currently inhabit. 
But the implied mismatch demands that we be prepared to ascribe common current behaviours that 
are either neutral (watching television perhaps), apparently adaptive (say, reading) or simply very 
well organised (say, driving a vehicle) to mechanisms that are not best described as adaptations. Here 
is the argument that allows for changes of ascription: 
(a) On the (questionable) assumption that an organism is wholly constituted of adaptations to 
specific problems, and, 
(b) On the assumption that the range of problems it faces change, and, 
(c) On the assumption that the organism continues to thrive (that the change in problems is not 
lethal) 
( d 1) It follows that the organism does not continue to thrive by virtue of adaptations properly 
defined, or (in the logically inclusive sense) it does so by virtue offeatures other than adaptations 
properly defined 
In other words, in order to account for the outcome - the still thriving but mismatched organism -
within a selectionist framework one must assume that the original adaptation is now either an 
exaptation, a spandrel, or a by-product. 
To allow for cases other than adaptation to spandrel/exaptation/by-product re-ascription we need 
only weaken assumption (a) by employing (d1). Here is the argument that follows: 
(a2) On the assumption that an organism is wholly constituted of adaptations, exaptations, spandrels 
and/or by-products, and, 
(b) On the assumption that the range of problems it faces change, and, 
(c) On the assumption that the organism continues to thrive 
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( d2) It follows that the organism does so by virtue of changes of ascription of adaptations, 
exaptations, spandrels or by-products properly defined 
In other words, in order to account for the outcome - the still thriving organism - within a selectionist 
framework one must assume that at least one adaptation, exaptation, spandrel or by-product is now 
properly described as either an adaptation, exaptation, spandrel or by-product. 
7.3.1.4.1 How do changes of ascription work? 
I hope to have shown that changes of ascription must necessarily come about if humans continue to 
thrive in conditions other than those to which they are adapted. This is the consequence of positing a 
domain mismatch. I suggest that evolutionary psychology and its invocation of the EEA suggests 
that Homo sapiens sapiens are an exemplary case of such changes having come about. What I will 
now do is take each possible case of a change of ascription and specify under what conditions each 
might come about. As we will see, certain cases are more plausible than others and certain cases are, 
by virtue of definition, impossible. I will go onto to argue that the adaptionist program as instantiated 
in evolutionary psychology must show that certain reascriptions have not come about in order to 
support the general hypothesis that humans minds are a suite of adaptations. 
By a change of ascription I mean a re-labelling of 
1 an adaptation to an exaptation 2 an adaptation to a spandrel 
3 an adaptation to a by-product 4 an exaptation to an adaptation 
5 an exaptation to a spandrel 6 an exaptation to a by-product 
7 a spandrel to an adaptation 8 a spandrel to an exaptation 
9 a spandrel to a by-product 10 a by product to an adaptation 
11 a by-product to an exaptation 12 a by-product to a spandrel 
The above is an exhaustive list of the possible changes of ascription. 
7.3 .1.4.1.1 From an adaptation to an exaptation 
This is the prime instance of a change of ascription. That evolution is said to be a tinkerer of existing 
design is to say that it builds on existing adaptation to cope with new or changed adaptive problems. 
Exaptations depend upon adaptations: this is to say that exaptations are former adaptations that have 
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been co-opted to perform some other/additional/expanded/distinct function. The motto is, "in the 
beginning there was an adaptation". 
We may follow Dennett (1995) and say that all adaptive features of humans are, in fact, 
exaptations from previous adaptations. To achieve this we simply have to choose a sufficiently 
distant comparison point- fish for example. (However, we may say that this is trivially true because 
it is merely the postulation of evolutionary change). But to capture the import in the term exaptation 
we need to suppose a much sharper disjunction. We need to be able to show that feature x was an 
adaptation in the full sense of the term and that feature x at some future but sequentially immediate 
point fulfilled all the general criteria of being an adaptation but the functional specification of each is 
distinct. For example, as an adaptation feature x is complex in manner y, and as an exaptation feature 
x is complex in manner w, and so on. 
7.3 .1.4.1.2 From an adaptation to a spandrel 
It is not possible for an adaptation to become a spandrel. The prerequisite for a spandrel is that it is 
first a by-product of an adaptation not an adaptation per se. 
7.3.1.4.1.3 From an adaptation to a by-product 
On the definition of a by-product, an adaptation cannot be become a by-product directly. However, 
we may say that an adaptation becomes redundant. To say that a feature goes from being an 
adaptation to being a by-product requires that the adaptation is first exapted and in the process some 
feature of it no longer has a function: 
7.3 .1.4.1.4 From an exaptation to an adaptation 
As in the trivial case of adaptations becoming exaptations by definition, exaptations proper just are 
adaptations. The only instance in which an exaptation could become an adaptation would be where a 
feature reverts to its original function. We might say that this happens all the time. For example, at 
this moment in time I am "using" my eyes to trace and read these words. When I prepare a cup of 
coffee at the end of this section I will use them to detect edges. 
7.3 .1.4.1.5 From an exaptation to a spandrel 
On the definition given, it is not possible for an exaptation to become a spandrel. The prerequisite for 
a spandrel is that it is first a by-product of an adaptation. It is possible, however, that in the process 
of becoming an exaptation an adaptation generates spandrels. This is to say that in the process of 
becoming an exaptation, what were by-products of the adaptation now become spandrels by virtue of 
the new problem the exaptation is co-opted to solve. 
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7.3 .1.4.1.6 From an exaptation to a by-product 
On the definition given above, an exaptation cannot become a by-product. The prerequisite for a by-
product is that it is first a functionless element of an adaptation, an exaptation or a spandrel. Again, 
as with an adaptation, however, we may say that an exaptation becomes redundant. We may also say 
that exaptations generate by-products in the case that the exaptation undergoes a further co-option 
and in the process some feature of it no longer has a function. 
7.3 .1.4.1. 7 From a spandrel to an adaptation 
On the definition given above, it is not possible for a spandrel to become an adaptation except in the 
trivial case whereupon a spandrel just is an adaptation. 
7.3.1.4.1.8 From a spandrel to an exaptation 
On the definition given above, it is not possible for a spandrel to become an exaptation other than in 
the trivial sense that a spandrel as an exaptationjust is an adaptation, and other than in the trivial 
case that a spandrel just is an additional use of an adaptation. However, we may say that a spandrel 
arises from an exaptation when in the process of co-opting an adaptation an exaptation produces a 
by-product that is subsequently co-opted to produce a spandrel 
7.3 .1.4.1.9 From a spandrel to a by-product 
It is possible for a spandrel to become a by-product when it becomes redundant. This can occur 
when, as a feature of an adaptation that becomes an exaptation, it becomes a by-product of that 
exaptation. 
7.3 .1.4.1.1 0 From a by-product to an adaptation. 
On the definition of by-product given above, is not possible for a by-product to become an 
adaptation. However, we might suppose that a by-product, properly defined, might become a 
functional aspect of a given feature. This would require that the specification of the adaptation 
remains the same (or not so dissimilar that is becomes an exaptation). Again the utilisation of a by-
product would enhance the economy of the adaptation. 
7.3 .1.4.1.11 From a by-product to an exaptation 
On the definition given above, it is not possible for a by-product to become an exaptation. However, 
it is possible for a by-product of a given adaptation to become a functional part of an exaptation. This 
may, in fact, be a parsimonious way for an adaptation to become an exaptation. We need only 
assume that a given adaptation has a by-product attached and that in the process of exaptation this 
by-product is utilised. The economy of the original adaptation is actually enhanced and no additional 
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engineering is required. The question is do we classifY such a change in ascription as an expansion of 
the adaptation or as a bona fide exaptation? 
7.3.1.4.1.12 From a by-product to a spandrel 
SpecifYing a reascription of a feature from it being a by-product to being a spandrel is to detail the 
conditions of a spandrel. It is to define a case of a spandrel. We need only assume that, in the first 
instance, a given adaptation has a by-product attached and that in the process of conversion this by-
product is utilised. The economy of the original adaptation is actually enhanced and no additional 
engineering is required. 
7.3.1.5 Implications for evolutionary psychology 
The point of the preceding sections is simply to show how a given or proposed feature or mechanism 
goes from being classified as one sort of product of evolution to another by virtue of changes in the 
problems an organism faces. What I want to do in this section is draw out three implications of the 
possibility- indeed, the probability given a domain mismatch -that mechanism can change "jobs" or 
be applied to tasks other than that which they were originally selected for. 
7.3.1.5.1 The relative importance of exaptations and spandrels 
A noteworthy feature of Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske and Wakefield's Adaptations, 
Exaptations & Spandrels ( 1998) is that it accepts and resists exaptations, spandrels and by-products. 
Following Tooby and Cosmides (1990b), Buss et al accept that the concepts are respectable, viz., 
"The evolutionary process produces three products: naturally selected features (adaptations), by-
products of naturally selected features, and a residue of noise" (Buss et al, 1998: 53 7). But they are 
anxious to squash any claim to the end that other products of the evolutionary process "may be a 
more important concept for the emerging paradigm of evolutionary psychology" (ibid: 533) than 
adaptations. That they countenance the idea at all flows from their acceptance of a domain-
mismatch. 
Buss et al 's strategy is as follows. First, they suggest that Gould, the main proponent of spandrels, 
is an unreliable voice on matters evolutionary. They do this by accusing Gould (1982, 1991) of being 
inconsistent in his usage of the term adaptation (they, in turn, are accused of being inconsistent with 
Gould by one of their commentators, i.e., Beauchaine, 1998). Second, having doubted the doubter, as 
it were, Buss eta/look to capitalise by marginalising the "other products". While accepting that 
there are constraints on optimal design (i.e. time lags, local optima, constrained genetic variation, 
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fitness costs, and modular co-ordination), they suggest that such constraints may only give rise to 
characteristics that appear to be exaptations and spandrels, and that by-products or noise are simply 
flaws in adaptations. What they say is that one can account for more or most behaviours by recourse 
to adaptations supported by accounts of the EEA. Thirdly, Buss eta/look to make exaptations and 
spandrels tractable in term of the adaptationist program by relabelling them. Exaptation, defined as a 
redeployed adaptation, is called a "co-opted adaptation". Similarly, spandrel, defined as deployment 
of a hitherto redundant by-product, is called a "co-opted spandrel". What is the same in each instance 
is that exaptations and spandrels "must possess a biological function that contributes to fitness to 
qualify" as either (ibid: 539). The gain here is that each term carries the obligation to be functional. 
True to the concept of the EEA, Buss et a! invoke objections to Darwinian Social Science (Buss, 
1995; Symons, 1992) to repudiate the utility of the concepts of exaptations and spandrels, given that 
they are said to apply to current fitness. In doing this they ignore the probability that exaptations are 
also features of the past and would themselves have exerted selection pressures on con-specifics. 
Having relabelled exaptations and spandrels in adaptionist terms, Buss et a! suggest a return to 
normal business by saying that " ... the component parts of a species can be analyzed, and empirical 
studies can be conducted to determine which of these parts are adaptations, which are by-products 
and which are noise" (ibid: 537). We will turn again toTooby and Cosmides in the next section to 
see how this analysis of determination is to be conducted. But first let us consider obvious problems 
for Buss eta! 's scheme. 
Firstly, how important does one take those behaviours that humans routinely perform in an 
organised manner, that are not obviously maladaptive and that we cannot be said to have been 
selected to perform? I have in mind such behaviours as, say, driving, reading and forming large 
abstract coalitions (e.g. national unions or multinational corporations). How are such activities to be 
explained in terms of the past? 
Secondly, what in addition to an adaptationist description of our predecessors do we need to 
produce in order to make sense of the fact that activities such as reading and driving are so routinely 
achieved by us? Surely the more complex, economic, efficient, reliable, precise and functional the 
mechanisms we take our predecessors to have been comprised of, the more difficult it is to explain 
how we achieve such complex tasks efficiently, reliably, precisely and functionally. We can attempt 
to tackle these questions. Or, alternatively, we can take a more relaxed attitude toward 
adaptation ism. 
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7.3.1.5.2 How do you tell an exaptation from an adaptation? 
In this section I want to point out two difficulties that arise when we try to discern exaptations from 
adaptations. One centers on Tooby and Cosmides' proposal for the analysis of adaptations. The other 
centers on the experimental method as a means of ascertaining adaptations. 
In order to establish a psychological adaptation, Tooby and Cosmides present "the five structured 
components that can be fit together in such an analysis" (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992: 73). 
I. An adaptive target: a description of what counts as a biologically successful outcome in a given 
situation ... 
2. Background conditions: a description of the recurrent structure of the ancestral world that is relevant 
to the adaptive problem ... 
3. A design: a description of the articulated organization of the recurrent features in the organism that 
together comprise the adaptation or suspected adaptation ... 
4. A performance examination: a description of what happens when the proposed adaptation 
mechanistically interacts with the world ... 
5. A performance evaluation: a description or analysis of how well (or how poorly) the design, under 
circumstances paralleling ancestral conditions, managed to produce the adaptive target (the set of 
biologically successful outcomes). The better the mechanisms performs, the more likely it is that 
one has identified an adaptation (ibid: 73-74). 
As the central place of the EEA in evolutionary psychology would suggest, Tooby and Cosmides' 
preferred method is to specify an adaptive target (i.e. an outcome known to have been regularly 
achieved in the past), construct the requisite background conditions, including the condition of the 
species in question at the time, and hypothesise a design. However, it is obvious that this approach is 
not open to us if we are testing to see if the design underlying a behaviour is an exaptation. To look 
for the background conditions for, say, driving, would, of course, be senseless. This leaves any 
search for an exaptation reliant on steps 1, 3 and 4. But, in light of considerations of our knowledge 
of the EEA, I suggest that steps 1, 3 and 4 are all we have at our disposal when searching for 
adaptations also. The result is that we can articulate a proposed design (step 3), examine its 
performance in the world (step 4) and decide that it is biologically successful (keeping in mind that a 
biologically successful outcome for Tooby and Cosmides can be remote from the production of 
offspring). Whilst our hunch might be that a performance that amounted to, say, the consumption of 
a macrobiotic diet was more likely to be the result of an adaptation(s), we cannot say that it has a 
better outcome (in Tooby and Cosmides sense of the term) than being, say, a good carpenter. I have 
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picked two ends of a fairly mundane spectrum to illustrate the point that we cannot attribute many 
day-to-day behaviours to adaptations less detailed and unsupported assumptions about the past. 
The second point of confusion that arises if we attempt to discern adaptations via Tooby and 
Cosmides' proposed method arises from the means we may use to do so. 
First of all, allow me to reiterate: It is respectable to accept that human minds are comprised of 
adaptations and exaptations. Any activity in which they engage that was not explicitly generated by 
the EEA is achieved courtesy of an exaptation, a spandrel or a by-product. Reading is the obvious 
example we have been working with and it is apposite to the present point. An adaptionist account of 
reading can go no further than saying that the EEA must have been comprised, in part, by problems 
for the visual system and cognition that have subsequently allowed for or permitted reading to 
become a common and organised behaviour. It cannot reasonably equate the functional value of the 
adaptations that allow for reading with the fitness consequences of reading. To do so would 
implicitly assert that reading is an adaptation. 
An odd result of the fact that reading is not an adaptation arises for any method for finding a 
psychological adaptation that depends upon the ability of subjects to read. Arguably the most 
influential experiment in the literature of evolutionary psychology, Cosmides use of the Wason 
selection task (Wason, 1969; Cosmides, 1985, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992) is just such an 
example. Whilst only a majority of participants could respond correctly to the social contract version 
of the selection task, all participants could read it. The wider point that many psychological 
mechanisms may best described in exaptationist terms arises from the ability of humans to complete 
experiments designed to show adaptations. Any method that depends on abilities that cannot be 
responses to ancestral problems is, ~nwittingly, a demonstration and study of exaptations. 
7.3.1.5.3 How do you do scruffy engineering? 
A possible way out of the difficulties that arise from trying to accommodate a domain-mismatch 
within the framework of psychological adaptations, as Tooby and Cosmides' define them, is to 
embrace the idea that adaptations are "scruffily engineered". This need not necessarily mean that 
they do not have background conditions or adaptive targets. But it does mean that they may produce 
quasi-functional behaviours and outcomes. This then presents problems when we attempt to evaluate 
their performance. The basic problem is how do we do scruffy engineering? For example: 
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• Whilst Tooby and Cosmides claim that "an evolutionary functional analysis consists of asking a 
series of engineering questions" (ibid: 75; see also Dennett, 1995), the stance required must set 
scruffy questions. 
• If we expect sub-optimal performance from an evolved design, how scruffily engineered need it 
be before we take it as an adaptation? 
• Should a proposed design produce an outcome that hits the adaptive target with very great 
precision and reliability, does this imply that the proposed design is too good? 
• Is there any reason to believe that all adaptations are similarly scruffy? Given the assumptions of 
modularity and specific problem/solution couplings, should we not expect that adaptations are 
variably scruffy? What performance standard do we set in order to evaluate each supposed 
adaptation and how do we set this standard? 
• Accepting that adaptations are (more or less) scruffily engineered and scruffy in their individual 
instantiations raises the very possibility of by-products and spandrels: we may assume that 
optimal designs would produce fewer of either. But it also raises the possibility that certain 
exaptations and spandrels may perform their functions better than do certain adaptations. All that 
is required is that the new problem meshes with the extant feature more precisely or closely than 
did the old problem. How would a performance evaluation settle the issue as to the proper status 
of a supposed design feature? 
7.4 Backwards, forwards but no further ahead 
In this chapter we have looked at two construals of the EEA. The first is that it was the same as is the 
present. The second is that it is not. What is the same in both cases is the questionable assumption 
that it is not minds that have changed since the beginning of the Pleistocene but the environment in 
which they operate. We examined some of the evidence that makes that assumption questionable in 
the last chapter. 
With regard to the first proposal, the benefit of assuming that our hominid predecessors occupied 
essentially identical environments or worlds, physical and social, to ourselves is that the present is as 
good as the past so far as discerning adaptations are concerned. However, if we take the past and the 
present to be homogenous or seamless we have to justify why one form of life and social living-
typically hunting and gathering- is taken as being primary, natural or, in some or another sense, 
more important than any other. If, in effect, we are going to ignore Homo outside of Homo sapien 
sapien surely we have to take into account the fact that most human beings have not lived that form 
of life. As "design propagators", human beings are more successful when out of their "natural" 
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environment. Does evolutionary psychology wish to stipulate the conditions in, say, modem India as 
the proper domain? 
With regard to the second proposal, the benefit of assuming that our hominid predecessors 
occupied non-identical environments or worlds, physical and social, to ourselves is that we gain the 
notion of maladaptation. Describing behaviour as maladaptive allows evolutionary psychology to 
explain functional and non-functional outcomes in terms of adaptations. Non-functional outcomes 
are the result of a mismatch between the past and the present confusing or confounding adaptations. 
However, two lines of reasoning present difficulties for this proposal. 
First, many behaviours of modem humans that, prima facie, have the hallmarks of being complex, 
economic, efficient, reliable, precise and functional cannot have been selected for in the Pleistocene, 
e.g. reading. Second, Tooby and Cosmides' use of terms such as "engineering", "architecture" and 
"mechanism" notwithstanding, evolutionary theorists from Wallace onwards accept that natural 
selection does not produce optimally designed organisms. From within the Darwinian tradition, 
Gould and Lewontin (1979; Gould & Vrba, 1982; Gould, 1991, 2000) have pressed this point and 
have won the concession that modem humans may not be exhaustively described in adaptationist 
terms. Tooby and Cosmides and other evolutionary psychologists accept this but they do not 
embrace it. One of the ways of avoiding the charge of teleology and keeping to a selectionist account 
of how species cope with domain-mismatches is to resort to the concepts of exaptations, spandrels 
and by-products. These two lines of reasoning issue the result that the behaviours of extant humans 
in modern environments, including those that look adaptive, are not the direct product of adaptations. 
Furthermore, depending on the interest of the researchers, behaviours that cannot be explained in 
terms of the EEA may be of greater importance or interest than those that can. 
I suggest that a way out of the difficulties created by construing a very tight fit between 
psychological mechanisms and the past is to embrace the notion of scruffy engineering. However, 
such a move demands that we abandon Tooby and Cosmides' definition of an adaptation and the 
method by which we ascribe a proposed feature of mind as such. 
1 Dewey's argument run's as follows: Because modem man has such a wide behavioural repertoire at his 
disposal, and that whatever the repertoire of our ancestors we cannot be sure of its psychological foundations, 
we cannot know the relationship between our psychology and theirs. Though we know that sapien sapien is 
novel, and that one cannot predict species X at time Y preceding it, the EEA cannot contain what we would 
need to know about subsequent events and species if we construct it from time 1 through to timen. However we 
define its duration, the past can tells us nothing definite and specific about the novel species that emerged from 
it by virtue of their novelty. This idea can also be expressed using Dennett's notion of"design space" (Dennett, 
1995). By design space Dennett simply means all viable possibilities for phenotypes at time X in environment 
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Y. He points out that there are a finite but "Vast" number of possibilities but only a tiny sub-set of actualities. 
Evolutionary novelty is really nothing more(!) than the computational difficulty (or impossibility?) of 
correctly predicting X at time Y at some point prior to either. 
2 Palaeoanthropologists divided themselves into "Jumpers" and "splitters". Lumpers minimise the number of 
different hominid species, although very few suggest there are less than five (Tattersall, 2000). Splitters think 
that there were many more and interpret what for a Jumpers is variation as type (ibid). 
3 A circular argument is an argument wherein one (or more) of the premises used to deduce the conclusion is 
itself supported by the conclusion. This is why circular arguments are often labelled question begging or taken 
to beg the question. 
This is the structure of the argument. 
X is an extant human mind 
All extant features (y) of X are adaptations 
all adaptations are product of the past 
all adaptations (strictly conceived as being successfully functional) are in the present 
The argument promotes two conclusions 
if feature of the past then an extant feature 
and 
if and extant feature then a feature of the past 
4 Bernard (1924) cited Thorndike's survey ofthe field in The Original Nature of Man (1913) as well as his 
own analysis of instinct in use to support his view that the predominant tendency amongst instinct theorists was 
to think of instincts as being for something, as being functional. However, 
The difficulty of this method [of classification] is that it describes our attitude toward the activity 
process or our understanding of its value in society, rather than the process itself. Such a defmition 
does not enable us to distinguish one instinct or set of instincts from another, so far as origin or 
structure are concerned ... (Bernard, 1924: 148t 
Bernard labeled the functional approach "instinctivism". More precisely, he was concerned about the 
plausibility of constructing an unbiased account of the present: 
... what adherents to this brand of determinism hope to accomplish ... depends primarily upon 
what their reason, traditions and experiences have taught them to consider desirable. One cannot 
avoid observing that a conscious ideal or principle or convention has justified the social or 
individual "necessity" of monogamy, or of freedom of sexual relationships, or of any other "ism" 
before instinct is invoked in its support ... Thus, in the case of so-called instinctive determination 
of social principles and attitudes, we have an interesting example of the influence of environment 
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itself. The environmental pressures have ... determined what the instinctivists wish society to be 
and have moulded [sic] their attitudes towards, or theories of, the instincts and their importance 
accordingly (Bernard, 1924: 33). 
In chapter XIII, "A Reductio Ad Absurdum" Bernard developed this line of criticism. He sought to show 
how the muddle that had come about in attempts to numerate instincts flowed from the tendency of functional 
account to talk of instinct being for something or to something. The example he chose was the instinct for 
criminality (or to criminality). Bernard's strategy was to decompose any such claim by arguing that it cannot 
possibly refer to any given inherited fact of physiology. Given that criminality is not a biological unit but a 
synthesis of units, Bernard showed how different forms of criminality- i.e. murder, robbery, arson-
themselves are comprised of different units. 
If we select shooting as the type of murder which we desire to analyse into its elements, we discover 
a great variety of instruments by means of which one may be shot. But this analysis into the 
instrumental mechanisms is only one phase of the divisibility. We must also take into consideration 
whether the shooting was intentional or purposive, whether it was socially justifiable or not, what 
the other circumstance of light, position, provocation, etc., are. All of these considerations have 
some effect, sometimes a profound effect, upon the final classification of the act from neural and 
from muscular standpoints, that is, as an act physically speaking, - the only sort of an act which can 
conceivably be inherited (Bernard, 1924: 308-309). 
Bernard took this decomposition as a demonstration that any claim of the type "instinct for ... "was, in fact, 
a synthetic claim, and "that an abstract idea (such as criminality) cannot be inherited, because neurologically it 
does not represent a unit act or organisation". 
It stands for a synthetic valuation of act with a certain similarity of social and moral significance, 
when viewed in relation to certain results. It is a conceptual fact rather than an overt of neuro-
muscular act (ibid: 310-311 ). 
This analysis was the basis of Bernard's claim that instincts defmed by their practical results, 
Instead of representing definite internal biological unit structural organizations which remain 
constant, as instinct or inherited traits necessarily must, they represent varying syntheses of 
biological (predominantly neurological) complexes and dispositions which have only a nominal 
constancy, one which exists in their meaning rather than in their structural organization. That is, 
their unity is a varying unity with regard to the time and space elements and we are able to give 
them a constant or permanent title only through a process of abstract or conceptual syntheses of 
functions. Their unity and identity are social and conceptual rather than biological (ibid: 303). 
On the same theme he also wrote, "Using the universality of a practise as an argument in support of its 
instinctive character would get us into all sorts of difficulties" (ibid: 223). The "difficulties" are three. First, 
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Bernard argues, it is easy to be deceived as to what is universal if one is selective about the time and place one 
chooses to look as one is bound to be due to operational constraints. Second, apparent universals, such as the 
belief in a god, can force one into stipulating instincts for religion if one is true to ones method. Third, and 
most pertinently, Bernard believed that functional accounts of instincts underplayed both the power and the 
ubiquity of "biological and anthropogeographical environments". 
Any practise which can be acquired can be made universal if the proper environmental conditions 
for stamping in or inducing the practise exist ... countless numbers of attitudes and practises have 
grown up because of their survival value under favourable environmental conditions. These attitudes 
and practises have tended to universalize themselves for the same reason that they appeared in the 
first place. We may expect any of these to undergo further modification under varying 
environmental pressures, understanding by environment the psycho-social environment quite as 
much as the biological and anthropogeographical environments (Bernard, 1924: 229). 
Notice that Bernard did not denying that humans are motivated to survive, or that they behave functionally. 
What he argued was that specific instincts are difficult to demonstrate as being functional in light of shifting 
means toward the end of survival. 
5 As it turns out, the notion of domain-mismatch was first articulated by one of the most insistent critics of 
instinct theory, Kuo. (Unlike, say, Dewey who gradually abandoned his positive view of instincts, Kuo appears 
to have never entertained the possibility that the concept had any use or validity.) To set up his domain-
mismatch, Kuo relied on what today critics of evolutionary psychology call "ultra-adaptionism" (Rose & Rose, 
2000. And see below, 'Adaptations, Exaptations, Spandrels and By-products). Kuo begins his criticism by 
rejecting what he saw as one of the" ... motives which have led the psychologists to insist on the existence of 
instincts and their significance in behaviour ... the notion that every instinct has an adaptive function" (Kuo, 
1921: 653). 
Biased by the Darwinian theory of natural selection, students of psychology are apt to interpret 
every spontaneous reaction of the organism in terms of biological value. They argue that instincts 
play a very important part in the preservation ofthe organism and the species. These instincts, 
because of their adaptive value, are preserved in the race through natural selection and are handed 
down from generation to generation (ibid: 653). 
Kuo levels had two complaints with this view. The one of interest to our present concerns was that, 
... supposed instincts might be adaptive in certain generations; but there is no guarantee that they 
will be adaptive in all generations and in every circumstance ... If instincts persist in form from 
generation to generation, they, instead of being adaptive instruments for racial or individual 
preservation, will become mal-adaptive in a new environment ... Should we have inherited the 
same instincts as our ancestors of a few thousand years ago, how awkward we would be in adapting 
ourselves to modem society (ibid: 654). 
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We don't have to take this criticism seriously to take the point. It was Kuo's view that either instinct theorists 
should concede that the ability of instincts to cope with such radically altered environments implied that their 
flexibility under the rubric of habit was the essential phenomena of interest, or that they should show that, 
contra the very notion of historical development, no change of environment had taken place. 
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Part lli: Evolutionary Social Psychology without Adaptations 
Chapter 8 Instincts and Adaptations 
Summary of chapter 8 
Instincts and adaptations invite comparison. Defmitions of both employ the notions of inheritance, selection, 
function and species typicality. With regard to the application of each to wider issues of social behaviour and 
the generation of culture, authors of different generations have illustrated the similarity by making similar 
claims for each. Whilst comparisons of instincts and adaptations are readily made, there are differences 
between the two. Whereas evolutionary psychology seeks to specify the adaptations that comprise humans by 
reference to their ancestral environments, instinct theory, whilst insisting that instincts have an adaptive 
function, did not explicitly press questions as to their origin in the natural history of humans. I suggest that 
instincts theorists were unable to avail themselves of a developed palaeoanthropology to differentiate an 
account of human origins from philosophical speculations about the "primeval" origin of man. Reasons for the 
fall of the instinct concept are examined and a further comparison is made with adaptations. I argue that Tooby 
and Cosmides drive the concept of a psychological adaptation into the difficulties that beset the notion of 
psychological instincts. 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will argue that there are lessons that Tooby and Cosmides and evolutionary 
psychology can take from the non-Standard Model paradigm in psychological thought that I have 
called the instinct debate. The first of these is the affinity between the earlier notion of instinct and 
the current one of adaptation. In the first part of chapter 8 we will see how close the affinity is by 
comparing Tooby and Cosmides' overall objective with that of William McDougall. More broadly it 
can be seen that instincts and psychological adaptations are, if you will, ofthe same species as 
concepts. 
The second lesson that evolutionary psychology can take from the instinct debate concerns the fate 
of the latter. Forty years of effort, expended by many of the major psychological thinkers of the 
period, did not- just as Tooby and Cosmides' thesis of the SSSM suggests- result in a mainstream 
social psychology explicitly founded in Darwinism. It is important for social psychologists inclined 
toward an evolutionary approach to ask why the idea of social instincts failed. 
In the later part of the chapter we revisit the instinct debate and look at some of the reasons why it 
came to an end. I hope to show that the notion of an adaptation could not be successfully de-coupled 
from its foundation in anatomy and physiology so to provide a satisfactory notion of a psychological 
instinct. A noticeable feature of the debate was the switch of emphasis from instincts conceived of as 
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physiological phenomenon and framed in the terminology of reflexes, to an emphasis on their 
psychological manifestation and properties. It was this switch which encouraged the reification 
objection 1, the criticism that comparative analyses of psychological content rested on 
anthropomorphism2, and accusations that psychological instincts were teleologicae. In my view, the 
attempt to discuss instincts in terms of psychological content also led to the demise of the concept. It 
did so because instinctive psychological states could not be adequately defined with the result that 
what counted as a psychological instinct could not be constrained. 
We will look at how psychologists tried to psychologise instincts. The exercise will show that once 
one decouples the notion of adaptation from anatomy or physiology one seriously weakens the tether 
to natural selection and natural history. We will also consider Luther Bernard's influential critique of 
the psychological instinct concept in use. In the final section of the chapter I will explicate Tooby 
and Cosmides attempt to psychologise adaptations and suggest that their formulation too cannot be 
constrained. 
8.2 Compare ... 
As suggested in chapter 4, instincts never entirely ceased to be of issue in psychology and social 
psychology. On the one hand, the concept was broken up. It buckled under the weight of its own 
obligations but lived on in a lower case existence and eventually faded from view as an unuttered 
assumption in drive theories. On the other hand, it lived on in ethology. A sideshow of the social 
sciences, the leading advocates of ethology went on advertising the wares of instincts to those most 
interested in the human drama. In this section I will directly compare evolutionary psychology's 
claims concerning the power of adaptations to shed light on social psychology and society with those 
made by instinct theory. More precisely I will compare Tooby and Cosniides with McDougall. 
Tooby and Cosmides are forthright and firm in stating the propositions that constitute the project of 
evolutionary psychology and the aim of the enterprise. They list eight propositions as a termination 
to their introductory remarks in The Psychological Foundations of Culture. Below I have quoted the 
list in full. After each proposition I have quoted phrases from Chapter II of McDougall's Social 
Psychology, "The Nature of Instinct". (McDougall is quoted in italics so to aid clarity). The object of 
the exercise is, I hope, self-evident. 
a. the human mind consists of a set of evolved information-processing mechanisms instantiated in 
the human nervous system; (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992: 24) 
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The human mind has certain innate or inherited tendencies which are the essential springs or 
motive powers of all thought and action, whether individual or collective . .. (McDougall, 1908: 
19). 
b. these mechanisms, and the developmental programs that produce them, are adaptations, produced 
by natural selection over evolutionary time in ancestral environments (ibid: 24); 
These all-important and relatively unchanging tendencies . .. [arise] out of the constitution of mind 
and the nature of mental process in general, when mind and mental process attain a certain degree 
of complexity in the course of evolution (ibid: 20) ... [these tendencies] are common to all members 
of any one species, racial characters that have been slowly evolved in the process of adaptation of a 
species to their environment (ibid: 20-21). 
c. many of these mechanisms are functionally specialized to produce behaviour that solves particular 
adaptive problems, such as mate selection, language acquisition, family relations, and cooperation 
(ibid: 24). 
In the typical case some sense-impression, or combination of sense-impressions, excites some 
perfectly definite behaviour, some movement or train of movements which is the same in all 
individuals of the species and on all similar occasions; and in general the behaviour so occasioned 
is of a kind either to promote the welfare of the individual or of the community to which he belongs . 
. . (ibid, 26). 
d. to be functionally specialized, many of these mechanisms must be richly structured in a content-
specific way; (ibid: 24) . 
. . . the psycho-physical process that issues in an instinctive action is initiated by a sense-impression 
which, usually, is but one of many sense--impressions received at the same time; and the fact that 
this one impression plays an altogether dominant part in determining the animal's behaviour shows 
that its effects are peculiarly favoured, that the nervous system is peculiarly fitted to receive and to 
respond to just that kind of impression (ibid: 27). 
e. content-specific information-processing mechanisms generate some of the particular content of 
human culture, including certain behaviours, artifacts, and linguistically transmitted representations; 
(ibid: 24) 
... that human nature has everywhere and at all times this common native foundation [affords} a 
much-needed basis for speculation on the history ofthe development of human societies and human 
institutions (ibid: 19) 
f. the cultural content generated by these and other mechanisms is then present to be adopted or 
modified by psychological mechanisms situated in other members ofthe population; (ibid: 24) 
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... social psychology has to show how, given the native propensities and capacities of the human 
mind, all the complex menta/life of societies is shaped by them and in turn reacts upon the course of 
their development and operation in the individual (ibid: 18). 
g. this sets up epidemiological and historical population level processes; and 
h. these processes are located in particular ecological, economic, demographic, and intergroup social 
contexts or environments (ibid: 24) 
... the understanding of the life of society in any or all of its phases presupposes a knowledge of the 
constitution of the human mind . .. (ibid; 18) 
The similarity is undeniable. Tooby and Cosmides restate McDougall. The former place 
psychological adaptations at the centre of the enterprise to understand mind, behaviour, social 
relations and society, the latter placed instincts at the centre of the same enterprise. Let us take this 
demonstration of similarity and look further into a comparison between adaptations and instincts. 
8.3 Instincts as adaptations 
It is, I think, difficult to avoid the conclusion that the instinct theorist of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century took instincts to be adaptations in the Darwinian sense. This raises the question as 
to whether instincts just are adaptations. In this discussion we need to follow Bateson's (2000t 
suggestion and ignore the fact that "instinct" has become an anachronism at best and a dirty word at 
worst5. We need to consider not the term itself but its definition(s). 
Any comparison of the constituent propositions that comprise definitions of instincts and 
adaptations shows them to be very similar. Instincts have many of the properties one finds in a 
definition of adaptation, most notably, of course, the claim that instincts are the adaptive 
consequences of natural selection. Whilst I do not wish to say that "instinct" and "adaptation" are 
equivalent terms, to a first approximation I do wish to say that all instincts are adaptations but not all 
adaptations are instincts: that instincts are a sub-set of adaptations. 
That a definition of "instinct" does not exhaust a definition of adaptation is readily apparent. Too by 
and Cosmides take the same view. 
The study of adaptations can be broken into two halves ... the study of adaptations that regulate 
behaviour- and physiology- the study of the morphological structures and processes ... (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1990: 383). 
Adaptations include anatomical features and behaviours (broadly conceived as processes), 
whereas, as Darwin's definition suggests, instincts do not include anatomical features; i.e. the pelvis 
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in bipedal hominids is an adaptation but it is not an instinct. Thus, at a minimum, we may say that for 
the set A, Adaptations, we have the sub-sets a., instincts, "Adaptations that regulate behaviour", and 
a 2, anatomy, "morphological structures and processes". 
However, this is too simple a picture. As we saw in chapter 7, section 3 'Adaptations, Exaptations, 
Spandrels and By-products', not all anatomical features are adaptations. A frequently offered 
example is the colour of bones (e.g. Buss, Haselton, Shackleford, Bleske, & Wakefield, 1998). 
Accordingly, anatomical features, taken as a set, includes the set of features that are not-adaptations. 
Similarly, not all instincts are adaptations when reflex actions are included as instincts. (For 
example, what is adaptive about laughter provoked by being tickled? Or something like the "ouch" 
response to pain?) Let us now look at one obvious implication of saying that all instincts are 
adaptations but not all adaptations are instincts. The implication according to an elementary account 
of sets is that any definition of a sub-set constitutes part of the definition of the set itself. In the 
scheme presented above, 
def- A= {a., a2 ........ an} 
It follows that should the definition of any sub-set be incoherent or inadequate - in this instance, 
the definition of instinct, a1 - the set itself is incoherent. In this instance, adaptation. These 
considerations, together with the similarities between Tooby and Cosmides' and McDougall, 
prompts the suggestion that evolutionary psychology, as an enterprise centred on the notion of 
psychological adaptation, has inherited the problems that beset the notion of a psychological instinct. 
It has inherited the state of affairs that obtained c.l930. There are, of course, obvious rejoinders to 
such a claim. One is that evolutionary psychology appears to have no place for the term instinct6 . A 
second is that instinct theorists worked with a different version of evolutionary theory than do we 
today (see Appendix 2). However, I do not think that eit_her response makes a comparison insensible. 
A third rejoinder to the proposal that Tooby and Cosmides' and McDougall argue much the same 
thing is that instinct theorists did not deploy (or were not in possession of) the central conceptual 
plank of the EEA. It is this third consideration that I want to address in the remainder ofthis chapter. 
8.4 ... and contrast 
In his introduction to the third edition of The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, Paul 
Ekman argues that the study upon which Darwin embarked in that volume was "rejected or simply 
ignored" because subsequent psychological and behavioural researchers asked questions differing in 
orientation. 
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Darwin asked a question about emotional expression that few other scientists asked in his own time 
or since. Most scientists studying emotion and expression address the "what, "how" or "when" 
question. What expressions are shown for each emotion? How are they produced? When do they 
occur? Darwin also deals with these, but he was one of the first, and for a long time, the only 
scientist, to ask the "why" question: Why do expressions occur in a particular form? (Ekman, 1998: 
xxiv). 
Ekman implies that the neglect of the "why?" question amounts to a repudiation of Darwin's 
approach. What needs to be pointed out is that the "why?" here has two related but slightly different 
senses. On the one hand it equates to function. On the other it equates to origin. As we have seen, for 
evolutionary psychology the two senses are combined. The EEA tells us about the origin of function. 
As I hope to have shown, instinct theory was Darwinian and, so it follows, those who promoted it 
cannot reasonably be said to have rejected Darwin. Certainly, the instinct theorists were concerned 
with the adaptive role of instincts. However, if we take Ekman's sense of "why?" to be about origin 
and apply it to the instinct debate he may be correct. Whilst various contributors approached a 
discussion of mind in historical terms - that is, in terms of it having a particular natural history - the 
instinct debate is notable for its lack of interest in the actual natural history of the mind. Many 
instinct theorists insisted that instincts, and the minds that embodied them, were adapted. But there 
are very few arguments or concrete claims about the origin of these adaptations. Few depictions of 
what made it the way it is. The interest focussed on how it is now. Comparisons are almost 
invariably horizontal across extant species, and not vertical within genera. Only occasionally are 
primates or apes invoked as explanatory devices or examples. Let us briefly review Darwin's 
position regarding the relative importance horizontal and vertical explanation before looking at why 
instinct theorists eschewed the latter7• 
Darwin, although of the opinion that the resemblance of instincts and habits (i.e. unlearned vs. 
learned, inherited vs. acquired processes and/or behaviours) was "so close as not to be 
distinguishable", he also insisted on a distinction between the two by appeal to their origin. This was 
achieved by tying instincts to "corporeal structures" and, in light of doing so, allow for natural 
selection to act upon instincts and shape them just as it did anatomy. 
No complex instinct can possibly be produced through natural selection, except by the slow and 
gradual accumulation of numerous slight, yet profitable, variations (Darwin, 1859: 193). 
The implication is clear. If one wishes to account for the presence of an instinct one must specify 
its adaptive role. But to discern its role as an adaptation, Darwin emphasised the need to specify the 
natural history of an instinct. 
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Hence, as in the case of corporeal structures, we ought to find in nature, not the actual transitional 
gradations by which each complex instinct has been acquired- for these could be found only in the 
lineal ancestors of each species- but we ought to find in the collateral lines of decent some evidence 
of such gradations ... (Darwin, 1859: 193). 
The two key points here are the emphasis on the development of an instinctive behaviour over 
historical time- the past of the instinct in question explains its current exhibition, and the 
dependency on comparative evidence to show this. Darwin accepted that only in the "lineal ancestors 
of each species" can the proper origin of instincts be "ascertained without offering a solution to the 
case whereupon adequate collateral lines of decent" are absent. The Expression of Emotions in Man 
and Animals is a record of how Darwin deployed his suggested method. The accusation against 
Darwin's claims in that volume by parties particularly interested in the human case was 
anthropomorphism. Darwin invited the charge by implying a privilege to an analysis that relies upon 
the ancestors of the species of interest. 
The obvious question, then, is why did instinct theory not attempt to reconstruct the past? I do not 
propose to offer a definitive answer to this question. However, two related possible reasons present 
themselves. First, I suggest that speculation as to the "original nature" of humans appeared to 
psychologists in the early part of the twentieth century as an outmoded and discredited exercise. 
Quite simply, it had too close a similarity to what we might call the "primeval" device so frequently 
used in social and political philosophy. Whether they agree or disagree on who founded social 
science and social psychology, where and when, most historians agree that by the late nineteenth 
century what had been the social philosophies wanted to become the social sciences (e.g. Allport, 
1954/1968; Collier, Minton & Reynolds, 1991; Farr, 1978, 1991, 1995; Jones, 1985; Leahey, 1994; 
Manicas, 1987; Manstead & Hewstone, 1997; Robinson, 1981). The lynchpin of the change was the 
adoption of experimental methods (Farr, 1983 b, 1985a). But other aspects of more traditional social 
philosophy were also rejected. Robinson ( 1981) suggests that one of them was an appeal to the dark 
and distant past of mankind that so characterised the influential philosophies of, for example, 
Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Karl Marx. Probably the most successful theorist in the 
twentieth century to rest so much of his case on a primal setting or scene is Freud. 
Second, the knowledge base in what today we call palaeoanthropology did not encourage such as 
exercise. At the turn of the nineteenth and through the first quarter of the twentieth century 
palaeoanthropology was in its earliest infancy. The picture we have today of the Homo lineage is 
very largely a product of discoveries that have been made and techniques that have been developed 
since the second world war (Ardley, 1961; Rensch, 1972; Tattersall, 1995; Trinkhaus & Shipman, 
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1993.) In short, it seems that the instinct theorists, for two related reasons, thought it unscientific to 
construct the lineage of humans. This is one way in which evolutionary psychology and instinct 
theory contrast. 
8.5 Physiological and psychological definitions of instinct 
A major division which came to split the vote amongst advocates of instinct in the psychological and 
behavioural sciences centred on the psychological status of instincts. There was that school which 
took instincts to be essentially physiological in character, and another which took them to be marked 
by their psychological manifestation. This is not to say that theorists insisted on their being one thing 
or the other. Most took them to be both. The dividing issue was how they were best or most fruitfully 
characterised in the human case. 
As our parade of definitions of instinct in chapter 4 showed, as well as being inherited, unlearned 
and adaptive, there was considerable agreement that an instinct manifests itself as or in a process-
this is what was taken to distinguish an instinct from an anatomical adaptation. It taken to follow 
from this distinction that an instinct was not to be discerned in anatomy alone but in activity tied to 
anatomy (James, 1890). It was in this view that the material nature of instincts was emphasised. And 
it was implicit in this view that any given instinct may be described in terms of more than one type, 
or level, of process. This opened the way for classifications of physiological, behavioural and 
psychological instincts. 
Just as did the majority of instinct theorists of the early twentieth century, today those who take a 
Darwinian view of mind and social behaviour take it as axiomatic that sex is fundamental to sexual 
reproducers including humans. In the first instance, this was indicated to instinct theorists by human 
anatomy: viz., it was accepted, on the maJerialist conception and on the morphological stance 
inherent in Darwinism, that physiology was fundamental to behaviour. However, the precise nature 
of the sex instinct in humans- and not just its general presence in sexual reproducers- is specified 
by particular processes. It was at this point that the process and its characterisation became open to 
disciplinary orientation. So, for a physiologist, for a zoologist and for a psychologist the type or level 
of process differed. Following Darwin, psychologists typically introduced mind in the form of 
intelligence and/or emotion (e.g. James, 1890; see Fletcher, 1957). As we will see, the invocation of 
intelligence saved the psychologist from having to demonstrate instincts by recourse to specific 
behavioural patterns - intelligence allowed one to retain the notion of instinct in the absence of 
behavioural rigidity. 
- 141 -
McDougall changed the nature of the instinct debate by capitalizing on, pressing further and 
emphasising Darwin's suggestion that mental states were to be considered instinctive. The problem 
McDougall introduced centered on the validity of invoking a primary place for instinctual mental 
states and their role whilst retaining the general argument for their initial presence. In other words, 
McDougall wanted to retain the authority of evolutionary materialism for a special case. He wanted 
to retain the orthodox standpoint of explaining the presence of humans and their characteristics in 
terms of an appeal to other species - i.e. ascribing to humans that said to obtain in non-humans -
whilst qualifying the very quality of the ascribed common feature. 
James, of course, preceded McDougall in claiming that instincts were exhibited in consciousness 
and subject to volition. This claim rested on the utility of consciousness in relation to the demands of 
instinct. In chapter 4, we left James' discussion at the point where he had emphasised the role of 
mental processes in instincts. I will gloss over James' argument as to how this state of affairs comes 
about,8 but he is quite clear as to why it comes about: it is adaptive to be adaptable. For James, actual 
situational and situated adaptability demands that instincts be goyemed. It is through this reasoning 
that James came to pose the conscious mind as a product of natural selection. 
Thus, then, without troubling ourselves about the word instinct and reason, we may confidently say 
that however uncertain man's reactions upon his environment may some-times seem in comparison 
with those of lower creatures, the uncertainty is probably not due to their possession of any 
principles of action which he lacks. On the contrary, man possesses all the impulses that they have, 
and a great many more besides. In other words, there is no material antagonism between instinct 
and reason. Reason, per se, can inhibit no impulses; the only thing that can neutralise an impulse is 
an impulse the other way. Reason may, however, make an inference which will excite the 
imagination so as to set loose the impulse the other way; and thus, though the animal richest in 
reason might also be the animal richest in instinctive impulses too, he would never seem the fatal 
automaton which a merely instinctive animal would be (ibid: 393. Italics in the original). 
Thus, for James, instincts in human beings were only going to be fully intelligible when their 
rational management is considered and the manner of this management is understood. This enterprise 
is possible by virtue of it being carried out consciously, for James took the management of instincts 
to be open to view. 
Extending James' analysis, McDougall claimed that instincts gave human consciousness its 
particular flavour(s). It rested on the association of instinct with emotion, taking its support from 
Darwin's The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. This is how McDougall reached his 
position: 
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... instincts are more than innate tendencies or dispositions to certain kinds of movement. There is 
every reason to believe that even the most purely instinctive action is the outcome of a distinctly 
mental process, one which is incapable of being described in purely mechanical terms, because it is 
a psycho-physical process, involving psychical as well as physical changes, and one which, like 
every other mental process, has, and can only be fully described in terms of, the three aspects of all 
mental processes- the cognitive, the affective, and the conative aspects; that is to say, every 
instance of instinctive behaviour involves a knowing of some thing or object, a feeling in regard to 
it, and a striving towards or away from that object (McDougall, 1908: 26). 
Opposed to a psychological account of instincts and prominent amongst those who sought to 
exhaust instincts via a physiological account were Thorndike and Watson. Alongside Loeb, both 
eschewed the notion that volition or experiential considerations play any role in the expression of 
instincts, holding instead to a mechanistic view. Although both subscribed to a reflex definition, they 
did not agree that an instinct was a reflex. Thorndike ( 1913) argued that as a reflex an instinct was a 
specifiable and specific nervous reaction. Watson argued that as a reflex an instinct was a behaviour. 
The term reflex is a convenient abstraction in both physiology and behaviour ... We mean by reflex 
when used in this way [neurology] that action takes place under appropriate stimulation in some 
fairly circumscribed glandular or muscular tissue. It is an abstraction because reflex action in the 
eye, the leg, the hand or foot can never take place in isolation. Action is altered in other parts of the 
body as well (Watson, 1929: 264). 
Watson's point in opposition to Thorndike was that instincts are reactions of the whole organism as 
opposed to abstracted parts thereof. But both maintained that instincts must remain tied to anatomy 
and physiology and that no amount of physiological complexity makes an instinct subject to 
conscious control and no inspection of consciousness would render an account of their operation. 
Dunlap (1919) made a similar point. He also pointed out the consequences. Dunlap saw the move 
from taking physiological patterns as instinctive (wherein an instinct was inherited, adaptive and 
species typical - a proposition with which he had no contention) and the assumption that these 
patterns were grouped according to broad end states, to specifYing instincts as psychological realities 
as illegitimate. In other words, he argued that one cannot build psychological content out of known 
physiology and supposed purpose without tying those purposes to specific physiological process. It 
was Dunlap's view that if this dictum is disobeyed any given physiological process can be used 
again and again for different purposes. The result at the psychological level being that although 
differentiated functionally, the psychological account has no definite physiology. Dunlap insisted on 
the link between anatomy and process as had Darwin. 
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It is important to make it clear that whilst some authors sought to emphasise the physiological and 
others the psychological aspects of instincts, most were content to entertain both aspects (see Helson, 
1951; Klineberg, 1954; O'Donnell, 1985; Roberts, 1987). A typical accommodation between 
mechanistic and conscious, physiological and psychological aspects was the claim that the relative 
importance depended on the particular instinct in question. However, for those seeking a definitive, 
or "meta", definition, this accommodation blurred the issue (e.g. Kuo, 1921) and encouraged 
recourse to the anatomical and physiological evidence. 
The invocation of the "distinctly mental" as opposed to the "purely mechanical" led to scepticism 
of instincts as psychological phenomena for much the same reasons that introspectionism was 
rejected (Collier, Minton & Reynolds, 1991 ). This was despite the fact that, whilst not so 
antagonistic toward introspectionism as was behaviourism, instinct theory sought to account for 
mind in a distinctly different way. Indeed, the allusions of James notwithstanding, as Charles Myers 
argued, instinct were prima facie instances of mental content not open to introspection: 
Man is never aware that he is acting instinctively ... When a mother sacrifices her life to save her 
child, does she recognize that she is acting instinctively or unintelligently? ... From our own 
introspection we can only answer negatively (Myers, 1910: 215). 
Nevertheless, Watson's took McDougall to be an introspectionist. Their exchange in 1929 shows 
this clearly. Watson began his critique of McDougall under the heading "The Religious Background 
oflntrospective Psychology". The one phrase of McDougall's that Watson quoted was, "Psychology 
is the description and explanation of states of consciousness as such". In the remainder of the paper 
Watson is adamant that any psychology, regardless of the quality of its underpinnings, is lost once it 
centres its attention on "the soul". Watson did not deny instincts, but he did reject the notion that 
they are felt sensations open to the view of the possessor. The approach to instincts that saw them as 
mental exhibits was a casualty of behaviourism and its influence. 
The majority of instinct theorists and their critics were content to say "without hesitation" that 
instinct was "any responses which have not been learned" (Dunlap, 1919: 307). Similarly, instinct 
was taken to be a biological adaptation (Kuo, 1921; Bernard, 1924). To say that an instinct was an 
unlearned response and an adaptation was to say what it was, but critics of psychological instincts 
drove proponents back from that position and demanded to know what an unlearned response was 
and what a biological adaptation was in psychological terms (Dunlap, 1932). To say that a thought 
was an adaptation or a sequence of thoughts was an unlearned response was deemed illegitimate 
because such notions could not be anatomically or physiologically specified. 
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Whilst the physiologically and the behaviourally inclined authors were by no means in agreement 
on the proper definition of instinct, there was very considerable overlap in what sorts of phenomenon 
qualified, e.g. sex, aggression, fear, greed, parental solicitude and altruism. I would contend that 
most took it that physiological evidence would eventually settle the issue of proper definition, 
classification and numeration. This follows from the basic and global acceptance that there were 
such things as instincts - naturally selected, inherited, functionally discrete, goal directed features 
that achieved their ends via behaviour. The acceptance of instincts prior to empirical verification of 
any given one of any given type in any given species was licensed by Darwin's own approach: one is 
able to make sense and build classifications of species and their behaviours subsequent to the 
acceptance of naturally selected "collateral" forms. I would also contend that those psychologists 
who promulgated instincts were, in general, similarly inclined to accept those points. That is, they 
too took instincts that manifested themselves in mental content to be naturally selected, inherited, 
functionally discrete, goal directed features that achieved their ends via behaviour9• 
But those who promulgated instincts as a variety of mental content injected heat into the debate 
theretofore not present. Animal behaviour- and we must be careful here not to conflate the study of 
animal behaviour pure and simple with the study of animals for comparative purposes- at the tum of 
the nineteenth century was very similar to modem ethology in that it did not impute cognition in its 
object(s) of study. The basic and default assumption was that should there be any cognition in the 
animal it was epiphenomenal. 
I specify the tum of the nineteenth century purposely. As Richard Richards ( 1987) has detailed, 
French zoologists in the 18th century had reacted against the Cartesian notion of reflex and the 
dichotomy it presented with mind. Extrapolating from what they took to be Locke's position on 
animal intelligence, the "Sensationalists" claimed that what appeared to be instinctive behaviour 
exhibited intelligence and reason and not mechanical inflexibility. Their challenge to the Cartesian 
view was simple: prove that physiological reflexes can result in elaborate and extended courses of 
action that differ from case to case, from organism to organism, from time to time (e.g. day to day, 
week to week, month to month, year to year). This challenge was posted as a bluff- a bluff based on 
parsimony. That is to say, whilst there were undoubted problems in investing reason in "lower" 
animals- how much? of what sort? toward, precisely, what end?- the supposition of rationality was, 
nevertheless, a more elegant solution than building reflex chains of indefinite length for indefinite 
instances of each type of behaviour. 
Richards pre-history of the term instinct offers a clue as to why the proponents of psychological 
instincts injected so much heat into the debate of the early twentieth century. Whilst there were 
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thorny empirical issues embedded in the claim that a resolutely materialist standpoint could account 
for mind, to the materialist mind-set of the immediate post-Darwihians there were as many thorny 
philosophical issues embedded in the claim that mind was an element in natural selection. One 
reason why James Drever (1917) was so anxious to detail what I have called the pre-history of 
instincts was due to his wish to avoid a repetition of what he took to be a sterile debate. 
Despite the best efforts of James and McDougall, those accounts of instincts that laid emphasis on 
mind and its role were seen as being at odds with the basically mechanistic tenet of evolution. The 
invocation of the mental was taken as retrograde and as flowing from an underestimation of the 
complexity of naturally occurring physiological systems. What I have called the psychological 
version of instinct theory was rejected not because it sought to accommodate flexibility but by the 
concepts it employed to do so. The failure of those who deployed this concept to agree on its nature 
and role seems to have been taken by opponents as evidence of its vacuity. Bernard's (1924) 
insistence that terms such as intelligence, affect and emotion be purged and replaced by 
"mechanisms" more or less fixed or more or less fluid arose from what he took to be confusion over 
the place of the conscious element in instinct. He saw the confusion as being between consciousness 
as epiphenomenal and consciousness as a modifying force which adjust instincts to particular 
environments. If it is seen as the former it is scientifically redundant; if it is the latter then instincts 
only occur once in a "pure form", leaving the rest of the organisms behaviour open to an alternative 
account. 
We will look at Tooby and Cosmides notion of a psychological adaptation shortly. Before doing so 
let us look at the treatment the idea of a psychological instinct received at the hands of Luther 
Bernard. 
8.6 How many instincts are there? 
Bernard's Instinct: a study in social psychology (1924)- a volume that Collier, Minton and 
Reynolds (1991 ), and Richards (1987) judge to be amongst the most influential critiques of instinct 
theory- zeroed in on the decoupling of instincts and anatomy. It showed what happens to a concept 
that is, essentially, biological when it ceases to be constrained by biology. 
McDougall had anticipated the central problem. In Chapter II of An Introduction to Social 
Psychology he takes to task unspecified "contemporary writers" "of considerable philosophical 
culture" for making use of the terms instinct and instinctive, "but, with very few exceptions, they use 
the them so loosely that they have almost spoilt them for scientific purposes". 
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On the one hand, the adjective "instinctive" is commonly applied to every human action that is 
performed without deliberate reflex ion [sic]; on the other hand, the actions of animals are popularly 
attributed to instinct ... Hundreds of passages might be quoted ... to illustrate how these two words 
are used with a minimum of meaning ... (McDougall, 1908: 21). 
McDougall's strategy against those he accuses of misusing the term instinct was a form of reductio 
ad absurdum. He went on to offer "obscure" and "incoherent" examples. These include the instinct 
of ancestor worship, the teetotaller instinct, an acquired political instinct amongst Russians and the 
instinct of contradiction. He moved on to plea that others acquire a habit of restraint when using the 
terms because, "there can be no understanding of the development of individual character or of 
individual and collective conduct unless the nature of instinct and its scope and function in the 
human mind are clearly and firmly grasped" (ibid: 22). But this plea for constraint was met with 
objections to the terms and conditions of definition that McDougall then offered. Most of these 
objections took the form of alternative proposals and alternative lists of instincts. Following through 
on McDougall's suggestion that "hundreds of passages might be quoted ... to illustrate how these 
two words are used with a minimum of meaning", Bernard sought to show that the term instinct 
when conceived of as psychological produced vacuous science. 
In chapter VII, "Usage of the term Instinct", Bernard attempted to filter out those usages that 
specified "acts which are definitely inherited and which may be properly termed instinctive" from 
those that were "a general and indefinite employment ... not necessarily descriptive of a concrete 
act at all", "cases covering automatic and habitual actions", and "stimulus-response activity". Given 
that he had not room enough to simply display the instances and definitions that he had discovered, 
Bernard devoted chapter VIII, "The Classification oflnstincts", to a discussion of his method of 
condensation and classification. He points out that the main difficulty in constructing a method 
flowed not just frotn sheer volume but also from the absence of any discernible scheme for 
classifYing instincts in general and even such an absence in the writings of individual authors10• 
In many cases it is a sort of catch-all for vague and indefinite ideas about the causes or relationships 
of activities. Writers, unable to account clearly for the occurrence of a particular behaviouristic 
phenomena on a purely objective basis, bring in the term instinct and use it as a charmed word, thus 
sidetracking further responsibility for an explanation (Bernard, 1924: 172). 
Bernard claimed that, against his better judgement, he was forced to order his data at the risk of 
misrepresenting it because he identified so many instincts in the literature he surveyed that in a 
volume that runs to five hundred and fifty pages, he was unable to find room enough to print them 
all. Furthermore, he was at pains to point out that the survey was not exhaustive, 
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On the contrary ... it has been his [the author] experience that the list of classes and cases grows 
constantly, with almost undiminished rapidity, as additional authors are consulted. In the industry of 
collecting instincts there seems to be no law of diminishing returns (Bernard, 1924: 180). 
He reinforces his point by calling the chapter "Some Results of Investigation". 
The two main forms of tabulation that Bernard employed were "Classification of Instincts by 
General Group" and "Specific Instincts Classified into Groups". In the classification of instincts by 
general group- what he called the "classification of classifications" he presents, 
No specific instincts ... all references are to instincts in the plural, that is, to groups or classes of 
instincts ... No attempt is made in this classification to distinguish between groupings of instinct on 
the basis of the general or specific functions served by them; that is, whether they are specific to the 
function or form from which they are named or whether they serve their function derivatively and 
by adaptation (ibid: 180). 
In effect Bernard's method was to take the 14, 046 individual instance of instinct (gleaned from 412 
authors and 495 books) and group them on the basis of synonymy. That is, he grouped individual 
instances on the basis of the meaning of the term attached to the term instinctive. For example, 
individual instances "bad, base, debased, debasing, depraved, evil, immoral, undesirable, vicious, 
wrong were thrown together" (ibid: 177). The "Classification oflnstincts by General Group" lists a 
total of 185 general types of instinct. In order to nuance these types in tune with authors own usage, 
most of these types were presented by Bernard as consisting of more than one class. For example, as 
a type, the "male" instinct has two classes and the "female"three classes. The type with the most 
classes is "human" with 25. Types with only one class include "Bohemian", "Healthy", 
"Mechanical", "Spiritual" and "Vitiated". In "Miscellaneous" types there are 139 classes. The total 
number of classes of instinct is 849 presented by 250 authors. Bernard concludes the presentation of 
his classification of classifications by reminding the reader that it is highly condensed. 
The tables that comprise "Specific Instincts Classified into Groups" employ an alternative method. 
Seeking to preserve as much original and actual terminology as possible, and guided by the rule that 
the specific instincts included were "specific inherited activities of individuals ... of a biological 
character" (ibid: 188) for editorial purposes, Bernard constructed groups of instincts oriented toward 
some intelligible general activity. For example, in the group "The Aesthetic Instincts" Bernard 
includes the specific instincts of"artistic", "for the beautiful" and "rhythmic". The "Specific Instinct 
Classified by Groups" yields a total of23. Here is the full list. Three examples of the specific 
instincts that comprise each groups are added for illustration (following Bernard's advice, it may be 
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helpful for prefix each example with "instinct for ... "or "instinct ... of'). The total number of 
instances (or classes) for each type are added after the examples. 
The Aesthetic Instincts - artistic, for the beautiful, rhythmic 51 
The Altruistic Instincts- affection, pity, sacrifice 44 
Anti-Social Instincts - aggression, criminal, selfishness 100 
Instincts of Disgust or Repulsion- avoidance, rejection, retching 39 
Economic Instincts -accumulation, acquisition, thrift 60 
Ethical Instincts- fair-play, honesty, justice 27 
Family Instincts- nesting, defence of family, filial 83 
Fear and Flight Instincts- clinging, escape, shyness 87 
Food Instincts- chasing, gathering, hunting 64 
Gregarious or Social Instincts- association, conformity, fidelity 149 
Intellectual Instincts- curiosity, juridical, ratiocination 106 
Imitative Instincts- mimicry, suggestion11 16 
Migratory and Climatic Instincts -home-finding, nomadic, running away 31 
Play Instincts -adventure, gambling, recreation 44 
Recessive and Repose Instincts- asceticism, solitude, sheltering 26 
Religious Instincts- faith, regard for a higher power, worship 30 
Retaliative Instincts- anger, defiance, revenge 41 
Self-Abasement Instincts -acquiescence, confession, submission 53 
Self-Assertive Instincts- action, ambition, elation 170 
Self-Display Instincts- adornment, rank, vanity 37 
Sex Instincts- carnal, chastity, courting 130 
Workmanship Instincts- construction, manipulation, planning 63 
Miscellaneous Instincts- heliotropic, thalassophilia, throwing things 144 
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In the grand "Summary of the Classifications of the Specific Instincts" the 23 types break down into 
1594 classes and 5684 individual cases gleaned from 388 publications written by 323 authors. 
Bernard offered two further alternative methods of sorting instincts for classification, the 
"Indefinite and peculiar instincts" and "Instinctive attitudes". By the former he meant "not specific 
instincts ... but characterisations of the qualities or nature of origin of such instincts" (ibid: 219) and 
reports that this method yields 843 types and 2238 individual cases. By the latter he meant "all 
activity or attitudinal processes containing the terms "instinctive" and "instinctively", instead of 
"instinct"" (ibid: 219) and reported 2474 types and 3585 individual cases. These last two surveys 
enjoy a fraction of the space and discussion afforded to the first two. 
It is in the "Summary of the Classifications of the Specific Instincts" that Bernard presented the 
upper and lower estimates of instincts in the literature he surveyed. The lower estimate of 23 
discernible groups (keeping in mind that the 23'd is a catch-all group containing 19 types and a 
further miscellaneous of the miscellaneous type comprised of 96 classes and 126 individual cases) 
carried the disadvantage of doing violence to the actual texts that supplied the data. The upper 
estimate is 5684 individual cases carried the advantage of preserving each application of the term he 
came across. It was in the distance between the two estimates that Bernard displayed "the 
indiscriminate chaos of instincts". 
Bernard appealed to the exhibition of psychological instinct in use to show the concept to be 
absurd. Moreover, he also quantified the absurdity. As a scientist, his form matched the function of 
his argument. Bernard believed in instincts but (and this may come as a surprise to Tooby and 
Cosmides given that he was a sociologist) he thought that the place to start was in the nervous 
system and not with psychological content. Instinct: a study in social psychology was put forward by 
Bernard as an account of what happens when the link between instinct and physiology is broken. 
Whilst there were those who objected to the concept outright (e.g. Ross, 1908; Kuo, 1929), Bernard 
showed that the difficulties of constraint, definition and demonstration were generated by 
proponents. Eventually the seeming inability of psychological theorists to constrain the concept of 
instinct or to discipline its employment led critics into rather caustic language. 
Man is impelled to action, it is said, by his instincts. If he goes with his fellow, it is the "herd 
instinct" which actuates him; if he walks alone, it is the "anti-social instinct"; if he fights it is the 
instinct of pugnacity; if he defers to another, it is the instinct of self-abasement; if he twiddles his 
thumbs it is the thumb-twiddling instinct; if he does not twiddle his thumbs, it is the thumb-not-
twiddling instinct. Thus everything is explained by magic- word magic (Holt, 1931: 4. Cited in 
Klineberg, 1954: 66). 
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8. 7 Adaptations as Idealisations 
It is, perhaps, a peculiarity of the instinct debate that the usefulness and tractability of the concept of 
psychological instinct deteriorated with discussion. However, the discussion did persist, and persists 
today in the form of"adaptionism", because of the sheer and apparent obviousness of the reality of 
instincts in man and animals. In light of Darwin it seemed, and in light of the modem synthesis it has 
become obvious, that distinct, enduring and species-typical anatomical features of organisms are 
"for" something. However, in animals such features, in order to be for something, need to do 
something. 
The doing is what was and is typically called physiology. Physiology is the study of process. It 
seeks to provide law like generalisations about what anatomy does. By virtue of physiological 
processes, organisms behave. Behaviours that were thought to be distinct (i.e. distinguishable), 
enduring and species-typical formed, and form, the basis of the term instinct (McFarland, 1993). The 
formal or technical use of the term instinct was reserved for those behaviours that could be 
unproblematically tied to anatomy and physiology and, thus, to heritability and natural selection. 
All behaviours depend upon anatomy and physiology, and the working default assumption is that 
all anatomy and physiology has a natural history of selection. The concept of instinct rested on the 
dependence of behaviour on anatomy and physiology. This dependency licensed the inference that 
behaviours too were heritable and naturally selected. However, the concept and mental states that 
appeared to be candidates could not be distinguished from behaviours that could not be candidates. 
The result were monsters such as, say, the instinct of filial piety (Bernard, 1924). The long career of 
the reflex arc shows how keen was the desire to establish behaviours as adaptations. Instinct 
theorists, and William McDougall in particular, shared with Tooby and Cosmides a dislike for the 
notion of adaptiveness because, rightly in my view, a species of instinct fell because proponents were 
unable to show human behaviours to have the same properties that permitted anatomy and 
physiology to be classed as heritable and naturally selected. The notion of a psychological instinct 
fell on the same sword. Instinct theorists could not show that behaviours and mental states as 
processes were amenable to law like generalisations and, accordingly, could not show what they 
were for and about in the functional terms demanded by Darwinism. Behaviours or a phenomenon is 
not properly evolutionised (that is, in the rubric of an evolutionary account) post hoc (that is, after 
the fact whereupon, ultimately, the "fact" is the established reproductive success of the organism or 
definite contribution to reproductive success of a given facet or behaviour). Because human social 
behaviour would not bend to the conditions demanded by the term instinct, no general species-
specific account of what to expect of and from humans in the way of social behaviour was 
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forthcoming. This encouraged the retreat into the head and the search therein for instincts initiated by 
James and exemplified by McDougall. 
At this point I want to pick up the contemporary story again. I want show how Tooby and 
Cosmides and evolutionary psychology address the problem faced by earlier proponents of 
psychological instincts. 
Tooby and Cosmides are unequivocal in calling themselves adaptationists and calling for 
psychology to be about adaptations. Similarly they are unequivocal about the universality of 
adaptations: if a proposed mechanism is not universal it is not an adaptation. In this section I want to 
address the consequences of these claims for researchers wanting to constructan evolutionary social 
psychology. I will argue that the price of universality in light of the fact that manifest human 
behaviours do differ is idealisation, and price of idealisation is that social psychology is uncoupled 
from behaviour. I will recommend that evolutionary social psychology rejects the notion of 
adaptation as construed by Tooby and Cosmides. 
From a Darwinian perspective, the answer to the question as to how universal is universal is two-
fold. One the one hand, it is not a question at all: human nature is universal to all those organisms 
properly classed as modern humans. Our confidence in this statement is derived from and equivalent 
to our confidence in our taxonomy. On the other hand, the question invites the reply that there is no 
strict equivalence between individuals by virtue of recombination. Courtesy of sexual reproduction 
and drift we are all of us genuinely unique. In the hands ofTooby and Cosmides, the term universal 
is closest to the first of these responses, but it is not exactly the same. They explicitly reject the latter 
position. Let us first look at their reasons for doing so. 
For Tooby and Cosmides that which is universal is some or another idealisation of the human 
genome conceived as a design. As a design, the idealised genotype and consequent phenotype and 
behaviour does not permit of variability- or, at least; the variability is inconsequential in comparison 
to that about which variability is hinged. Thus, 
Nearly all of population genetics consists of the elaboration of a mathematics to describe the 
varieties of genetic change and ongoing selection ... In population genetics, designs show up purely 
as some allele or combination of alleles, that is, as part of some system of genetic variation. As 
alleles become fixed they tend to disappear from the analysis, leaving the accumulated uniformity of 
the evolving organisms complex design invisible to these tools of mathematical analysis (Tooby and 
Cosmides, 1990: 380). 
Notice the distinction between "designs" and their exhibition- combinations of alleles. Tooby and 
Cosmides argue that too close an interest in actual genotypes inevitably leads to a misleading 
concentration in that which varies between individuals or samples. A consequence of this for social 
and behavioural science has been that, 
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... empirical studies tended to focus on related phenomena that were observable: the distribution of 
genetic variation; the relationship between genetic variation and phenotypic variation; the patterns 
of variability within and between populations; fitness differentials between individuals ... For this 
reason, there are many studies of such phenomena as environmental gradients associated with 
genetic or phenotypic gradients. But when a gene reaches fixation it no longer creates heritable 
differences between individuals; at that point it disappears from the analytic scope of the study of 
variation. Consequently, present variation in design and ongoing selection was visible to these 
methods, whereas the uniform design reflecting already completed selection was invisible. 
Unfortunately, the vast preponderance of organic design representing the accumulated effects of 
four billion years of selection reflects completed rather than ongoing selection. To study variation is 
to bypass most of the structure of complex functional design (Tooby and Cosmides, 1990: 3 80-l ). 
Their point is that one cannot find adaptations in the differences between genotypes because, 
An adaptation is more than a mere collection of phenotypic properties which, in a particular 
individual, happen to have the effect of enhancing reproduction ... An adaptation is a recurrent 
design that reappears across generations and across individuals ... This means that the phenotype of 
an individual organism must be carefully distinguished from the design of the phenotype -fitness 
should be assigned to designs, not to individuals (ibid: 394). 
Furthermore, by arguing that it is "logically necessary ... [to] redescrib[e] the variable and the 
transitory [i.e. the actual] in terms of that which is recurrent and stable ... Thus, individual 
phenotypes are instances of designs, not designs themselves ... to recover adaptive design out of 
behavioural or morphological observations, one needs to determine what is variable and what is 
invariant across individuals" (ibid: 395), Too by and Cosmides relegate actual properties of actual 
organisms in favour of recurrent composites derived from the natural history of species. This 
approach leads to a situation whereupon adaptations may be specified in the absence of any extant 
instance of such an adaptation. Accordingly, the price of universality is idealisation. 
~-
As idealisations, adaptations are robust against variations in "output" or performance, they are 
robust against variations in output due to temporal and spatial exigencies - i.e. against the fact that 
they are subject to different "input conditions" due to historical, geographical and cultural variation -
and they are robust against individual differences in performance despite the reasonable expectation 
that they are individually instantiated organism to organism. Additionally, adaptations as 
idealisations are robust against outputs that, prima facie, may be described as maladaptive. There is 
no obligation to show any design to be extant. Adaptations as idealised designs do not need to be 
defmed ostensively. As a consequence, whilst the claim is that adaptations are a universal property of 
human design, they need not be treated literally. Tooby and Cosmides are asking us to refrain from 
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surprise if, in actuality, we unable to show a concrete instance of a proposed psychological 
adaptation. 
The cost, in my view, is not acceptable. To cast psychological adaptations as idealised designs 
isolates and inoculates them from descriptions of actual minds and the output of those minds - and 
there is the rub for social psychology because surely social psychology is interested in output, in 
behaviour. This interest in not just an obligation imposed by method (our window into heads is 
behaviour) and the need to substantiate psychological theories by recourse to eliciting, observing and 
analysing behaviour. The interest in behaviour stems from the fact that social psychology in 
concerned with the interaction, action and reaction of actors. 
I am of the view that adaptations as presented by Tooby and Cosmides will run into the same sand 
as did instincts as presented by McDougall. Conceptually decoupled from definite behaviours, all 
constraints are off aside the need to depict them in mechanistic counterfactual term. The key danger 
is that there is no way of keeping a lid on the number of adaptations that may be posited. I suggest 
that the eventual result will be a volume in the spirit of Bernard: "Adaptations: a study in social 
psychology". 
1 The reification (or hypostatization) objection: This objection takes two forms. The frrst of these is the claim 
that in naming a phenomena, i.e. a pattern of behaviour taken to be species wide, species specific, heritable 
and, against some criteria, adaptive, one does not thereby explain it. The second form of the hypostatization 
objection is the claim that the act of classification is taken as a fact of that classified that then requires 
explanation. 
In the general case, hypostasis it is said to be fallacious because it supposes that a concept of a set containing 
specific sub-sets plays a causal role in the explanation of those sub-sets. The application of the general case to 
instincts involves, in the frrst instance, the claim that organisms are instinctive 1• This broad characterisation is 
then substantiated by appeal to individual example of instincts e.g. sex, fear, self-preservation. The fact that 
organisms are instinctive is taken to be responsible for the individual cases. 
The commonest expression of this "error", and the one which Thorndike (1913) highlighted, involved the 
demarcation of certain behaviours (and, often, mental states or dispositions that support them) under an 
instinctive rubric- sex for example. This process yields the claim that behaviours/dispositions a, b, c . .. z 
equal the sex instinct, S. Explanatory force is then sought in the claim that S causes a, b, c . . . z. As Thorndike 
suggests, this slippage gives the impression that the causal factors for given behaviours are established when 
all that has actually been achieved is a categorisation of those behaviours as being of a type. 
This criticism does not necessarily amount to a denial of instincts- Thorndike did not deny them. What it 
does deny is that naming and knowing are equivalent, and in doing so it cast doubt on the scientific utility of 
- 154-
the concept of instincts. It eventually led others, such as Bernard (1924), to cast doubt on the activity of 
classification given that it could not yield causal accounts- an enterprise Katz (1937) came to see as 
"irritatingly sterile". But not all took that view. Whilst labelling behaviours and dispositions as being 
instinctive did not thereby explain them instinct theory remained influential because it stipulated that to be 
explained. This moves us on to the second form of the hypostatization objection; acts and facts of 
classification. 
We can look to Dewey to clarify the distinction between the act of classification and the facts supposedly 
grasped. Casting a net beyond psychology and the instinct debate, Dewey was of the view that, "The tendency 
to forget the office of distinctions and classifications, and to take them as marking things in themselves, is the 
current fallacy of scientific specialism" (Dewey, 1922: 131 ). He took this tendency to be at its height amongst 
instinct theorists with the result that a most obvious fact was ignored: 
Man has been resolved into a defmite collection of primary instincts which may be numbered, 
catalogued and exhaustively described one by one. Theorists differ only or chiefly as to their 
number and ranking ... But in fact there as many specific reactions to differing stimulating 
conditions as there is time for, and our list are only classifications for a purpose (ibid: 132). 
Dewey argued that the root of the "mythological psychology" of instincts resided in the mistake ofreifying 
abstract classes of properties from what are actually lists of tautologies. Here is how he treats the instinct of 
"self-love". 
Animals, including man, certainly perform many acts whose consequence is to protect and preserve 
life. If their acts did not upon the whole have this tendency, neither the individual or the species 
would long endure. The acts that spring from life also in the main conserve life. Such is the 
undoubted fact. What does the statement amount to? Simply the truism that life is life, that life is a 
continuing activity as long as it is life at all. But the self-love school converted the fact that life 
tends to maintain life into a separate and special force which somehow lies back of life and accounts 
for its various acts (ibid: 135). 
The accusation is clear. Dewey argued that in the process of stipulating what animates life - instincts -one 
needs to go beyond the evidence and assert that life is constituted by discrete forces not witnessed in the actual 
ongoing behaviour of the organism in question. To follow the example, to say that a given behaviour has the 
effect of preservation does not legitimate the claim that the organism is comprised, in part, of a force to the end 
of self-love. It was Dewey's contention that such a move results only in propositions that not only assume the 
validity of the conclusion from which they are drawn but that are repetitions of it. 
Dewey's criticism resolved into a question concerning the sense of what we might call a compositional 
account of mind and behaviour. Whilst he accepted there to be some analytical sense in supposing that 
organisms are comprised of discrete dispositions and behaviours, the utility of this approach is brought into 
perspective and curtailed should one try to conceive of an organism complete except a given instinct. His 
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question was, can one deduct a discrete instinct from a given organism? He suggested that we would have no 
idea as to what an organism would behave or think like. He took it as an indication that the proposition of 
discrete instincts is incoherent. 
It is often said that academic psychologists in the first part of the twentieth century were averse to the past of 
their discipline. This may add substance to Fletcher's (1957) claim that the hypostatization objection was most 
influential in the guise presented by Field ( 1921 ). In a manner comparable to that of Falk ( 1981) sixty years 
later in the paper Is Sociobiology Neophrenology?, Field's Faculty Psychology and Instinct Psychology 
accused the latter of being equivalent to the former. The difference between the two being that faculty 
psychology was probably better attested empirically and was not plagued by anthropomorphism. 
2 Anthropomorphism: Formally, to anthropomophise is to make ascriptions of mental state known or said to 
hold in humans to animals (or to inanimate objects). Darwin's thesis in The Expression of the Emotions in Man 
and Animals was attacked on this point even by those who accepted species continuity. The logical flaw of 
anthropomorphism resides in the inconsistency of holding that two entities are at once distinct and identical. 
Such an objection may, in principle, be raised against any form of comparative analysis. 
Although to anthropomophise is to ascribe properties said to obtain in humans to non-humans, there are 
closely related varieties of the same reasoning. For example, a comparative analysis between cultures said to 
be distinct involves the ascription to one culture properties that are held to obtain in another. But the variety 
that I wish to focus upon for present purposes involves a simple reverse of the definitional case: The ascription 
to humans of some property said to obtain in non-humans. 
Sometime after the debate in psychology, with hindsight buttressed by advances in ethology Beech claimed, 
... that this war over instinct was fought more with words and inferential reasoning than with 
behavioural evidence ... most of the battles of the campaign were fought from the arm chair in the 
study rather than in the laboratory (Beach, 1955: 409). 
Fletcher (1957) and Richards (1987) make comparable claims. But they are not entirely accurate. Whilst 
statements about the human case were openly theoretical, there is a striking similarity with contemporary 
discussions in that evidence was liberally cited and examples given from species other than humans. The most 
popular source species were insects and birds. Very few authors support an argument, definition or 
classification by recourse to evidence from primates. Carr (191 0) saw the problem as obvious. The need to 
suppose that humans shared with other (mostly distant) species certain key properties in order to explain 
pertinent human behaviours and thought indicated to him nothing so clearly as it did the absence of evidence 
that humans consisted of and were determined by instincts. Carr took the appeal to other species as an 
admission that human were a distinct phenomena and that this admission left comparisons open to conscious or 
unconscious anthropomorphism. His tone is essentially one of incredulity. 
I cannot understand what is meant if it really be asserted that the instincts of ants and bees have a 
concomitant aspect of intelligence. There is nothing in our own intellectual life at all analogous to 
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these activities, and they are completely different to any aspect that our own intelligence can be 
madetopresent(Carr, 1910:231). 
3 Critics did not object to the idea human beings and other species were driven, orientated or organised toward 
the achievement of, say, sex: i.e. that sex was a goal. However, they did object to the view that these goals 
were a psychological fact. This objection rested on the supposition that goals did not seem to be self evident by 
virtue of anatomy or by virtue of their not being species or group universal. The idea of a pre-specification of 
psychological function provoked the objection that such a method was teleological. 
For example, Dunlap (1919) was keen to emphasis that whilst instincts could be classified according to 
different stances, not all such classifications made sense. The classifications he saw as most important were 
what we might call "instinct for" and "instincts as". Dunlap maintained that instincts taken as being for 
something led to them being defined teleologically, whereas instincts taken as being constituted by something 
led to them being defined physiologically. 
It makes considerable difference whether, for example, we consider the "feeding instinct" as made 
up of the activities which result in food being secured; or consider it as a certain physiological group 
of activities which ... is defmed by its actual reaction character, and in that way distinguished from 
other physiological groups (Dunlap, 1919: 307). 
Dunlap's later work also criticised what he called the "teleological approach" to instincts on the grounds that 
it presumed the very thing that general psychology sought to discover. To post physiological and/or 
psychological processes as being in the service an instinct defmed by its function was to presume that the 
function was established. Seeing McDougall as the main culprit, Dunlap wrote, 
The constant tendency in social psychology is to consider these convenient groupings, arbitrarily 
made, as if they were series of natural and generic distributions on the psychological level, and to 
deduce an important set of deductions from the classification adopted (Dunlap, 1919: 309). 
Dunlap's objection to functional, or "end state", accounts of instincts fed upon what he saw as "plain and 
deplorable fact" that the teleological classification inherent in a psychological accounts of instincts hinged on 
the outlook and taste of the classifier. Dunlap took the different classifications of different psychological 
accounts as evidence that even the most paired lists of instincts reflected the values of the classifier, not any 
basic consensus on the nature of humans and their needs or wants. 
4 Bateson's paper is titled Taking the Stink Out of Instinct 
5 Bateson provides a list of properties that either singly or in various combinations amount to an instinct. It 
tallies neatly both with a summary definition of instinct c.1925 and with contemporary defmitions of instinct. 
1. Present at birth 
2. Not learned 
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3. Develops before it can be used 
4. Unchanged once developed 
5. Shared by all members of the species (or the same sex and age) 
6. Organised into a distinct behavioural system (such as foraging) 
7. Served by a distinct neural module 
8. Adapted during evolution 
9. Differences between individuals are due to genetic differences 
6 A brief inspection of the indices of contemporary texts and compendia of evolutionary psychology and social 
science suggests that I am mistaken in this claim. There is no entry for "instinct(s)" in the indices of the major 
compilations of evolutionary psychology; e.g. Barkow, Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Betzig, 1997; Simpson & 
Kenrick, 1997; Crawford & Krebs, 1997. If and when the term is discussed at all it is typically done so in terms 
of species considerably removed from humans (e.g. insects) and it is done so in term of algorithms (e.g. Pinker, 
1997). 
For evolutionary psychology, then, instinct is not an issue if we take as evidence the virtual absence of the 
term in its literature. But, again, we need to go beyond the label itself and look at its defmition and its 
perceived utility. As we have seen, aside being a concern of Darwin, Wallace and those in the psychological 
and behavioural sciences in the succeeding era, and aside it being described in terms of natural selection, 
instincts were taken to be important because there represented the "live" element of that which had evolved. 
Psychological and behavioural authors were interested in instincts because it was processes and not primarily 
anatomy that were of interest. 
I take it essentially on trust that more is known and understood now about physiology and anatomy than was 
known in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Taking this as the case we may say that that part of the 
defmitionalledger of"adaptation" which owes itself' to physiology and anatomy is, in some sense, better than it 
was. We may also say that because behavioural processes are dependent upon physiology and anatomy, 
developments in the understanding of the latter sharpen and impose more precise constraints on our conception 
of the former. However, they do not dissolve the problems. The issue as to what constitutes a psychological 
adaptation is the same problem as the issue as to what constitutes an instinct on the assumption that a 
psychological adaptation is not comprised of anatomy (i.e. a given partition of the cerebral cortex) and/or 
neurophysiology (i.e. a particular pattern of activity with the cerebral cortex). 
7 Here are some examples of the how instinct theorists viewed the importance of an analysis of the past. We 
can see from them how close the debate came to postulating a natural history of human psychology. With a 
view to getting a better grasp of the number a type of instincts in humans, Lloyd-Morgan suggested that 
psychologists should follow the lead of biologists; 
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... for the biologist, a criterion of instinctive behaviour is that it is serviceable on the first occasion. 
But the biologist ... will ask: Serviceable for what end? Most broadly and generally serviceable for 
survival ... In further detail serviceable for avoiding danger by shrinking, quiescence, or flight; 
serviceable for warding off the attacks of enemies; serviceable for obtaining food, capturing prey, 
and so forth; serviceable for winning and securing a mate, for protecting and rearing offspring; in 
social animals, serviceable for co-operating with others and so behaving that not only the individual 
but the social group shall survive. Under each head diverse modes of behaviour may be grouped-
modes of behaviour which have this in common that they severally subserve what we regard as one 
end (Lloyd-Morgan, 1910: 226-227). 
He went on to say that such an analysis offers up a power to predict what sort of behaviours to expect from a 
given species, including humans. Predictive power rests on a clear specification of the set of"potentialities" 
that comprises a species. For Lloyd-Morgan, one of these potentialities was intelligence itself; 
... what I mean by potentiality is an actually existent structure in virtue of the possession of which 
the organism does functionally respond in specific ways under the appropriate circumstances. There 
is an innate potentiality, then, a so-called instinctive faculty, dependent on the inherited make-up of 
the organism, to respond with the behaviour which I have defmed as instinctive ... If you know 
your bird, including its past history, you can bet on its intelligent procedure with as confidence as on 
its instinctive behaviour (Lloyd-Morgan, 1910: 227-228). 
The salient thing in Lloyd-Morgan's view, then, was "the past history" of the species. However, he refrained 
from offering such a history for the human case. 
Also from a 1910 edition of the British Journal of Psychology, the paper by Stout is most replete with 
allusions to the functional nature of instinct and intelligence as biological adaptations. Stout subscribed to the 
notion of"mental anticipation" and a view of the organism as "striving after ends". He binds instinct to 
intelligence as opposed to "Reflex Action" by seeing instincts and intelligence in explicitly function terms. 
The marks by which we recognize an action as instinctive rather than reflex are precisely the same 
marks which show the presence of intelligent consciousness, - conative impulse, unity and 
continuity of attention, perseverance with adaptive variation of behaviour corresponding to felt 
success or failure ... The differentia of Instinct, then, as contrasted with a series of reflex actions, 
however complex, is that in Instinct congenital prearrangements of the neuro-muscular mechanism 
for special modes of behaviour do not ofthemselves suffice to explain the animals conduct. Their 
biological utility depends from the outset on their operation being sustained, controlled and guided 
by intelligent interest in the pursuit of ends (Stout, 1910: 244). 
Pillsbury (1932) adopted a comparable position. Of the three definitions of instinct Pillsbury offered, the one 
he preferred emphasised the purpose they serve: Instincts can be thought of and distinguished in terms of their 
functional yield. From within a more overtly behaviourist perspective, Thorndike's The Original Nature of 
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Man (1913) sought to introduce order into the proliferating and confused systems of instinct classification by 
arguing that one could not know a behaviour to be instinctive unless one knew under which conditions it 
appeared and operated. However, he did not privilege a specification of these conditions over other means of 
defming instincts (such as the stimuli which elicit them, the conditions that satisfy them or their ontogeny). 
Perhaps the closest of approaches to those we see now regarding the point, purpose and fruit of the analysis 
of historical origin was expressed by Bernard. One of Bernard's complaints about others (e.g. Dunlap) was not 
that they failed to consider "lower animal forms, to discover if there are corresponding defmite and apparently 
unlearned action patterns in these primitive types" (Bernard, 1924: 7), but that they think of"action pattern 
merely in terms of structure, instead of in terms of origins"; 
Long ago we learned that we do not content ourselves with the anatomy or cross section view of any 
subject or organ or organization. We are primarily interested in what the thing does, although a 
study of the anatomy or structure may be of the greatest use value in solving this problem of 
function. Function and origins are inseparable in our thinking ... We examine it [the object of 
study], not alone in terms of its structure or organization, but we study its origin and its application 
and we consider that we do not comprehend the one until we have discovered the other. (ibid: 7). 
In the absence of a direct reference it is reasonable to assume that he has Darwin in mind here. What is clear, 
and he reiterates the point, is that instincts are only to be properly understood and distinguished from habits 
and other forms of acquired behaviours by reference to their source in natural selection and their role in 
evolution. Where Bernard appears to have failed is in the point of making this distinction. Other psychologists 
took the means of sorting the distinction as redundant if they did not share Bernard's purpose in making it. 
8
" .•• as her [Nature's] children get higher, and their lives more precious, she reduces the risks [by] 
implanting contrary impulses to act on many classes of things (ibid) 
9 The obvious exception to this - and it is by no means a trivial exception - is Freud. 
10 One cannot help but be reminded ofTooby and Cosmides accusation that the social sciences are "an 
enormous mass of half-digested observations, a not inconsiderable body of generalizations ... expressed in a 
babel of incommensurate technical lexicons". 
11 Only two specific types are listed. The third is "miscellaneous". 
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Chapter 9 Adaptations and Fixed Functions 
Summary of chapter 9 
The contemporary dispute between those of the adapted mind persuasion and those of the adaptive mind 
persuasion echoes the attempt to accommodate instinct and intelligence. We see in this chapter how tortured 
the attempt became. There appeared to be and appears to be an inverse relation between adapted and adaptive 
behaviour. Playing-up mechanistic instincts/adaptations highlights non-mechanistic adaptiveness. Playing-up 
adaptiveness seems to defY the nature of instincts/adaptations. A way through the conundrum is proposed. We 
can retain the notion of an evolved adaptation in social psychology only if we accept that this adaptation is for 
social living and has no rigidly fixed function. What is known about the natural history of humans offers 
license for such an approach. 
9.1 Introduction 
I am of the view that Tooby and Cosmides' insistence on a machine approach to the mind and the 
antagonism toward the term adaptive that flows from it (nicely illustrated in the demand for a switch 
from an "adaptive mind" stance to the "adapted mind" stance) presents a number of problems for 
evolutionary social psychology. We have already looked at two of these problems. In chapter 8 we 
looked at some of the implications that follow from a minimisation ofthe domain mismatch between 
the past and the present. One of those implications is that the notion of a maladaptive behaviour 
evaporates for if there is nothing new under the sun then we must consign all that would appear to be 
maladaptive to the dustbin of scruffy engineering. However, just as Too by and Cosmides suggest 
when arguing for the explanatory usefulness of maladaptive behaviour, and as we discussed under 
the heading 'Domain mismatches and maladaptive behaviour', there are good grounds for thinking 
that the world inhabited by humans in the industrialised west today is not that inhabited by our 
predecessors. One of the implications of the acceptance of a domain mismatch (even if we ignore the 
view that the mismatch between the past and the present includes a speciation event) is that modem 
humans operate courtesy of exaptations and spandrels and that such notions are not amenable to a 
seamless adaptionist account. Either view -that we function courtesy of scruffy adaptations or that 
we do so courtesy of exaptations and spandrels- suggests that Tooby and Cosmides' notion of a 
psychological adaptation is of limited value. We have to reject the idea that psychological 
mechanisms are rigid and embrace the notion that minds are adaptive. 
In this chapter, after a review of attempts by instinct theorist to accommodate the idea of 
adaptability within the concept of an adaptation, I present an alternative view of a social adaptation. 
This view has already been intimated in the literature and it has to be accommodated if evolutionary 
social psychology is to progress. The tenor ofTooby and Cosmides' adapted mind thesis 
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notwithstanding, humans are adaptive in the biological sense of the term. They have to and do adapt 
to one another. Resting on the view that what we have left when a comparative analysis between 
humans and other species is exhausted is our relatively elaborate social lives, I argue that evolution 
has produced an adaptation for nothing in particular. This "adaptation" is about other people. But 
because others are not and have not been entirely predictable it is not best described in mechanical or 
counterfactual terms. Natural history suggests to us that we cannot exhaustively detail this adaptation 
because we cannot exhaustively detail social life. 
9.2 Adaptiveness - "the unexplained remainder" 
The preparedness to move away from a strictly reflexive account of instincts was an expression of 
the desire of physiologically inclined researchers such as Watson to accommodate what they took to 
be the flexibility of instincts. However, Watson and Thorndike wanted to go no further than an 
appeal to the improbability of identical organisms being faced with identical stimuli so producing 
identical instinctive patterns. As we saw in the discussion of 'Physiological and psychological 
definitions of instinct' in the last chapter, James and McDougall appealed to the role of 
consciousness, reason and volition to explain the indefiniteness and variability in the behavioural 
expression of instincts. Whilst those who subscribed to a psychological account of instincts did not 
all agree on the nature or role of instincts as psychological content, in the effort to accommodate the 
evident flexibility of human behaviour there was some convergence on the notion that instincts were 
intimately connected with intelligence. The connection was grounded in the properties that the two 
shared; both were inherited, adaptive, species typical and naturally selected. 
The invocation of intelligence as inherited and adaptive implied that natural selection had produced 
a phenomenon that is, in some sense, "above" instincts as they were conceived in philosophies of 
reflex and the chain-reflexes of behavioural patterns. In effect, authors from James to Drever, 
implied that instincts could be and had been inadequate as adaptations. This was a radical move in 
the sense that it sought to explain away classical dualism - it took the very thing which defied a 
wholly mechanistic view into account via a mechanistic account. More pertinent to our present 
concern is that this view seems to have been taken as opposed to the Darwinian orthodoxy of the 
time in saying that in the hierarchy of reflex-behaviour-mind, mind was master. By its advocates, 
this view was seen as the most viable solution to the problem of flexibility. 
That the presence of intelligence and its relation to instinct was taken seriously as a problem for 
evolutionary accounts of psychology and social behaviour is evidenced by volume III, part 3 ofthe 
British Journal of Psychology published in 1910. The whole issue consists of papers titled "Instinct 
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and Intelligence". We will largely restrict ourselves to its contents to see how a previous generation 
of evolutionary psychologists handled the problem of flexibility by recourse to intelligence. The 
opening salvo from Charles Myers set the tone: 
Instinct and intelligence are generally regarded as two distinct modes of mental activity. In the 
following paper I hope to give adequate reasons for abandoning this view. I shall endeavour to show 
that instinct and intelligence are everywhere inseparable, and that in every so-called instinctive or 
intelligent act, a concomitant aspect of intelligence or instinct may be obtained. I regard the 
separation of instinct and intelligence as a purely artificial act of abstraction- convenient, no doubt, 
for the purposes of psychological science, but resulting merely from regarding the mental from two 
different points of view (Myers, 1910: 209). 
Myers argued that this act of abstraction is a "necessarily 'anthropo-psychic' interpretation of one 
and the same problem". Behaviour is seen as being necessarily intelligent when conceived of from 
the standpoint of the organism, and necessarily instinctive when simply observed: "instinct regarded 
from within becomes intelligence; intelligence regarded from without becomes instinct" (ibid: 221). 
Myers went on to recommend that each of these positions be allowed to dilute one another as the 
evidence suggests: let instinct dilute our ascription's of intelligence and intelligence our ascription's 
of instinct. The result is that the dichotomy will dissolve. 
Of the four papers that follow, three agreed with the proposition that any metaphysical distinction 
between intelligence and instinct is untenable and must be dissolved. All four disagreed with Myers 
solution. And all four disagreed with one another. 
Using Darwin's terminology, Lloyd-Morgan argued that intelligence is a property of individual 
instincts that hones them to specific conditions: 
The products of natural selection are practically serviceable, not theoretically perfect ... It affords 
the rude outline sketch of that far less imperfect behaviour, the finishing touches of which are 
supplied by practise under the guidance of intelligence (Lloyd-Morgan, 1910: 225-226). 
Lloyd-Morgan called intelligence the "unexplained remainder" of any mechanistic account of 
instincts which seeks to specify their behavioural characteristics in advance of their actual exhibition 
by particular organisms. 
Stout joined Myers and Lloyd-Morgan in seeing instinct "as essentially a form of biological 
adaptation" (Stout, 191 0: 23 7). But his elaborated position is a hybrid of the two. He did not believe 
that intelligence is just instinct viewed from the organisms point of view as did Myers. And, in 
opposition to Lloyd-Morgan, he did believe that instincts in their mature expression are the result of 
intelligence. In tune with Darwin, Stout took instinct and intelligence as conceptually distinct but 
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practically indistinguishable. His criticism of what we might call Myers "double-aspect" view, or 
mirage, is that it denies that the basic nature of instinct is something unlearned and that intelligence 
is something learned. His support for the view that instincts are given shape by intelligence rests on 
his conviction that "all intelligent activity, including that of animals, is directed to the attainment of 
future results" (ibid: 239). 
Stout set up his position via a contention with the "typical" definition of intelligence as learning by 
experience. 
An animal in consequence of a train of previous experience, intelligently modifies its behaviour 
from the outset, when it is again confronted with a similar situation. This implies what we call 
learning by experience ... but in the first execution of a train of instinctive movements, there can be 
no learning by experience, because the required experiences are themselves absent ... when does 
the animal learn its lesson? Does the actual process of learning take place on the second occasion or 
on the first? Plainly it takes place on the first and not on the second. On the second occasion the 
lesson is utilised: but in order to be utilised it must already have been learned. Thus if the actual 
process of learning involves intelligent consciousness, intelligence must accompany every 
instinctive act which leads to intelligent modification of behaviour on its repetition in a similar 
situation (ibid: 238). 
However, Stout argued that the intelligent modification of behaviour based on prior instances is not 
in itself sufficient to explain the quality of fit between organisms and their environments. The revival 
of past experience cannot accommodate the flow of uncertainty that an organism faces. It is at this 
point that Stout introduced the notion of"mental anticipation". In a manner not dissimilar to that 
espoused over eighty years later by Henry Plotkin ( 1995), Stout sought to reconcile instinct and 
intelligence by positing both as forms of knowledge. This knowledge is what the organism inherits . 
. . . I see no intrinsic absurdity in the assumption that even in the commencement of the first 
performance of an instinctive action, the given situation may be apprehended as about to have a 
further development. Such anticipation, if it exists, is not wholly indefinite; for the mental reference 
is to a coming change and development in a certain specific situation, and is therefore, to that extent, 
itself a specific anticipation of the future (ibid: 240). 
In support of this attribution Stout wrote; 
Animals in their instinctive actions do actually behave exactly as if they were continuously 
interested in what is for them one and the same situation: they actually behave as if they were 
continuously attentive looking forward beyond the ignorant present to meet what is coming (ibid: 
242). 
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Stout differentiated himself from Myers and Lloyd-Morgan by casting his analysis beyond the 
confines of any given act. It is the ability of humans to do likewise that marks them out as intelligent. 
For Stout, to anticipate is to think. 
McDougall begins his contribution by saying that he agrees with Myers and Stout if his reading of 
them is correct in that they regard "instinctive processes and intelligent processes as of essentially 
similar nature, as involving the same fundamental modes of mental activity" (McDougall, 1910: 
250). But he did not agree with any view to the end 
... that we cannot properly and usefully distinguish between the mental processes that are 
conditioned wholly or mainly by innate dispositions on the one hand, and on the other hand such as 
are conditioned by dispositions that have been largely built up through the experience of the 
individual" (ibid). 
Thus McDougall wanted to say that instinct and intelligence are identical in so far as they amount to 
evolved psychological processes but distinguishable in their specific service to the organism. 
McDougall sided with Stout in believing that "animals are guided by anticipatory representations 
of the ends to be achieved, representations that owe little or nothing to previous experience" (ibid: 
251 ), and against Myers and Lloyd-Morgan in their view that intelligent behaviour is determined by 
"factors of revival" (i.e. memory). 
McDougall was, perhaps, the most resolutely psychological of the instinct theorists. We have seen 
how closely tied is his conception of instinct to that of felt emotion, and in the 1912 paper he 
objected to the," ... usage of the word instinct to denote an instinctive action ... to describe any 
particular action as an instinct is, I submit, a loose and confusing usage against which we must set 
our faces". 
We ought rather to use the term an instinct to denote that feature of the innate constitution of any 
organism, that inherited disposition, in virtue of the possession of which the organism acts 
instinctively ... the former member of the pair of terms denotes some enduring condition of the 
mode of activity denoted by the second (ibid: 253). 
Thus it is not behaviour per se that is the product of evolution but the disposition to behave. It is 
from this stance that McDougall distanced himself from the other authors. His basic point was that 
intelligence is to be understood as volitional and volition is to be understood as instinctive. He 
objects to the dividing up of instincts into "dualistic" oppositions and contrasts between the 
mechanical and the situational. 
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I would say that each innate specific conative tendency has at its service an innately coordinated 
system of motor or efferent nerve channels; that these belong together functionally and 
phylogenetically as one feature, one psycho-physical disposition, of the inherited constitution of the 
organism ... instinctive activity always involves their cooperation (ibid: 263). 
By removing instinct, as opposed to the instinctive exhibitions, from the realm of the directly 
observable and into a "conatative tendency" served by a "perceptual disposition" and "coordinated 
motor channels", McDougall's strategy was to dissolve the opposition by refusing to acknowledge it. 
Like Tooby and Cosmides, in attempting to psychologise instincts McDougall idealised them. 
I have discussed the papers in order save the contribution by Carr. The reason for this is that he 
was the odd man out. This is reflected in the fact that he was summarily dismissed by Myers, Stout 
and McDougall, and totally ignored by Lloyd-Morgan. Following the theory of Henri Bergson, Carr 
argues for a parallel in the evolution of instinct and intelligence. For Carr instinct and intelligence are 
both "natural" products of evolution but they are fundamentally distinct. 
When we consider two such outwardly dissimilar instances of behaviour as, let us say, that of a 
paralysing wasp, and that of an admiral directing a naval engagement, have we before us only two 
different aspects of a mental behaviour that is essentially identical? ... Or, are they two modes of 
psychical activity, fundamentally distinct, different in the nature of their mentality, in the direction 
of their activity, in the kind of knowledge that each is fitted to receive and use? (Carr, 1910: 232). 
Carr's answer is that they are. 
The fundamental difference [between instincts and intelligence] is one of kind, and lies in the mode 
of apprehension of reality, and the kind of knowledge that serves the activity of each. It is this 
essential difference that accounts for the degree of consciousness or unconsciousness, plasticity or 
fixity that characterises each, and not vice versa (ibid). 
He took to task the idea that the behaviour of different species must be driven and organised by a 
single unified system of instinct with attendant intelligence. He suggested that the muddling of the 
two stems from the very power of each to fulfil the goals of different types of organism. Carr 
invested more in the potential of evolution to compose different systems than do the other 
contributors. In effect, he accused them of being conservative in their application of natural 
selection. He concluded by saying that the apparent contradiction between instinct and intelligence 
is, as the evidence from comparative psychology suggests, real and not merely redundant 
metaphysical dualism. 
In this brief review of four sophisticated and psychologically orientated positions on the 
relationship between instinct and intelligence, I hope to have conveyed three main points. One, that 
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there was a common beliefthat both "faculties" were the product of evolution. Two, that the 
commitment to a naturalistic account leaves adaptability, the basis of which for Myers, Stout, Lloyd-
Morgan, McDougall and Carr was intelligence, as an "unexplained remainder" for strictly instinctive 
accounts. And three, that, ignoring any erstwhile motivation to place humans at the pinnacle of 
evolution, the comparative approach adopted by all four authors leads to the conclusion that the 
exemplar of relatively flexible behaviour is man. This point is worth further elaboration. 
The desire to place their claims within the confines of Darwinism and to be scientific led Myers, 
Stout, Lloyd-Morgan, McDougall and Carr to cite examples of animal behaviour. The examples are 
cited both to support their claims that instincts and intelligence are exhibited in the natural world and 
to generate a model of their operation. So, in discussing the nesting behaviour of the moorhen, for 
example, Lloyd-Morgan seeks to show the origin and aetiology of a known behaviour in term of the 
functional modification of an inherited tendency. Each author then "runs" his model with a view to 
offering an account of instinct, intelligence and their relation in humans - they are, after all, 
psychologists. With the partial exception of some tentative remarks by McDougall, they do not give 
examples drawn from human behaviour and excuse themselves from doing so because they see any 
attempt to do so as premature. The issue of the relation between instinct and intelligence needs to be 
settled before it can be applied. All except Carr agree that the relation between instinct and 
intelligence in humans is different from that in, say, ants. But the difference is one of degree and not 
kind. The outcome of this approach is summed up in a representative statement by Stout; 
In the case of human beings, this function of instinct, is in the main, superseded by Instruction. All 
that either Instinct or Instruction can do is to supply appropriate experiences ... The importance of 
Instinct as a substitute for the lessons of experience, become greater as we descend the scale of 
animal intelligence. But the more instinct serves as a substitute for experience, the more fixed and 
specialised must the instinctive equipment be, in order to provide in advance for the special 
exigencies which arise in the life-history of the animal. On the contrary, in proportion·as the 
educational function of instinct becomes more pronounced, instinctive endowmentbecomes less 
fixed and specialised ... in the case of human beings there are hardly any well marked instincts as 
distinguished from special capacities for learning by experience in certain directions (Stout, 1910: 
249). 
In other words, the claim is that instinct and intelligence in humans is to be considered in relation to 
other animals but that nature may be viewed from humans downward, and that that comparison 
yields the result that humans are less instinctive. 
Vital adaptation, in the first instance, calls in psychical adaptation to help it; but, in the sequel of 
biological development, it is gradually ousted from its place and function by its servant and ally. 
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The climax of this process is reached in man, where instinctive endowment dwindles to the 
minimum of complexity and specialisation, so that careful scrutiny is required to detect its presence 
at all (ibid: 245). 
The extent of agreement is evident it the following claim by McDougall; 
In the young mammal the instincts ripen slowly and successively at considerable intervals ... This 
period of youth, characterised by the accumulation of experience in preparation for the serious tasks 
of life, reaches its maximum in the most developed forms of human life ... the vast accumulation 
thus rendered possible modifies so greatly the innate dispositions and their modes of operation as to 
obscure completely for some of us the fact of their existence (McDougall, 1910: 257). 
Despite variations there was also considerable consistency of approach: thoroughly comparative, 
avowedly anthropocentric and devoid of sentimentality. We also reach a conclusion as to the role of 
intelligence very similar to that outlined by James. We can see here elements of the SSSM in the 
assertion that there "are hardly any well marked instincts", but there is too what we can only call an 
adaptionist approach. 
If for Theodosius Dobzhansky nothing in biology made sense except in the light of evolution, for 
many social psychologists at the tum and in the first quarter of the twentieth century, nothing about 
behaviour made sense except in the light of the relation between instinct and intelligence. The 
reception that Carr's view received shows that instinct theorists were not interested in separating out 
the origin or the practical exhibition of the two concepts. This was taken as being antithetical to 
Darwinism and evolution. But, in retrospect, it appears that the failure of instinct theorist to do more 
than allude to and gesture toward the origin and nature of adaptable instincts and behavioural 
flexibility opened the way for the widespread consideration of determinants other than instincts on 
behaviour. The remarkable fact of flexibility - a phenomenon "so wonderful that [its] development 
will probably appear to the reader a difficulty sufficient to overthrow my whole theory" (Darwin, 
1859: 191) - led to the neglect of the determinants of behaviour outside of its varieties within the 
lifetime of given organisms. 
9.3 The uncertain futures problem 
With the debate over the problem of flexibility and the nature of intelligence in mind, let us now 
consider what Plotkin calls the "uncertain futures problem" (Plotkin, 1995). 
Plotkin sets up his discussion with a definition of evolution as the response and solution to 
uncertainties in the ecological niche of organisms. In short, evolution is driven by change and 
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uncertainty in environments for perfect stasis demands no change in viable organisms. Here is how 
he defines the uncertain futures problem: 
The uncertain futures problem concerns an organism going through life, equipped only with 
instructions given at conception (and hence perhaps only correct at that time) on how to survive, and 
having to interact with a world that may be different from that in which its life began (Plotkin, 1995: 
144). 
Plotkin argues that there are several forms of uncertainty. The first and most prevalent form- indeed 
inevitable should anything else in the environment of a given species be evolving even if by random 
drift alone - is essentially historical in nature. This is natural selection in its widest and most 
inevitable form - the "great digital river out of Eden" (Dawkins, 1995). 
The fossil record is a demonstration of the uncertain futures problem. It tells us that the great 
majority of species that ever lived are now extinct- including all but one species of hominid- and 
that genes, the organisms and species that they build, do not cope well with the uncertain future that 
is natural selection. Constrained by the possible rates of evolution, genes are frequently over run by 
uncertainty. 
Extinction is always caused by an inability to cope with the uncertain futures problem, and given the 
estimates that well in excess of 98 per cent of all species that have ever existed are now extinct, it is 
clear that, in the end, all life succumbs to its uncertain future (Plotkin 1995: 144-5). 
A second form of uncertainty is local and specific to species, populations and, ultimately, down to 
individual phenotypes. This uncertainty takes the form of specific new or novel problems within the 
lifetime of a given organism. Any deviation from the norm that a given organism is adapted to 
encounter amounts to such uncertainty. Uncertain futures within the lifetime of an organism leave 
genes exposed to what Lorenz (1966) called "generational deadtime". This phrase refers to the 
exposure of genes between replications. Plotkin discusses generational deadtime in term of the 
interlude between dips into the gene pool that comprises a species. Any given gene is locked into a 
given genotype and at the mercy of the subsequent phenotype until (indeed if) it recombines courtesy 
of the reproductive success of the organism. Generational dead time at one extreme of the r- K 
continuum can be minutes, at the other it is years. In highly K-selected modem humans generational 
deadtime exceeds a decade. 
But certain characteristics of animals suggest that genes have learned that the future is uncertain 
and have responded. Plotkin points out two ways in which genes have come to cope with 
generational deadtime and the subsequent exposure to uncertainty. We can call one type physical 
uncertainty, the other chemical uncertainty. 
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Just as Buss ( 1995) has suggested, although not by using the terminology, a physiCally uncertain 
future and its solution is the human capacity to develop protection of exposed skin surfaces with 
calluses. Genes reach into generational deadtime of modern humans via the capacity of phenotypes 
to develop such features should they be required. Perhaps more sophisticated is the solution to 
chemically uncertain futures represented by the immune system. Seen as biochemical systems, 
humans inhabit a sea of biochemical systems that replicate at their expense. Humans cope via their 
immune system. The immune system is another way in which genes defend against their exposure to 
the uncertainties of the world between replications. Both ofthese solutions to uncertainty are called a 
"tracking option" by Plotkin. By tracking option Plotkin means that genes build a capacity for 
change or alteration within individual phenotypes. 
A third, and, for our purposes, more interesting sort of tracking option that responds to and solves 
uncertain futures problems is psychological. Plotkin is of the view that what we typically and 
commonly call intelligence and rationality is an adaptation to solve for uncertainty during 
generational deadtime. As a tracking option, intelligence allows organisms to adjust their behaviour 
according to "wobbles" in the world. As an adaptation intelligence is for nothing in particular other 
than serving inclusive fitness. Before its actual exhibition one cannot say what it is intelligence will 
do, or how it will adjust unless one is able to specify exactly what uncertainty will be faced during 
generational deadtime. 
To develop this discussion and conclude this dissertation we can now return again to the idea that 
what it is that is truly distinctive about humans is their sociality. 
9.4 Social life is not discrete 
In chapter 6, section 4, 'The physical and the social EEA', we looked at some of the arguments and 
evidence put forward to support the claim that sociality flavours the depiction of humans as "another 
unique species". The core of the position rests on a conundrum common to all social species. The 
conundrum is this: social animals must cope with the hawkish individuals or Machiavellian 
Intelligence of individuals around them. They must do so using a brain of comparable sophistication 
to that possessed by conspecifics. It would appear to be the parity of sophistication that renders 
stability in the population. This stability can become profound. Thus, we see stasis in brain volumes 
in very many species over time (and very probably in complexity of organisation also). 
However, this is decidedly not the case in the lineage Homo. As we have discussed, our relatively 
swift transition from pan troglodyte to Homo sapien sapien is flavoured by instability. Our lineage 
would appear to have been embroiled in an evolutionary arms race. What makes it so acute and 
- 170-
dramatic is that the "weaponry" has been, so far as we know, the most sophisticated pieces of 
Darwinian engineering on earth at each stage in the race (Buss, 1997). The sociality argument for 
encephalisation says that key adaptive problems have been set by one another, by social life. On this 
account, then, the EEA- the environment(s) whose flux amounted to the suite of adaptive problems 
that issued Homo sapien sapien -was a social psychological phenomenon. Buss concurs: 
Humans are probably unique in the duration and complexity of the social relationships they form. 
Humans sometimes form lifelong mating relationships, develop relationships that last for decades, 
and maintain contact with their brothers, sisters and other relatives over great expanses of time and 
distance. Because social adaptive problems were so crucial for human survival and reproduction, 
many of the most important features of our evolved psychological mechanisms will necessarily be 
social in nature. Social adaptive problems have been so important over evolutionary history that 
many of the dedicated psychological mechanisms currently studied by cognitive, personality, and 
developmental psychologists, in addition to those studied by social psychologists, are inherently 
social. (Buss, 1995: 9). 
What Plotkin adds to this analysis is the claim that sociality presents a particular form of 
uncertainty. What I want to do is look at the implications of saying that what it is that is distinctive 
about human minds - what is left over, if you will, once what can be said from a comparative stance 
has been exhausted - is best considered as a response to socially uncertain futures and the ability of 
humans to deal with them. 
First, Tooby and Cosmides insist that we talk about psychological adaptations as mechanisms. 
They give no examples ofthese mechanisms other than as counterfactual devices or algorithms: That 
is, devices that manipulate statements via counterfactual propositions. For example; 
and, 
If your rival is larger than you then don't attack, 
Jfretinal displays of naked nubile females then move toward source (Tooby & Cosmides, 
1990b: 405-6). 
In chapter 6, section 5, 'The EEA and ARE', I argued that Tooby and Cosmides readily confuse 
ultimate and proximate causes. They confuse and conflate the principles that we take to comprise 
evolutionary forces with the actual species-specific adaptations that solve for selection pressures. For 
example, the imperative "have sex"- an imperative that applies to any and all sexual reproducers -
tells us nothing more than that humans will seek to have sex. It tells us nothing about the actual 
psychology of sex and mating other than that we should expect the imperative to be instantiated in 
minds and exhibited in behaviour. Here I want to draw attention to the clauses (propositions) that 
plug into counterfactual propositions. Tooby and Cosmides call these "ancestral cues" (ibid: 406). 
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Recall that ancestral cues are the statistical composites of past environments that provide the 
antecedent clauses for adaptive ( counterfactual) mechanisms: ancestral cues provide the content after 
the operator "if' (ibid). Being composites these cues are particular in that they are about sorts or 
classes of problem or stimuli. But, being composites, ancestral cues are not definite or tightly tied to 
particular instances of stimuli. 
Although, in Tooby and Cosmides' hands, evolutionary psychology is all about adaptations, what 
is clear is that the notion of ancestral cues actually relegates mechanisms in favour of meanings (and 
the ability to generate or derive them), and it places the source of meanings "out there" in the world. 
If the meanings - the antecedent clauses in counterfactual mechanisms - are about social problems 
then the cues we are looking for are also social. I am of the view that an emphasis on cues, or 
"fitness tokens" (Daly & Wilson, 1988) is right despite its formidable difficulties. (Philosophical and 
psychological literature is littered with theories and unsettled discussions of the nature of 
isomorphism, prototypes, affordances, and the necessary and sufficient conditions required to 
classify instances of kinds into classes of kinds.) Despite the repeated emphasis on adaptations, if we 
want to do evolutionary social psychology according to the cannons ofTooby and Cosmides, the 
pursuit of adaptations in the first instance won't help because external cues - the trigger for decisions 
and the driving stimuli behind behaviour- are not adaptations. 
Secondly, as we have seen, encephalisation suggests that as social "place" or phenomena, the EEA 
was uncertain. Encephalisation seen as a response to an increase in the complexities of social living, 
defines it as such. This is because in a psychological arms race the source of the key adaptive 
problems- other brains- is as sophisticated as the means of the tool used to generate solutions. A 
mind engaged in the social EEA that was, as a mechanism, adapted to some concrete characterisation 
of social living would be vulnerable to socially uncertain futures. A mind that was attuned to various 
non-species-specific social problems - sexually dimorphic mating, male kin bonded groups, mating 
mechanisms, iterated reciprocal altruism - but capable of negotiating the potentially endless forms 
that they can take is a different prospect. Viewed this way the adapted social mind is characterised 
by its ability to adapt. I am of the view that we can only make sense of brain growth and the 
development of cognitive sophistication in the lineage Homo by presupposing indeterminacy of both 
problem and psychological process. On the adaptionist account of the EEA the capacity of humans to 
negotiate social uncertainty entails that the EEA and its selection pressures were themselves 
uncertain. The sociality that was the selection pressure behind human brain growth was variable. 
Although a "fact", these selection pressures cannot be specified precisely. If we say that our brains 
are there to "solve" sociality within generational deadtime we must accept that the problems were 
and are undetermined and fluid. What our brains tell us about the past is that it was socially rich. 
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Accordingly, searching for variation from an idealised hunter-gatherer-like arrangement is not going 
to be profitable. The ability to negotiate others and the attendant uncertainty is what we mean when 
we talk of humans being adaptive as opposed to adapted. From the point of view of social 
psychology, humans are adapted to adapt to others. 
Finally, one may insist that the ability to solve for social uncertainty is itself an adaptation. On 
Tooby and Cosmides' account this leaves us with the obligation to specify in what way this 
adaptation is economic, efficient, reliable, precise and functional. Although we may be able to point 
to behaviours and say, yes, that was or is economic, efficient, reliable, precise and functional (and we 
may be able to help ourselves in doing this by invoking the non-optimal nature of adaptations thus 
permitting perfonnances or output that is mostly or quasi- economic, efficient, reliable, precise and 
functional) we can only ever do so after the fact. We cannot say in advance what such an adaptation 
is for because it isn't for anything in particular. We can go no further than saying that the adaptation 
is for sociality (and all the uncertainty that that entails) and that it serves inclusive fitness. 
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Concluding remarks 
The dissertation began with an introduction to John Tooby and Leda Cosmides' project for 
evolutionary psychology as it is presented in their influential essay The Psychological Foundations 
of Culture. Other than to introduce the adapted mind view that underpins what we can call 
mainstream evolutionary psychology, the aim of chapter 1 was to show what is and what is not new 
in evolutionary psychology as presented by Tooby and Cosmides. I argue that the central place 
given to John Bowlby's notion ofthe Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness and the history of 
social science called the Standard Social Science Model mark evolutionary psychology out from its 
immediate predecessor, sociobiology. By isolating the EEA and the SSSM I simultaneously sought 
grounds to justify the title of the dissertation and the concentrated analysis the history of social 
psychology and natural history receive in Parts I and II. 
Chapter 2 is purely expository, but the quality and fairness of the exposition is critical. I try to 
capture in two propositions Tooby and Cosmides' thesis of the Standard Model paradigm. I call 
these propositions the 'culture as cause commitment' and the 'tabula rasa commitment'. Chapter 3 
rests upon the adequacy of my exposition. The obvious danger is that I refute a straw man of my own 
making- I knock down an argument that nobody has made. Of course, I do not think that this is the 
case. The extensive quotations from The Psychological Foundations of Culture show this. 
Those who are alive to the history of social psychology may not have needed to read chapters 3 
and 4 to find that the Standard Model thesis is not reliable as a history of ideas. Still, one of the aims 
of chapter 3, and the whole thrust of chapter 4, was to go a little further than showing up the 
inadequacies ofTooby and Cosmides' history. The object is to show that Darwinism has not just 
been of issue in social psychology, it has, in the past, been a dogma. 
My strategy in chapter 3 was to map the two propositions that comprise the Standard Model thesis 
onto the long-standing division between sociological and psychological forms of social psychology. 
The adequacy of that mapping is key to the success of the chapter. As a starting point, I accept the 
possibility that the tradition of sociological social psychology might show the culture as cause 
commitment to be applicable to social psychology in general. And I accept the possibility that the 
psychological form of social psychology might show that the tabula rasa commitment has 
dominated social psychology. The weight of historical opinion and the evidence suggests that the 
dominance of a psychological over a sociological emphasis in social psychology enforces the 
conclusion that social psychology cannot be said to be well characterised by the culture as cause 
commitment. I went on to argue the other possibility, that psychological social psychology has been 
governed by the tabula rasa commitment, is not a view that withstands scrutiny because social 
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psychology has never been dominated by behaviourism (indeed, nothing has been as dominated by 
behaviourism as the Standard Model thesis implies). Tooby and Cosmides' thesis does appear to 
hold, however, for the tradition in psychological social psychology we now call social cognition. The 
cognitive turn in social psychology in the 1950's did import the general-purpose machine view along 
with the computational metaphor. The general conclusion of chapter 3 was that a qualified version of 
the Standard Model thesis holds for social psychology since the nineteen sixties. 
If chapter 3 is about cleavages -both in the form of my stark reduction ofTooby and Cosmides' 
thesis of the SSSM to two propositions and my ready acceptance of the division of social psychology 
into SSP and PSP - I may be accused of ignoring another that is common in histories of social 
psychology. I have in mind the distinction between American and European forms of social 
psychology. While it is true that I have not made an issue of this distinction, I do not think that it 
would rescue the larger part ofTooby and Cosmides' argument. Recent commentaries (e.g. Farr, 
1996; Manicas, 1987) suggest that, as a whole, American social psychology has expunged the social 
and individuated the discipline. Developments in Europe have sought to redress the balance. The key 
points are that social psychology as an enterprise is much larger in America than it is in Europe and 
that American social psychologists have also been resistant to the tabula rasa view. 
The role of chapter 3 in my overall argument is to weaken confidence in the Standard Model thesis 
and in doing so begin the process of weakening confidence in the scholarship ofTooby and 
Cosmides' essay. Chapter 4 takes the first of those goals to its conclusion and develops the second. 
The long and intense effort to establish instinct as a basic unit of analysis and explanation in the 
psychological and behavioural sciences shows that the SSSM did not dominate the century of social 
psychological theorising that preceded The Psychological Foundations of Culture. However, Tooby 
and Cosmides are not entirely consistent in their claims for the duration of the Standard Model. 
Accidentally, or by design, they also suggest that it took hold at just about the time the instinct 
debate abated. Should we accept the more modest time-scale, my claim that the instinct debate 
refutes the Standard Model thesis loses force. What is not lost is the remarkable neglect of the 
instinct debate shown by Tooby and Cosmides in their history of social science. I argue that the 
integrity ofTooby and Cosmides' work is damaged by their seeming ignorance of the many others 
who would not have objected to being labelled "evolutionary psychologists". Additionally, and this 
is a theme that I develop in Part III, by taking no backward glance at their predecessors, Tooby and 
Cosmides' flawed account of intellectual history mitigates against the learning of lessons from the 
failure of instincts to win a central place in contemporary social psychology. 
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Having accused Tooby and Cosmides of an omission I must highlight one of my own. Appendix 2 
shows that no one was more cited and referred to in social psychology through the twentieth century 
than Sigmund Freud, yet I do not discuss his definition(s) or account of instincts. I omit Freud for 
two reasons. One, there is nothing in Freud that would rescue Tooby and Cosmides' thesis- he 
consistently argued in favour of instincts and was an unashamed biological materialist. And two, 
whilst my argument that the instinct debate refutes the SSSM would be further strengthened, I do not 
think that the conclusion needs the additional support a consideration of Freud would give. 
The analysis that constitutes Part I may be regarded as largely irrelevant to the enterprise that 
Tooby and Cosmides promote as opposed to that which they reject. Whilst I recommend that the 
Standard Model thesis be abandoned by evolutionary psychology because its promulgation does not 
aid or add to the prospects of a wider adoption of a Darwinian view in social psychology, the future 
of evolutionary psychology will not be determined by the Standard Model thesis. It is in Part II ofthe 
dissertation that I turn to the positive project that Tooby and Cosmides present. Particularly, I turn to 
an analysis of the EEA, the concept that Tooby and Cosmides place at the heart of evolutionary 
psychology. 
Like chapter 2, chapter 5 is largely expository. I show that, in practice, the EEA refers to the set of 
conditions responsible for modern humans. We saw that the role of the EEA is to furnish us with a 
specifically human psychology. And it was pointed out how Tooby and Cosmides use the EEA to 
mark a distinction between the adapted mind approach, i.e. evolutionary psychology, and the 
adaptive mind approach, i.e. Darwinian social science. In chapter 5 we looked at the concept of the 
EEA in use, and unearthed some of its assumptions about the natural history of the human lineage. 
Having elucidated the justification for and conceptual role of the EEA, chapter 6 turns to a fuller 
explication and consideration than has hitherto been offered of the actual evidence and facts of our 
natural history. I presented the (more or less) conventional view ofpalaeo~nthropology. This view 
suggests that evolutionary psychology is radically wrong in assuming that modern hunter-gatherers 
give us a window into the Pleistocene. Homos prior to Homo sapien sapien were not hunter-
gatherers in the same sense as are modern humans. Furthermore, several hominid species were in 
existence in the Pleistocene and it is not known which of them evolved into Homo sapien sapien. 
These considerations mitigate against the assumption that the Pleistocene was a seamless continuity 
that issued modern humans. 
The latter part of chapter 6 sounds a rather pessimistic note. Based on the orthodox belief that 
modern humans are a product of social selection pressures, I argue that what we would need to know 
about the EEA to construct an evolutionary social psychology is probably not knowable. But if this 
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position is pessimistic it too is common. The recovery of the social-behavioural ecology of our 
predecessors is not a tractable exercise when one considers the kind of detail required to flesh-out the 
information processing mechanisms at the centre ofTooby and Cosmides' enterprise. One way in 
which the dearth of detail expresses itself is in what I called a "slippage" between ultimate and 
proximate causes; i.e., the tendency to take as natural history the constituent propositions of 
evolutionary theory. Aside pointing out some of the accepted facts of our natural history and how 
Tooby and Cosmides appear to underestimate the difficulty of ascertaining the further facts their 
program demands, I also point out how evolutionary psychology tends to disobey the dictum of 
conceptual integration by overlooking the fossil record. 
The strength of chapter 6 is the emphasis placed on the material evidence taken to demonstrate 
that modern humans have evolved. The emphasis the EEA concept places on natural history begs the 
sort ofanalysis ofthe evidence I provide. The fossil and archa~ological records do not support the 
rather static and simple picture that evolutionary psychologists use as an adaptation generator. 
However, the weakness of chapter 6 also comes from my emphasis on the evidence. For example, I 
rely, perhaps too heavily, on the absence of evidence to make the point that pre-modern forms 
differed substantially from Homo sapien sapien. And I presuppose that evidence to come; i.e. the 
actual lives of millions of humans, will show modern forms to be more markedly different from their 
predecessors than even now seems to be the case. 
Whilst I do not pretend to be a palaeontologist, my treatment of the palaeontological literature must 
be trusted if chapter 6 is to work as a criticism of evolutionary psychology. There is an important 
aspect of that literature so far as evolutionary psychology is concerned that I do not address. 
Although, by making an issue of speciation within the hominid lineage prior to Homo sapien sapien, 
I am a "splitter", I also adopt an orthodox "Out of Africa" view of the lineage after Homo sapien 
sapien appears. Tooby and Cosmides' do not present their case for universal adaptations in these 
terms but, in practice, they too assume a common ancestor for modern humans. Alongside Tooby 
and Cosmides, I assume that modern humans are of a common stock that originated and radiated out 
of Africa and subsequently developed superficial morphological characteristics in situ that are of no 
matter to social psychology. The alternative to this view is the so-called "multi-regional hypothesis". 
The multi-regional view argues that populations of a Homo prior to Homo sapien sapien left Africa 
and evolved into modern humans independently. Should it be true, the importance of the multi-
regional account for evolutionary social psychology is potentially profound. It weakens the 
likelihood that current races of humans are psychologically identical. It weakens Tooby and 
Cosmides' idea that human nature is everywhere the same. I do not pursue this line of inquiry 
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because different strands of evidence converge to support the Out of Africa hypothesis at the cost of 
the rival account. As a social psychologist I have sought at each turn to keep to an orthodox path 
through the palaeontological literature. 
Chapter 7 moves the analysis of the EEA on and looks at its conceptual coherence. There are two 
basic ways of viewing the EEA as an explanation of the present. The first of these is the idea that the 
past and the present differ in no important respect so far as Tooby and Cosmides' enterprise is 
concerned. The second is the contrary view that the past and present do differ in some respect that 
impinges upon our explanations of the present. I take issue with both views. If the past just is the 
present then the dictum "the past explains the present" is equivalent to the 'past explains the past' 
and 'the present explains the present'. The difficulty with either approach is that they are more akin 
to the quasi-historical stances that constitute the so-called Standard Model so despised by Tooby and 
Cosmides. On the other hand, the idea that the past and present are distinct leads us to conclude that 
many of the routine performances of modern humans cannot be said to depend on adaptations and 
cannot, therefore, be explained in adaptationist terms. An insistence on couching, say, driving or 
reading in adaptationist terms reveals as much, perhaps, about the explainer as it does the 
phenomena. 
In my concluding comments on the status of the Standard Model thesis I borrowed Daniel 
Dennett's term and called the SSSM a "luscious slogan". My overall treatment of the EEA in chapter 
6 invites a reuse of the term. A strength of chapter 7 is the further analysis of some of the concepts 
which the EEA encourages or gives rise to. The idea of a domain mismatch is, in my view, true, but 
I ask if it is useful. Similarly, the demand that an engineering viewpoint is taken toward adaptations 
seems essential, but I ask if it is plausible. By looking at the EEA as a device an~ not just as natural 
history its utility is brought into doubt. 
The main problem with chapter 7 is that it is obtuse. Whereas chapter 6 takes virtue from evidence 
and examples, chapter 7 eschews them. For example, in the discussion of how we might re-ascribe 
adaptations, exaptations, spandrels and by-products I offer no illustrative cases or instances. This 
makes the chapter more difficult to read. My defence is this: examples would clutter the argument 
and would mislead. Clutter would come in the form of the inevitably analogous nature of any 
examples, and the presentation of analogies would mislead because they would suggest that we know 
that changes of ascription in the uses of mind are, somehow, just like changes in the use of anatomy. 
I take the view that illustrations and examples would engender a sense that we know answers to the 
very questions that arise from invocations of a domain mismatch between the EEA and the present. 
As Stephen Jay Gould had repeatedly pointed out, apparent discontinuities in natural history suggests 
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to us the need for the concept of exaptation. The features of the hominid line that have undergone 
changes of function is a central issue and not a starting point. 
In Part III I look to redress an imbalance that may have arisen from the content and tone of Parts I 
and II. My issue in the dissertation is not with Darwin but with the Darwinism ofTooby and 
Cosmides and the evolutionary psychology they have successfully promulgated. Precisely, I criticise 
their claim that social psychology has had no room for Darwin and the key notion that they add to 
contemporary evolutionary theory, that the past explains the present. Part III looks again at both 
points. 
In the early parts of chapter 8 I try to show how, luscious slogans and developments in 
evolutionary theory aside, old notions concerning the explanatory power of psychological instincts 
and new ones concerning the power of psychological adaptations are similar. In the middle sections 
of the chapter I show how and why the descent ofthe concept of psychological instinct into 
confusion occurred despite Darwin's confidence that instincts presented no particular problem for a 
naturalistic account of human psychology. Proponents of psychological instincts could not meet the 
demand that such entities must sustain a tie with physiology. Without this constraint the concept of a 
psychological instinct was used too freely for the tastes of psychologists anxious to be called 
scientists. Critics rendered the apparently fecund notion of psychological instinct vacuous and forced 
an abandonment in the nineteen thirties. Alongside the overarching aims ofMcDougall's social 
psychology, Tooby and Cosmides have resurrected the idea of discrete, universal, non-material 
psychological entities. I argue that the price of such entities remains the same: idealisations that 
cannot be constrained. 
Based as it is on the claim that instincts and adaptations are comparable concepts, chapter 8 might 
be criticised for not pursuing the comparison more fully, for not extending to other authors the 
match-up I present between McDougall and Tooby and Cosmides. In part, the second section of 
chapter 9, 'Adaptiveness- "the unexplained remainder"' is a reply to such a criticism. There my aim 
is to continue the comparison of instinct and adaptation by inviting the reader to further consider 
mutual difficulties the two concepts face. I show how the contemporary dispute between those of the 
adapted mind persuasion and those of the adaptive mind persuasion echoes the past attempt to 
accommodate instinct and intelligence and I give some idea as to how tortured the attempt became. 
It appeared to instinct theorists that there was an inverse relation between functionally appropriate 
behaviours that could said to have been unlearned and those acquired or modified by experience. An 
emphasis on mechanistic instincts served to highlight non-mechanistic patterns of activity that 
mapped onto contingent needs. On the other hand, an emphasis on adaptability served to marginalise 
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the explanatory power and scope of unlearned instinct. I suggest that the conundrum is mirrored in 
the tension between evolutionary psychologists and Darwinian social scientists. 
The final two sections of the dissertation look to find a way through these positions for social 
psychology. The cornerstone ofthe argument is an appreciation of novelty that I think Tooby and 
Cosmides and evolutionary psychology lacks. I take seriously Darwin's argument that natural 
selection generates real novelty. In phylogenetic terms we call this process speciation and the 
product species. Modern humans are novel. This is trivially true by virtue of them being a species. 
But what it is that is novel about them is not a trivial truth of taxonomy. Our novelty as mammals, as 
primates, and, most saliently for evolutionary psychology, as hominids, is our ability to thrive in the 
face of novel problems. Most importantly, the novel problems are other people. Whilst I think that 
labelling the novel features of mind which distinguishes us from other species an adaptation is 
problematic, I argue that we can retain the notion of an evolved adaptation in social psychology. 
However, the cost of doing so is an acceptance that this adaptation is for social living and has no 
rigidly fixed function. 
Of course, the obvious problem for an evolutionary social psychology resting on the claim that the 
key human adaptation is for nothing in particular is that the claim is an oxymoron: adaptations are, 
by definition, for something very particular. My argument has been that both the history of the 
concept of instinct/adaptation and the natural history of encephalisation tells us that that formulation 
is not useful. 
A peculiar outcome of my examination of the Standard Model thesis is the attention it draws to the 
fact that two (or even three) generations of social psychologists have already tried to incorporate 
psychological adaptations into the discipline. Tooby and Cosmides take us back to a dormant debate 
but they do not resuscitate it. The prominent role of the EEA concept is new. However, the inquiry 
into our natural history it invites suggests that the aspect of mind of most interest to social 
psychology is not a mechanism in Tooby and Cosmides' sense of the term. It does not get switched 
on by stimuli x, it does not get switched off by stimuli y, it does not have predetermined decision 
rules or algorithms. This is not to say that some adaptations are not for something very particular. It 
is to say that not all adaptations - not all naturally selected and heritable features of a species - are 
equally particular. 
Whether this analysis matters or not depends on what it is one is interested in. The sort of 
adaptation that accommodates social uncertainty may not be of interest to, say, the vision researcher 
who uses evolutionary theory and natural history to construct a psychological model of how we 
accomplish movement through undulating terrain. Similarly, on my account, social uncertainty does 
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not encompass the sort of stimuli that provoke invariant reflex-like responses. However, for those 
who are interested in the social thought and behaviour of extant humans, the past does not explain 
enough of the present to warrant the place imagined for it by evolutionary psychologists. 
I said in the general introduction that, before beginning this dissertation, I wanted to do some 
evolutionary social psychology. I wanted to test hypotheses derived from evolutionary theory. In the 
event I have spent my time reading and thinking about evidence and arguments for and against the 
very prospect of an evolutionary social psychology. I want to close with some comments that 
indicate why I, like so many others, ended up writing about rather than adding empirical results to 
evolutionary science. 
The following is a statement about material objects: all human beings are products of evolution. 
This is not a controversial statement in the psychological and behavioural sciences. The following is 
a statement about behaviour: the behaviour of all humans is precedented in evolution. The following 
is a statement about thought: the thought of all humans is precedented in evolution. These are 
controversial statements in the psychological and behavioural sciences. The first statement is not 
controversial because psychologists and behavioural scientists have been persuaded by the argument 
and the evidence. The other two statements are controversial because psychologists and behavioural 
scientists have not yet been persuaded by the arguments or presented with sufficient evidence. The 
old literature on instincts and the new literature on adaptations points to an underlying frustration in 
Darwinian thought in the social sciences. The frustration is with those who accept the claim that all 
human beings, as material objects, are products of evolution but do not, at the same time, accept the 
claim entails that all human thought and behaviour is explicable in terms of natural history. 
To date, the frustration has not been productive. In the psychological and social disciplines the 
power of evolutionary theory seems to create distortions in our thinking and rhetoric in our writing. 
Luther Bernard's Instinct: a study in Social Psychology reads like a farce- the story of a concept 
gone mad - but it is no such thing. What it is is an account of the immodest application of a good 
idea. In a similar vein, Philip Kitcher's discussion of the immodesty of sociobiology is ideally titled 
Vaulting Ambition. Today, the apparent result that sociality is responsible for the brains that so 
clearly mark modern humans out even with our own genus, makes evolutionary social psychology 
particularly vulnerable to overheating. If an evolutionary approach to psychology, behaviour and 
society is to have anything like the sort of future imagined by thinkers such as William McDougall, 
Edward Wilson, John Tooby and Leda Cosmides we must be more circumspect. With an eye toward 
the false starts of the past, in looking to avoid the pitfalls of our own ambition we can help ourselves: 
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we must always stop and ask what it is that the terms such as "evolution" or "Darwinism" adds to 
our accounts of social thought and behaviour. 
For example, let us suppose that David Buss is correct and we say that males and females are 
equipped with two sorts of mating strategy (Buss, 1989a, 1990, 1992a, 1994). As a matter of fact, 
and as are all other empirical findings in the psychology of human beings, this finding is derived 
from extant populations. In what way is the finding altered, what else do we know, if we say that the 
finding is evolutionary? Does it always follow that we know something over and above, something 
extra or more if we attach tags such as "evolution" or "Darwinian" to results? The danger is that 
such tags are used to legitimise or add weight to otherwise ordinary, day-to-day, research. 
Generating hypotheses coloured by an overt allegiance to evolutionary theory does not guarantee 
their quality. The truth value of evolutionary theory does not transfer to appended propositions. The 
brand name of Darwin will not rescue questionable methods or results. Such practices lead to 




The influence of The Psyclzological Foundations of Culture 
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citation search, 24/05/0 1 ). 
The three papers that precede and presage The Psychological Foundations of Culture are; 
Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. 1989a. Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture: Part, 
Theoretical Considerations. Ethology and Sociobiology, 10, 29-49 
Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. 1990a. On the universality and the uniqueness ofthe individual: The role 
of genetics and adaptation. Journal of Personality, 58, 17-67 
Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L. 1990b. The past explains the present: Emotional adaptations and the 
structure of ancestral environments. Ethology and Sociobiology, 16, 375-424 
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Appendix 2 
Influential authors in social psychology 1908-1989. 
The following details and tables have been extracted from work by Collier, Minton and Reynolds 
( 1991 ). Collier eta/ compiled a list of theorists and researches most frequently cited in social 
psychology texts books between 1908, the date of publication oftwo of the earliest and most 
influential textbooks on social psychology, and 1989. Frequency of citations are ranked in time 
slices, these being, 1908-29, 1930-42, 1948-53, 1959-69, 1970-79, and 1980-89. Each period is 
headed by the most frequently cited theorist according to the disciplinary orientation of the author(s): 
sociology or psychology. For example, in the period 1908-1929 William McDougaJI was the most 
frequently cited by psychologists writing social psychological texts, and Edward Ross was most 
frequently cited by sociologists writing social psychological texts. 
Table One 
Period Sociological authors Psychological authors 
1908-29 E.Ross W. McDougall 
1930-42 F. Allport F. Allport 
1948-53 G.Murphy G. Allport 
1959-69 S. Freud T. Newcomb 
1970-79 G. Mead L. Festinger 
1980-89 E. GotTman L. Festinger 
Additionally, Collier, Minton and Reynolds point out that some theorists appear in the top ten 
citations list of both sociologically inclined and psychologically inclined authors. These are 










McDougall, F.Allport, Tarde 
McDougall, F.Allport 
Murphy, Newcomb, Freud, Sherif 




And the final list derived here is that of those authors who are cited in the top ten of both 
sociologically inclined and psychologically inclined authors in three or more periods. These are as 
presented in table three. 
Table Three 
Theorist Period 
F.Allport 08-29 30-42 48-53 
G. Allport 30-42 48-53 59-69 70-79 
Freud 08-29 30-42 48-53 59-69 70-79 
Mead 30-42 48-53 59-69 70-79 
Sherif 48-53 59-69 70-79 
Newcomb 48-53 59-69 70-79 80-89 
Kelley 59-69 70-79 80-89 
Festinger 59-69 70-79 80-89 
Schachter 59-69 70-79 80-89 
This leaves us with the following list of theorist that, if citations in general social psychology texts 
are any guide, have been important in the discipline. G.Tarde, E.Ross, W.McDougall, F.Allport, 




The development of Darwinian theory in the twentieth century 
It is often said that Darwin retreated from the position he set out in The Origin of Species (e.g. 
Badcock, 1994). The validity of this claim depends on what one takes to be the fundamental core of 
his position. I agree with that his position was essentially Malthusian (Dennett, 1995; Rose, H. 2000) 
and not, as is sometimes supposed, Mendelian. Darwin did retreat on his original anti-Lamarkian 
view on inheritance. Without a mechanism for selection he incorporated a sort of morphological 
learning process that could be transmitted through generations (see Darwin, 1859: 191-195). The 
modern synthesis is the death ofthat idea. It is the death ofLamarkism. But this "concession" did not 
affect his conviction that adaptation (via whatever biological means) was a mathematical necessity. 
This conviction followed from his reading of Mal thus (1798, 1821 ). 
The ideological motivations of Thomas Mal thus are variously depicted. Events showed his 
political economy to be wrong, but his mathematics were sound and simple. Malthus claimed that 
organisms capable of geometric reproduction would, sooner or later, saturate and exhaust available 
resources. At the point of exhaustion, some factor or another would militate against population 
growth rates as had been typical to date. It was the militating (or mitigating) facets that caught the 
attention of Darwin. Darwin saw that the great "crunch" that Malthus envisaged need not be the 
supposed cataclysm. It could also be a feature of day-to-day existence. The existence that both 
Mal thus and Darwin had in mind was that of the individual actor- the organism. The difficulties that 
this view created for Darwin have been extensively discussed (e.g. Sigmund, 1995). It is called the 
problem of altruism (i.e. Brown, 1985). The solution to the problem of altruism has shifted the focus 
concerning the unit of natural selection. 
Darwinism as was 
As is frequently pointed out (Desmond & Moore, 1991; Richards, 1987), the idea of evolution was in 
the air long before 1859. Darwin's own grandfather had been a proponent (Darwin, E. 1799). On the 
production of his theory, and the collected evidence in support of it, the general argument was won 
in the scientific community. The great debate that took place in Oxford in 1860 between T.H. Huxley 
and the Bishop of Oxford indicated the most acute contention. That contention was between the 
world view of which natural selection was of a piece and religion (Rose, 1985). There is some very 
definite sense in which the scientific world was not surprised or inclined to dispute the necessary 
features of what Darwin had to say. 
Still, what Darwin presented was not complete. The rump issue, not fully decided until 1964 and 
not widely understood until 1976, was: What is the unit of selection? The obvious answer (and the 
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one behind the social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer for example) was the individual organism. This 
was certainly Darwin's view and he never abandoned it. Survival, and hence reproduction and 
extension through generations, was a matter of fitness as specified in the individual organism. 
This hard-edged approach, aside its political implications in the dawning age of collectivist 
thinking (Rose, N ., 1985), did not appear to fit the evidence that began to pour out of comparative 
zoology and ethology. Whilst it was accepted that the physical and mental condition of individuals 
within a species carried implication for the ability of that organism to survive, it also carried 
implications for the group in which the individual was nested. 
Following the synthesis ofMendel and Darwin (after the former was rediscovered in 1900) the 
mathematics inherent in the ideas of both men were twined and formalised by Sir Ronald Fisher. 
Fisher's The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection (1930) might be better titled "The Chromosomal 
Theory of Natural Selection". This is because the level of hard detail stops at the chromosomal level. 
At the time, chromosomes were the lowest level of specification and identification of species. This 
work, together with the apparent (one could say obvious without being anthropomorphic) co-
operation amongst members of species as diverse as ants and birds, offered what seemed to be sound 
reasons for believing that individual characteristics pertaining to fitness were pertinent to the survival 
ofthe species as a whole. Thus, group selectionism took hold (Wynn-Edwards, 1964). 
There is little doubt that group selection ism offered a softening of the darker tones in individual 
selection. (One hundred years before, Mill's On Liberty (1859) seemed to have a similar effect on 
the doctrine of utilitarianism in that the will of the individual could have a salutary affect on a wider 
group). On a human level, group selectionism seemed to offer the prospect that the good of the 
species orchestrated some of the most acute human behaviours such as aggression and altruism. 
The strength of appeal that group selectionism offers has not been laid to rest. As recently as 1994 
a target article in Behavioural and Brain Sciences argued that the idea still has relevance (Sober & 
Wilson, 1994). A recurring theme amongst those who responded to that article was that the idea 
brought about a collapse in the constraints the gene selectionist view offered. 
It might also be noted that group selectionism held sway over most ofthe period of the supposed 
SSSM hegemony. This helps us to put Tooby and Cosmides' thesis into perspective. Because Tooby 
and Cosmides are so vociferous in their account of the SSSM as an anti-thesis to evolutionary 
accounts of human mind and social behaviour (as well as a doctrine in its own right), I want to point 
out that there has, in the shape of group selectionism, been plenty for the SSSM to feed upon. In 
claiming that individual human destiny is inherently and biologically bound up and dictated by the 
destiny of the group, Darwinism before Hamilton built the group into the human mind. Right or 
wrong, group selectionism says that the point and purpose of a species being is not decided in the 
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individual but imposed by the wider group. In order to understand and find out what is in the interest 
of the group, highly flexible organisms such as humans referred and deferred to the prevailing notion 
of the group. It is but a short step from group selectionism to the SSSM. And group selectionism 
dominated evolutionary biology close to the centenary of scientific psychology. 
Darwinism as is 
The problem of altruism haunted Darwin (Desmomd & Moore, 1991 ). The fundamental conundrum 
was this: If an organism sacrificed itself or any resource (including time) to the benefit of another 
then that proclivity would, axiomatically, not be passed on to others (and, incidentally, this holds for 
Lamarkian inheritance as well). This is because the bottom line in evolution is differential 
reproductive success. 
The notion that organisms behave according to the good of the whole species had been weakened 
by the time Hamilton published his solution to altruism. This is indicated in the term "group" 
selection rather than species selection. The narrower term reflected evidence from the field. It had 
been noticed that groups, often made up of blood kin, exhibited more ofthe selfless behaviour that 
seemed to contradict Darwin and Mendel. Hamilton accounted for this by following through on 
Fisher's formulation but doing so at the level of the gene. The key notion that Hamilton put forward 
was that any given gene is .selfish but not necessarily unique. A gene could be extant in a number of 
individuals. The chances of this are a function of the degree of relatedness. The formalisation of this 
is as follows: Br>C 
Where B = benefit to the reproductive success of the actor 
Where C = cost to the actor in terms of reproductive success, and , 
Where r = the degree of relatedness between the benefactor and the benfitee. 
So, provided that there is some degree of relatedness, there is always some potential that it will 
benefit the actor to jeopardise its own reproductive success provided the success of the other is 
enhanced. This formula was the beginning of the rigorous application of game-theory mathematics in 
evolutionary theory (Maynard-Smith, 1981; Sigmund, 1993). 
Accounting for kin altruism in this way allowed for both the individual selfishness insisted upon by 
Darwin and pro-social behaviour to evolve and settle into what Maynard-Smith (1982) termed an 
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). The selfish-gene account of altruism achieves this synthesis by 
concentrating on outcomes and multiple iterations. Altruism need not be explicitly intended to be 
what amounts to the case in fact; altruism without a representation of it, if you will. And it can fail 
any number of times but still be selected for when it occurs quite blindly. Altruism works not in spite 
of selfish genes but because of them. 
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